[Authors and titles are listed at the end of the review.]
This important anthology on Seleukids at War is the second installment in the Seleukid Perspectives series,[1] building further on the research results of the Seleukid Study Days (2011–2019) and the Seleukid Lectures (2021–2022).[2] As the title suggests, the volume focuses on the recruitment, composition, and organization of the Seleucid army. While the volume fits into a broader trend of recent decades, marked by numerous new studies of the Seleucid Empire,[3] the choice of topic is particularly welcome, since the military power and forces of the Seleucid kings are often treated in the shadow of the Classical Greek and Roman armies. It truly deserves a volume of its own.
The volume has fourteen chapters, including an introduction and a conclusion, and is rounded off by useful indexes of names, subjects, and sources. The contributions are divided into four sections addressing different aspects of the Seleucid army: 1) recruitment, 2) composition, 3) organization, and 4) diplomacy and ideology.
The volume opens with an introduction by Benjamin Scolnic and Altay Coşkun that situates the contributions within the wider research context of Seleucid studies. Taking as their point of departure Livy’s account of the Battle of Magnesia and the subsequent peace treaty at Apamea, the authors introduce a set of central questions addressed across the volume: how trustworthy are Roman descriptions of the diverse Seleucid empire; who were the soldiers who served in the army; and how was the army mobilized, composed, and structured?
Section 1 tackles questions related to army recruitment and addresses the interesting relationship between settlement, the allocation of land, ethnicity, status, and military service: on what model were soldiers drafted into the army?
One solution was that the obligation to serve was tied to land, providing the Seleucids with elite phalangists well into the second century. John Serrati’s chapter 2 examines the relationship between military settlers acquiring land (so-called katoikoi) and their obligation to perform military service in return. He argues that “the katoikoi were fundamentally different from the klerouchoi in Ptolemaic Egypt” (p. 32), and that they were placed near larger populations, which secured long-term stability for skilled settlers, linking this development to both the success and eventual decline of the kingdom.
Another model was that recruitment was based on the privileged ethnic status of being ‘Macedonian’. Chapter 3 by Nicholas Sekunda uses the ‘Conscription diagramma’ of Philip V to argue that “the requirement to perform military service inherited from generation to generation was not an obligation incurred on the receipt of the klēros; it was an obligation incurred by becoming a Macedonian citizen of a particular polis and at the same time a subject of the Seleukid king” (p. 92). Thus, possessing land lots did not necessarily entail the obligation to perform military service (as in Ptolemaic Egypt), and, according to Sekunda, this system remained in place at least until Antiochus IV, after which Macedonian citizenship was extended to more regions.
A third model depicts the process as more complex, varying by period and including local people, mercenaries, and Macedonians. Paul Johstono, in chapter 4, focuses on recruitment at the regional level and finds that the system changed over time, making it difficult to determine the exact relationship between the local military population and the core infantry of the field armies. As more people later became eligible for drafting, the system grew increasingly complex and inefficient.
Another interesting tension in the section is Sekunda’s argument that ethnic identity could result in (military) privileges from the king, which stands in opposition to the constructivist approaches applied in other chapters (in particular, Serrati and Johnstono, but also chapters 5 and 6 in the next section). In these treatments, it is not taken for granted that the elite forces were ethnically distinct Macedonians, and it is often noted that such high status soon became available to non-Macedonians to expand the pool of manpower (for example, when the offspring of earlier non-Macedonian veterans joined the army for money, prestige, or the acquisition of land).
Section 2 concerns the origin, ethnicity, and identity of the various units in the Seleucid army.
In chapter 5, Altay Coşkun examines the Silvershields (argyraspides) to better understand the origin, nature, and development of this elite troop. Originally an Alexandrian innovation from 327, when Alexander had his old, trusted guards put silver on their shields to honor them, Coşkun argues that when this unit was reintroduced by Antiochus III, they “emerged as the most reliable and efficient phalangists, and their increased unit as the second and better phalanx of the Seleucid army” (p. 132).
Chapter 6 by Pim Mohring and Rolf Strootman examines the Mysians in northwestern Anatolia and argues “against convention, that their identity was for a large part based upon a real background in the mountainous interior of Northwest Anatolia, a region that was beyond direct Attalid control even after Apameia” (p. 158). According to Polybius, they were prohibited from serving in the Seleucid army after the peace, so it is notable that they can still be found. To explain this, the authors apply the concept of ‘strategic essentialism,’ meaning these people were loyal first to their own group but could be recruited by various Hellenistic armies (e.g., Achaemenids, Seleucids, and/or Attalids).
