Giulia Icardi offers an extensive analysis of how sea power emerged as an essential element of transnational hegemonic authority in fifth- and fourth-century BCE Greece. Sea power is, of course, a well-established topic in ancient history, but most studies focus on Athens—how it used its navy to advance its interests (e.g., Cawkwell 1984; Hale 2009) or on its role in the conflict with Sparta. Other scholarship has addressed the rise of Theban sea power in the fourth century (Buckler 1980; Cartledge 1987), but Icardi provides the most detailed account to date, treating Theban naval forces on par with the more widely studied fleets of Athens and Sparta. Her work offers a new overview of how the three hegemonic powers of Greece before the rise of Macedon exploited both sea and land.
Icardi demonstrates that Sparta and the Boeotian confederation (koinon) each found themselves compelled to develop naval capabilities in order to challenge Athens (pp. 11–12). By focusing on the technological and logistical challenges faced by land-based powers, she fills a significant gap in the literature (pp. 23–24). She underscores the state-led, rather than privately funded, organization of both the Spartan and Boeotian navies (pp. 101–102). While she emphasizes the systemic and institutional framework underlying Spartan naval development (p. 105), she argues that Epaminondas’ vision of Boeotian hegemony depended on the integration of both land and sea power (pp. 211–214).
The book contains eleven chapters arranged into three main parts: (1) resources for the construction and maintenance of the fleet (Chapters 1–4); (2) Sparta and the sea: geographic, social and political features (Chapters 5–7); and (3) Boeotia and a new fleet of 100 triremes (Chapters 8–11).
Part I is particularly interesting because it integrates information from a range of sources about the realities of building, financing and deploying naval assets in Classical Greece. The opening chapter (“les arsenaux”) introduces the infrastructure developed to build and maintain ships, as well as the raw materials (above all, wood) needed to create a navy. The narrative includes stretches that are thick with Greek technical terms that could use a bit more explanation if they are to serve historians without advanced Greek (for whom it may not be obvious that neosoikos, for example, means “ship-home” or that kleistos limen means a “closed harbor”: ch 1. para 1).
Chapter 2 moves from naval infrastructure to the ships themselves, above all to the trireme, with sections on the trireme’s history, form and structure, the materials out of which it was constructed, and the necessary conditions for navigation. Because of the importance of triremes and of shipping in general throughout much of Classical Greek history, this may be the section of the book of interest to the largest number of readers. While the trireme is the focus, the discussion of what materials were employed for shipping and of navigation apply more broadly.
Chapter 3 goes beyond the Athenian navy and describes the corresponding efforts first by Sparta and then by Boeotia. I would recommend that readers begin with the table at the end of the chapter on the distribution of ships in the Peloponnesian fleet. The table provides an overview of Peloponnesian (though not Boeotian) naval efforts, extending from 430 to 365 BCE. A long extract from Archidamus’ speech in the debate at Sparta in book 1 of Thucydides (Thuc. 1.80.3–1.83) provides an opportunity to integrate this chapter for those reading Thucydides and I could easily see including this chapter of Icardi in a class on historiography in which Thucydides features (in Greek or English).
A conclusion to Part 1 follows. Although Sparta and the Boeotian confederation never developed a naval policy comparable to those of Samos, Corinth, Aegina, or Athens, both engaged in naval efforts. They had access to materials for shipbuilding, but timber was scarce. Sparta relied on forests from the Peloponnesus, while Boeotia sourced wood from Macedonia and Euboea. Funding was state-controlled, supported by allies and Persia, with no private contributions. The navy required manpower, but Sparta’s elite soldiers remained in land forces, while Perioeci, Helots, and mercenaries manned ships. Similarly, Boeotia used lower-class citizens. Despite lacking a stable naval policy, both states effectively maintained wartime fleets.
Parts 2 and 3 shift the focus to the navies and naval strategies developed first by Sparta and then by the Boeotian confederation. For those who wish to have a broader view of naval power and to move beyond Athens, these parts will be invaluable resources.
Part 2 opens (Chapter 5: Les activités navales de Sparte de leurs débuts jusqu’au ive siècle av. J.‑C.) with an overview of Sparta’s naval activities through the fourth century BCE, with background on activities before the Peloponnesian war, and a description of how the Spartan fleet evolved and became a strategic instrument of Spartan hegemony. While this chapter provides useful insights into (mostly) well-known events, Chapter 6 (“Les sites maritimes de Sparte et leurs fonctions”) discusses how the geography of the Peloponnese affected Spartan naval infrastructure, strategy and actions. A succession of maps and pictures of sites and topography, taken by the author, make this a very engaging contribution. Chapter 7 (“Le commandement de la flotte spartiate”) shifts the focus back to primary sources as it describes the institution of the Spartan nauarchia as well as the role of nauarchs and other officials (such as the epistoleus).
