[Authors and titles are listed at the end of the review]
Conceptualising Concepts in Greek Philosophy for the most part avoids engaging with individual concepts and instead analyzes the difficult topic of concept qua concept and the way various philosophical schools in the ancient and occasionally modern world use and define their equivalents for the term “concept.” The main terms under discussion include Greek epinoia, dianoia, noemata, prolepsis, katholou, and ennoema; for Latin, notitiones and notitiae. The terms shift in their usage over time and from author to author, and the level of specificity in each author also varies, so each essay must make clear how the terminology is used in its particular time and in the philosophical school under discussion. While Latin authors such as Cicero, Lucretius, and Augustine are occasionally discussed, the main focus is Greek philosophy, as the title of the work makes clear.
The nearly 500-page book includes a wide-ranging collection of 19 essays in addition to an Introduction. It covers about a thousand years of history from the earliest “inklings” of concepts in Parmenides, Empedocles, Democritus, and even Homer through to Imperial Platonists (Plotinus, Porphyry, Proclus) and Christian theologians (Origin, Basil, and Gregory of Nyssa). It is organized chronologically, although some of the topics cover a longer time span than a single author and therefore overlap. This is a lot. I think that scholars will in general dip into this weighty book to check out individual essays on a specific topic of interest – say, “The Stoics on Conceptions and Concepts” by Katerina Ierodiakonou (237–58) or “Concepts in Greek Mathematics” by Reviel Netz (307–29) – rather than reading the volume straight through. Presumably expecting this, the editors have allowed or encouraged some overlap; numerous chapters start with a section addressing “What is a Concept?” before diving into their arguments. To be sure, however, they do not all supply the same answer, since a concept for Aristotle is not the same as for Epicurus or Sextus Empiricus or Origen.
While it is reasonable to want to read the essays sporadically, the real power of this volume comes out when read from beginning to end – this is because passages often recur across essays and the contributors frequently engage with one another’s points. In the preface, Betegh and Tsouna write that they jointly wrote their chapters and did “all the editorial work” together, not in parallel. It really shows and there is a unity to the work that rarely is achieved in a volume that includes so many authors of such differing expertise. Indeed, reading the book feels like reading a cohesive text, not a collection of separate essays. For instance, the three chapters by McKirahan, Rapp, and Johansen are dedicated to Aristotle and each of them addresses the same passages from Posterior Analytics (2.19) and Metaphysics (A.1). As Rapp summarizes, in these passages, Aristotle “sketches the several stages through which people, starting from repeated perception and experience (empeiria), come to develop universals (or what we would call ‘concepts’) in their souls, which will provide the basis for the formation of scientific principles” (149). While it might feel repetitive for these same sections to come up again and again, the arguments are complimentary; each writer explores the nuances of terms such as ennoēma/ ennoēmata, their content, the role of memory and experience to forming them, and ultimately whether they should be understood as “concepts” or not. Laks introduces the same Aristotle passages in the first essay of the volume, which explores the underpinnings for later theories of concepts and their origin in archaic and early-Classical works by Homer, Parmenides, Empedocles, and Democritus. The back and forth between the chapters feels conversational and the sum of them together is more fruitful than any one on its own.
One’s favorite essays are likely due more to one’s own research interests rather than the individual arguments, as all are very worthwhile. For me, the chapters by Betegh and Tsouna on Epicurean theories of concepts and Ierodiakonou’s on Stoic ones especially stood out. The Epicureans ultimately prove to have been more interested in preconceptions (prolepseis) than concepts themselves, as the former are said to be self-evident (enarges) and therefore provide a sure foundation for knowledge; however, they are also shown to have developed important theories regarding concepts and a vocabulary for dealing with them. Stoics, on the other hand, offer a more nuanced theory of concept (ennoia) and conception (ennoēma), providing a material explanation for impressions (phantasia), which are imprinted in the soul and ultimately preserved through concepts;[1] this also ties into their theories of language (lekta) and ontology with careful analysis from Ierodiakonou. Again, these chapters are in conversation. For instance, Betegh and Tsouna reference McKirahan’s earlier essay on Aristotle (206 n. 6), as well as Ierodiakonou’s (218 n. 24); similarly, Ierodiakonou references Irwin’s (238 n. 3), in addition to Betegh and Tsouna’s (240 n. 9; 256 n. 44). This also allows each of these essays to draw distinctions between the fine details of each school’s theories of concepts with the varied terminology for Epicurean “concepts” and “conceptualizing” (including ennoia, ennoēma, noesis, nooumenon/epinooumenon, huponoia, dianoia, perilēpsis, hypolēpsis, and prolēpsis) (204), contrasted with the more clearly defined and technical Stoic theories of ennoia/ennoēma. This sort of interplay is not always possible in an edited volume like this, but this work shows how powerful the collective effect can be when it is achieved.
There is not much to quibble with. There are occasional trivial typos (extra words or misspellings) and a few cross-references between chapters retain their provisional “000” placeholders.[2] While knowledge of Greek is certainly helpful, all passages are translated and important terms are mostly transliterated. Nevertheless, it might have been helpful for chapter authors to agree on a shared translation for repeated passages (such as in the multiple passages from Aristotle discussed above). It also would have helped if the relevant Greek or Latin was always provided; in some cases, for instance across the four passages on pages 334–5, there is confusion about the precise terms under discussion. And sometimes transliterations are lacking (e.g., on pages 415 and 424). But again, these are very minor issues.
Betegh and Tsouna, along with their excellent group of scholars, have produced a valuable work for anyone interested in ancient philosophy—particularly in the areas of epistemology and linguistics. Knowledge of these theories would also benefit people working in modern philosophy as well, for instance on Frege, whose work is referenced several times. As the editors note in their introduction, the book fills an important lacuna in the scholarship on the various theories of “concept” found in the ancient period.
Authors and Titles
Introduction (Gabor Betegh and Voula Tsouna)
The Emergence of the Concept in Early Greek Philosophy (André Laks)
The Place of Concepts in Socratic Inquiry (Terence Irwin)
Early Learning in Plato, Republic 7 (James Warren)
Are Platonic Forms Concepts? (David Sedley)
Do Forms Play the Role of Concepts in Late Plato? (Lesley Brown)
Concepts and Concept Formation in Aristotle’s Logical Works (Richard McKirahan)
Concepts and Universals in Aristotle’s Metaphysical Thought (Christoff Rapp)
Aristotle on the Stages of Cognitive Development (Thomas Kjeller Johansen)
Epicureans on Preconceptions and Other Concepts (Gábor Betegh and Voula Tsouna)
The Stoics on Conceptions and Concepts (Katerina Ierodiakonou)
Doing Things with Concepts in Sextus Empiricus (Richard Bett)
Relative Concepts (Matthew Duncombe)
Concepts in Greek Mathematics (Reviel Netz)
Platonist Notions and Forms (Mauro Bonazzi)
Contested Concepts: Plutarch’s On Common Conceptions (Thomas Bénatouïl)
Alexander of Aphrodisias on Concepts (Frans A.J. de Haas)
Plotinus on Concepts (Sara Magrin)
Concepts in the Neoplatonist Tradition (Péter Lautner)
Early Christian Philosophers on Concepts (George Karamanolis)
Notes
[1] See the passage from Plutarch, Comm. Not. 1084F-1085A, L&S 39F, discussed in Ierodiakonou, p. 238 ff.
[2] This happens on 138 n. 52, 149 n. 1, and 429 n. 1.