Chapter 7 by Hadrien Bru deals with the Pisidians from southern Anatolia. Bru shows that, besides serving in the Ptolemaic army, “from the 3rd to the 2nd century BC the Pisidians were also enrolled in the Seleucid armies as light infantrymen, notably during the reign of Antiochus III” (p. 195). This underlines that the Pisidians had a long history of participating in foreign armies and maintained strong connections to both dynasties.
Benjamin Scolnic’s chapter 8 examines the enrollment of Jews in foreign armies. While monotheism and strong religiosity have often been seen as obstacles to military service, Scolnic argues that Jews willingly served in Hellenistic armies for prestige and loyalty, even after the Maccabean revolt against Antiochus IV in the 160s. For example, enrollment in the Seleucid army was mutually beneficial, reflecting “tolerance by the kings for the religion of those soldiers in return for their loyalty and service” (p. 216).
The section’s focus on identity among Macedonians, Mysians, Psidians, and Jews shows the diverse foundation on which the Seleucid empire was built. It demonstrates that the Seleucids were able to attract highly mobile specialist units from across the empire. This connects to broader issues of identity formation, understood as something constantly created both through self-ascription and ascription by others. What appears common to all these groups is that they often operated within a fluid, transnational framework and sought to choose their own leaders and agreements that best served their interests and survival.
Section 3 explores the organization and command structure of the Seleucid army.
In Chapter 9, Graham Wrighton examines the Seleucid command structure in comparison with the armies of Alexander and the Romans. Wrighton finds that “Alexander’s phalanx was successful because of its efficient command structure, and that Hellenistic armies were unsuccessful against the Romans because the hierarchy of tactical command was too cumbersome and inefficient” (p. 224). At Magnesia, as Wrighton shows, the Roman army was able to reform and adapt after the initial cavalry surprise attack by Antiochus, underlining that they, perhaps more than the Seleucids, had an effective hierarchical command structure capable of addressing unforeseen challenges.
Silvannen Gerrard, in Chapter 10, focuses on the importance and development of the Seleucid cavalry and argues against the idea that it declined in both quality and quantity throughout the Hellenistic period. Gerrard shows that the infantry-to-cavalry ratio during this time was closer to 5:1 than 10:1, highlighting both the infantry bias in ancient battle narratives and demonstrating that the Seleucids could adjust their forces according to specific tactical aims.
Chapter 11 by Michael Taylor is a thorough treatment of the Battle of Magnesia and its two main sources, Livy and Appian. Like Wrighton, Taylor also finds that Antiochus was surpassed by the flexible Roman command structure and the skills and innovations of Roman officers. He concludes that “the experience, equipment, tactics, and initiative of the legions proved a lethal combination that outmatched even a numerically superior and well-led Seleucid force” (pp. 291–292).
What stands out from this section is the empire’s resilience and the valuable insights it offers into the so-called decline of the Seleucid Empire in the second century. While Magnesia was a fundamental turning point (demographic and military challenges are traceable from this point onwards), the army remained also capable of attracting and mustering skilled soldiers from across the empire well into the second century. The decline, therefore, should perhaps not be attributed to a shortage of resources or able soldiers, but rather to the loss of prestige on the battlefield.
The final section 4 covers diplomacy and ideology.
Yuri Kuzmin’s chapter 12 focuses on Patara in Lycia and some notable blocks used to re-erect the city’s theater in the third–fifth centuries AD. As these blocks bear Seleucid symbolic imagery, such as a shield with the characteristic anchor, this raises the question of when the monument was erected. According to the author, “the monument was erected only after 167 BCE,” which would have “commemorated the recovery of freedom not only from the Seleucids a few decades earlier but also from the Rhodians” (p. 305).
Chapter 13 by Pierre-Luc Brisson discusses how the Mediterranean adapted to new circumstances after Magnesia and Apamea. Brisson interprets these decades within the framework of relations between the Senate and the East, aiming to show that “the Roman Senate was not disengaged from the affairs of the Hellenistic East, as demonstrated by its diplomatic action in the 180s–160s BCE” (p. 308). Roman embassies to the East (e.g., Cn. Octavius in 163 BCE) illustrate how the Romans assessed the wider geopolitical situation and the ways in which the Seleucids remained a force to be reckoned with in the middle of the second century.
Altay Coşkun ends the volume with a short concluding chapter on the importance of the ‘Macedonians’, and the strength of the Seleucid army, which allows him to draw wider conclusions across the sections. Coşkun rightly points out that the significance of this ethnic group goes beyond their contribution to the phalanx as specialized phalangists and equestrians: their loyalty, support, and historical ties to Alexander and Seleucus provided the empire with a fundamental justification. When the Seleucids lost control of the major Macedonian settlements with the fragmentation of Syria in the 140s, it marked a point of no return for the empire.
