In the acknowledgements (p. xi) of this commented translation of Epictetus’ Encheiridion both authors express their gratitude to their students for “planting the seeds that grew into these pages.” The book is the fruit of many years of teaching Stoicism to students of philosophy, the Encheiridion being an ideal text to serve as a starting point. No knowledge of Greek is assumed. The plan of the book is straightforward: introductions to Ancient Stoicism and Epictetus, translation of the Encheiridion followed by a chapter-by-chapter commentary, then critical responses to Stoicism.
Part One, “An Introduction to Ancient Stoicism,” starts with the provocative but well-defended thesis that Socrates was the first Stoic. The main representatives of the Stoa, the three elements of the Stoic system (logic, physics and ethics), and six core themes are explained, followed by an illuminating discussion of the Stoic paradoxes as treated in Cicero’s Paradoxa Stoicorum. Part Two, “The Encheiridion and Its Context,” gives a brief sketch of Epictetus’ life and philosophy, followed by an overview of the historical influence of the Encheiridion. Here a mention of the three topoi of Epictetus’ philosophy would have been welcome.
A common feature of both the translation and the commentary is that there is hardly any engagement with the vast secondary literature on Epictetus in general and the Encheiridion in particular. As to the translation, the critical edition prepared by the present reviewer (Boter 1999), which is available in the TLG, is mentioned on pp. 53–54 but in the note on the translation (p. 61) the authors announce that their translation is based on the Greek text “of the Perseus Digital Library 4.0,” which is taken from Schenkl 19162, which in its turn reproduces the text by Schweighäuser 1798. As to the commentary, the authors mention Ulrike Brandt’s excellent 2015 commentary on p. 54 but they never refer to this work in their own commentary and do not seem to have appreciated Brandt’s convincing contention that the Encheiridion is not “a second-rate excerpt and mere summary of the Discourses” – witness their remark on p. 51, “Arrian abridged these lengthy Discourses into a short compendium called the Encheiridion.” Keith Seddon’s commented 2005 translation is not mentioned at all. This troubles me. Even if the book is meant for beginners and non-classicists, the translation offered to these readers should be based on an up-to-date edition of the Greek text; similarly, the readers should be made aware that often interpretations of the text exist that differ from the present authors’ interpretation.
In the preface (p. ix) the authors state “that the Encheiridion was written in Koinē Greek, the accessible language of everyday people, not the technical Greek of the philosophers.” This is a false antithesis, the actual counterpart of Koinē being the Attic dialect of the fourth century BCE, employed by authors with literary aspirations, such as Arrian in his historical works. Therefore, the use of Koinē does not justify the use of low register words such as “an honest buck” (24.3), “brown-nosing” and “sucking up” (25.4) and “dimwit” (41.1). Now this might be considered a matter of taste but the authors really go too far when they replace “obol” by “dollar” (25.3), “horse-races” by “NASCAR” (33.2) and “a gilded shoe, then a purple one, then an embroidered one” by “an embroidered pump, then a golden stiletto, then a red-soled Christian Louboutin” (39). This is travesty, not translation.
The commentary’s main goals are explaining the philosophical content of each chapter, its place in Epictetus’ thought in general, the relationship of Stoic views towards competing philosophical schools, and the relevance of Stoic thought for twenty-first century people; in general, these goals are fully reached. Just as Epictetus hammers on the importance of bringing into practice what you learn at school, the authors often point out how students of Stoicism can apply what they learn in their own lives. This explains the frequent mention of contemporary issues, such as our getting angry “when we discover that someone has put a long, ugly scratch into our car door” (p. 82). Another feature of the commentary is that it repeatedly uses the Encheiridion to dwell on an issue that is not tackled explicitly in the text, such as the treatment of propositional logic in the commentary on chapter 36 or the discussion of the characterisation of philosophy as medicine for the soul in the commentary on chapter 38.