The conclusion to this part summarizes its results. Sparta’s naval presence was significant, though secondary to its land power. Its fleet, used for troop transport before the Peloponnesian War, expanded out of necessity to counter Athens. Geographically, Laconia had ports like Gytheion and a strategic position near key maritime routes. Sparta’s road network facilitated communication and naval coordination, though coastal defenses were weak. Naval command was led by influential Spartans, with Perioeci likely commanding ships to preserve Spartan manpower. The Peloponnesian War strengthened Sparta’s naval capabilities but maintaining dominance was challenging due to resource constraints and ongoing conflicts among Greek city-states.
Part 3, on the sea power of Boeotia, sheds light on a topic that is probably much less well understood than with Athens and Sparta. Chapter 8, the opening chapter of this part (“La politique navale de la Béotie dans la première moitié du ive siècle av. J.‑C.”), like the opening of the previous part, goes through the (much less extensive) sources. Close readings of Ephorus (quoted by Strabo: FGrHist.70 F 119 at Strabo 9.2.2), Diodorus (15.78.4–79.1) and Xenophon (Hellenica 6.1.10–12, 5.2.16–17) constitute the core for this relatively brief chapter. Chapter 9 (“La Béotie face aux problèmes de la construction et de l’organisation de la flotte”) shifts to geographical and topographical features, with a reliance on maps and pictures by the author. Chapter 10 (“Le réseau de la Béotie pendant son hégémonie”) includes an extensive analysis of numismatic evidence and proxeny inscriptions from Boeotia to explore political and social networks with other states. Chapter 11 (“La croisière d’Épaminondas en mer Égée”) concludes the main body of the book with an extensive description of how Epaminondas led the Boeotian fleet on a show of power around the Aegean.
A first appendix (“Le discours Contre Timothée et le commandement de la flotte béotienne”) offers a brief commentary and analysis of a key passage from the Against Timothy that appears in the Demosthenic corpus. The second appendix (“La croisière du vainqueur dans l’Égée: les exemples de Périclès, Lysandre et Conon comparés à celui d’Épaminondas”) extends the topic of Chapter 11.
This book is available under a CC-BY-NC-ND Creative Commons license. While this provides open access and anyone can read the book online for free, the PDF and ePub versions are available for purchase at a nominal fee (10.99 $USD). ND stands for “no derivative works” and this restriction prevents third parties from downloading and rehosting enhanced versions of the book. Without the ND restriction, a third party could, for example, create a version that converted traditional citations such as “Thucydide, III, 6, 2” (ch. 1, n. 47) and “Strabon, XIV, 2, 15” (ch. 1, n. 48) into machine actionable citations. Such machine actionable citations can become bidirectional links that can not only lead from the Icardi to an online version of the source text but also lead readers viewing Thuc. 3.6.2 or Strabo 14.2.15 to the places where Icardi mentions these sources.
Readers who work with Icardi via the Open Edition platform have another major advantage: unlike those reading the ePub version (as I primarily did), they can download higher resolution images of the 48 figures. Many of these are enormously useful, especially the drawings that Icardi has either herself produced and included from other recent publications. Drawings include: a reconstructed view of the port of Munychia (fig. 2: chapter 1), with details showing structures where ships were stored and repaired in Zea and Munychia (neosolkoi: figs. 3 and 4); reconstructed views of a neosolkos (fig. 5 and 6) position of the rowers in a trireme (8: chapter 2).
The author takes advantage of digital methods to provide a rich collection of color photographs, maps and archaeological images. These visuals allow Icardi to situate historical events much more firmly in their geographical and archaeological contexts. Maps covering road networks in the Peloponnese, Boeotian ports and Aegean naval operations by Pericles, Lysander, Conon, and Epaminondas are particularly helpful (Appendix 2).
The open license gives readers access to the machine actionable text without the restrictions imposed by e-readers such as Kindle (which limit the amount that readers can quote). Many anglophone readers will make use of various machine translation systems for particular passages. More importantly, instructors in non-Francophone institutions who cannot expect their students to know French can have their students use machine-translation to work with an important source that is not otherwise accessible to them.
Icardi’s study is a thorough, thoughtful review of seapower in classical Greece. It is a major contribution to a core subject and, with its coverage of Sparta and Boeotia, addresses an overemphasis on Athenian sea power to which many of us are subject.
References
Buckler, John. The Theban Hegemony, 371–362 BC. Harvard University Press, 1980.
Cartledge, Paul. Agesilaos and the Crisis of Sparta. Duckworth, 1987.
Cawkwell, G. L. Athenian Naval Power in the Fourth Century. CQ 34 (1984) 334-345.
Hale, John R. Lords of the Sea: The Epic Story of the Athenian Navy and the Birth of Democracy. Viking, 2009.
Hanson, Victor Davis. A War Like No Other: How the Athenians and Spartans Fought the Peloponnesian War. Random House, 2005.
Nash, John. “Sea Power in the Peloponnesian War.” Naval War College Review, 71.1, 2018, https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol71/iss1/8.