There are many strengths to the volume. First, it successfully fosters discussion across papers and sections, with numerous shared topics and themes addressed. This results in a variety of (sometimes conflicting) interpretations of the same issues, providing significant benefits to the learned reader. Although central terms and concepts in Polybius, Livy, and Appian are sometimes defined differently, this does not detract from the fact that the volume functions effectively as a coherent whole, with several papers directly engaging with one another. Second, the volume makes excellent use of diverse source material, which is essential for understanding the Seleucid war machinery. This results in several rewarding chapters on understudied regions of the empire, highlighting its multicultural nature and constant adaptation to surrounding political circumstances.
Yet, certain topics are absent, as the editors themselves note in the introduction, subjects that one might reasonably expect in an anthology of this scope. One is naval warfare, including the Seleucids’ conflicts with Ptolemaic Egypt and the Romans for dominance in the Eastern Mediterranean, discussion of which would have offered insights into differences in recruitment, organization, and composition across types of warfare. Another is financial issues related to military expenses, which could shed further light on the empire’s rise and fall. However, as further volumes in the series are already planned, on Jewish responses to Seleucid rule and on Seleucid coinage, this last point will likely be addressed.
Overall, this is a significant contribution to Seleucid scholarship. It succeeds in creating new vantage points for further research on the nature of settlers, military service and recruitment process as well as on the composition and organization of the Seleucid army.
Authors and titles
- Benjamin E. Scolnic and Altay Coşkun: An Introduction to the Seleukids at War: Recruitment, Composition, Organization
Section I: Recruitment
- John Serrati: Soldiers, Settlers, and Citizens: Katoikoi in the Seleukid Empire
- Nicholas V. Sekunda: Macedonian Military Service in the Seleukid Kingdom
- Paul A. Johstono: Generating Infantry for Seleukid Field Armies
Section II: Composition
- Altay Coşkun: Macedonians, Silvershields, and the Phalanx under Antiochos III Megas and Antiochos IV Epiphanes
- Pim Möhring and Rolf Strootman: Mysian Light Infantry in the Seleukid Army
- Hadrien Bru: The Pisidians between Seleukids and Ptolemies
- Benjamin E. Scolnic: From Mosallomos’ Arrow to Makkabaios’ Sword: Jewish Soldiers in the Seleukid Era
Section III: Organization
- Graham Wrightson: Command Hierarchy in the Seleukid Phalanx
- Silvannen R. Gerrard: Seleukid Infantry/Cavalry Ratios: The Numerical Importance of Cavalry
- Michael J. Taylor: ‘A Commander Will Put an End to His Insolence’: The Battle of Magnesia, 190 BCE
Section IV: Warfare and Diplomacy
- Yuri N. Kuzmin: A Shield with the Depiction of a Seleukid Anchor at Patara
- Pierre-Luc Brisson: Of Ships and Elephants: The Aftermath of Gnaeus Octavius’ Embassy and Rome’s Eastern Policy in the 160s BCE
- Altay Coşkun: Epilogue: The Strength of the Seleukid Army and Open Questions
Notes
[1] The first volume was Coşkun, A. and Wenghofer, R. (eds.) 2023, Seleukid Ideology: Creation, Reception, and Response (Stuttgart).
[2] Numerous collaborative volumes have emerged from this scholarly network, including Coşkun, A. and Engels, D. (eds.) 2019, Rome and the Seleukid East: Selected Papers from Seleukid Study Day V, Brussels, 21–23 August 2015 (Brussels); Erickson, K. 2018, The Seleukid Empire, 281–222 BC: War within the Family (Swansea); Coşkun, A. and McAuley, A. (eds.) 2016, Seleukid Royal Women: Creation, Representation, and Distortion of Hellenistic Queenship (Stuttgart); and Erickson, K. and Ramsey, G. (eds.) 2011, Seleucid Dissolution: The Sinking of the Anchor (Wiesbaden).
[3] Important contributions include Daryaee, T., Rollinger, R., and Canepa, M. (eds.) 2023, Iran and the Transformation of Ancient Near Eastern History: The Seleucids (ca. 312–150 BCE) (Wiesbaden); Anagnostou-Laoutides, E. and Pfeiffer, S. (eds.) 2022, Culture and Ideology under the Seleukids: Unframing a Dynasty (Berlin). See also Paul Kosmin’s monographs The Land of the Elephant Kings (2014) and Time and Its Adversaries in the Seleucid Empire (2018), as well as John Grainger’s Pen & Sword trilogy: The Rise of the Seleukid Empire, 323–223 BC: Seleukos I to Seleukos III (2018); The Fall of the Seleukid Empire, 187–75 BC (2020); and The Seleukid Empire of Antiochus III, 223–187 BC (2024).