The commentary bears the traces of oral teaching in being repetitive on a number of issues (e.g., Stoic ethical intellectualism) and in being rather verbose; I think that the readability of the commentary might have been greater if the authors had killed some of their darlings.
After these general remarks I will now turn to a number of passages where I think that the translation or the commentary or both are open to criticism.
- 1.4: the words πάντως γε μὴν ἐκείνων ἀποτεύξῃ go untranslated while they are crucial in the context: they express the thought that one will certainly not procure freedom and happiness if one strives for externals at the same time.
- 2.2: in the final sentence of this chapter, μόνῳ δὲ τῷ ὁρμᾶν καὶ ἀφορμᾶν χρῶ is translated as “But only choose and refuse.” In the commentary the authors argue at length that this phrase deals with preferable and dispreferable externals. In reality the concepts ὁρμή and ἀφορμή form the second topos of Epictetus’ philosophical system; they deal with καθήκοντα, “duties,” as is explicitly stated in Discourses 3.2.2: ὁ περὶ τὰς ὁρμὰς καὶ ἀφορμὰς καὶ ἁπλῶς ὁ περὶ τὸ καθῆκον (scil. τόπος). See Brandt 2015, 68-70.[1]
- 7: in the translation, the long-winded clause starting the comparison with Καθάπερ is cut into three separate sentences. The outcome is unfelicitous and obscure; the first sentence is an auxiliary clause without a following main clause: “Just as when on a voyage when your ship has anchored, if you go ashore to fetch fresh water, on the way you might collect a shellfish or a vegetable.” As to the contents: like most interpreters the authors follow Simplicius in assuming that the period when the sailor is ashore stands for the whole of human life, but Brandt 2015, 92–93 convincingly argues that the voyage as a whole stands for human life: Καθάπερ ἐν πλῷ is picked up by οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῷ βίῳ, so that “voyage” stands for “life.” This drastically affects the interpretation of this enigmatic chapter.
- 24.1: The phrase εἰ γὰρ ἡ ἀτιμία ἐστὶ κακόν is translated as “Because if lacking prestige is a bad thing, then ….” In a textual note on the passage (p. 294) the authors surmise “that the consequent of this conditional statement has dropped out of the text, so we take this argument to be an enthymeme. The omitted consequent is ‘you can be in a bad way on account of another person.’” It is not clear whether the consequent has dropped out as a result of scribal error or was intentionally left out by Epictetus. If the former, it is not an enthymeme but a textual corruption. If the latter, I don’t see how the reader can be expected to supply the consequent suggested by the authors. For another interpretation of the passage, based on the newly constituted text, see Boter 1999, 124-125.
- 24.3: “And so what do you desire more? Some silver coins or being a trustworthy and modest friend?” For “being” read “having” (which might also be omitted altogether).
- 25.5: “and you didn’t have to endure those knocking at his door.” For “those knocking at his door” read “his doorkeepers.”
- 27: this is another enigmatic text: ῞Ωσπερ σκοπὸς πρὸς τὸ ἀποτυχεῖν οὐ τίθεται, οὕτως οὐδὲ κακοῦ φύσις ἐν κόσμῳ γίνεται. The authors’ translation of the tenor of this comparison is very far removed from the original Greek: “similarly nor does nature let what’s bad occur in the universe.” A faithful rendering is “so there is no nature of evil in the universe either.” The authors’ commentary on the chapter contains a lot of material that is interesting in itself but it does not do justice to the original text. In fact, the translators accommodate the translation to their argument, making it impossible for their Greekless audience to make up their minds on the authentic text for themselves. For an attempt at interpreting the comparison see Boter 1992.
- 28: “But should you turn your own mind over to anyone you happened upon, so that if he abuses you, you’re upset and confused, wouldn’t you be ashamed to do this?” The indicatives ἐπιτρέπεις and αἰσχύνῃ are wrongly translated as potential optatives; they express an actual state of affairs.
- 29.7: τὰ ἐκτός is not only “material possessions” but comprises also immaterial external things such as reputation.
- 31.1: “to accept all events and obey them willingly as if they’re being perfected by the best intellect”: “as if” translates ὡς, but “as if” creates the wrong impression of counterfactualness, while ὡς means “in the conviction that.” The same wrong translation of ὡς occurs in chapter 50, “Whatever tasks are set before you,[2] abide by them as if they were laws.” In the commentary much fuss is made about this “as if,” but the fuss has been created by the translators themselves.
- 36: τὸ τὴν μείζω μερίδα ἐκλέξασθαι is correctly translated as “selecting the larger serving” but in the commentary it is replaced by “eating your fill” (pp. 191–94); this once more leads to a self-created problem that “you can at least sometimes have both” (that is, eating your fill and leaving enough for your fellow-guests). The real point at stake is that your taking a larger portion necessarily implies someone else’s getting a smaller portion.
- 40: in this chapter it is stated that women should not be valued for their sexual attractiveness but for their being modest and self-respecting. The authors suggest that Epictetus, in the wake of his master Musonius Rufus, thinks that women are as capable of becoming philosophers as men. They point to Epictetus fr. 15 (= Stobaeus 3.6.58), in which Epictetus notes “that the educated women of Rome regularly point to Plato’s Republic as evidence that there should be more opportunities for women to pursue philosophy,” as the authors would make us believe. Referring to Musonius fr. 3 (= Stobaeus 2.31.126), they state that “Epictetus’s teacher Musonius Rufus was part of this proto-feminist movement in Rome.” This is wishful thinking, or rather, wishful interpreting. What does fr. 15 in reality say? “In Rome the women have Plato’s Republic in their hands because he says that women should be held in common.” The sequel of the fragment makes clear that these women are not interested in studying philosophy at all but that they invoke Plato’s authority for justifying their sexual licence.
- 53.1: The authors wrongly state that this (iambic) couplet is taken from Cleanthes’ (dactylic) Hymn to Zeus.
The final part of the book is excellent in all respects.[3] Old and new objections against several elements of Stoic philosophy are presented in a clear way, followed by actually given and possible answers to these objections. Again, the authors exhort their audience to internalize the useful elements of Stoic ethics and to put these into practice. Also, students of Stoicism should have an open mind for the difficulties inherent to applying a two-thousand years old philosophy to our contemporary world. As the authors state (p. 269), “living intellectual traditions are not museum pieces.”
In conclusion: this book contains much material of great value for those wishing to get acquainted with Stoicism in general and with Epictetus’ thought in particular. The authors repeatedly state that Stoicism is an aspirational doctrine, in which perfection can hardly be obtained but progress is possible. The same goes for this book: it is not perfect but it has much to offer.
References
Boter, G.J. 1992. Epictetus, Encheiridion 27, Mnemosyne 45, 473-481.
Boter, G.J. 1999. The Encheiridion of Epictetus and its Three Christian Adaptations, Leiden.
Brandt, U. 2015. Kommentar zu Epiktets Encheiridion, Heidelberg.
Schenkl, H. 19162. Epictetus, Dissertationes ab Arriano digestae. Accedunt Fragmenta, Enchiridion ex recensione Schweighaeuseri, Gnomologiorum Epicteteorum reliquiae, Leipzig.
Schweighäuser, J. 1798. Epicteti Manuale et Cebetis Tabula graece et latine, Leipzig.
Seddon, K. 2005. Epictetus’ Handbook and the Tablet of Cebes, London/New York.
Notes
[1] In 1.1 and 48.3 the authors render ὁρμή correctly as ‘impulse’.
[2] My edition has προτίθεσαι instead of προτίθεται: ‘the principles you set before yourself’.
[3] Just one critical remark: the authors state that the concept of the progressor (προκόπτων) was introduced by Epictetus (pp. 248, 265) but it is already frequently found in Seneca.