Over thirty years ago, F.I. Zeitlin argued that Athenian tragedy portrayed Thebes as Athens’ inveterate other.[1] In a fresh study of interstate relations, R. van Wijk challenges the notion of an entrenched mutual enmity. Chapter 1 (‘Introduction’) lays out the book’s concerns. Chapter 2 (‘The Attic Neighbour’) provides a chronological overview of Atheno-Boeotian relations, arguing that the brief periods during which Athens and Thebes experienced seismic differences were contingent and atypical. Chapter 3 (‘That Sweet Enmity’) maintains that periods of inter-city strife were brought about through contingency rather than long-term rivalry. Chapter 4 (‘Do Fences Make for Better Neighbours?’), drawing on the recent excellent work of S. Fachard, A.R. Knodell et al., examines the borderlands of Boeotia and Attica.[2] Chapter 5 (‘Contested Memories’) examines how neighbours commemorated their relations monumentally and divides commemoration into three channels: Panhellenic, local (epichoric), and at contested sanctuaries such as the Oropian Amphiareion. The overriding aim is to show that Athens and Thebes were not natural enemies; that quarrels over borderlands did not cause, but were caused by, diplomatic ructions; that Attica and Boeotia were economically intertwined; and that, via religious cult, the two neighbours shared an imagined past that bound them together through perceived common kinship and heritage.
Earliest documented contact falls in the sixth century, when the tyrant Peisistratus called on Theban help to restore him to power (Hdt. 161.3-4; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 15.2). Drawing on the conclusions of S. Larson, van Wijk maintains on the strength of Hom. Od. 11.235-80 that in popular folklore Athens, Thessaly, and Boeotia were closely interconnected and suggests that these traditional elements were incorporated in the Peisistratid recension of Homer.[3] The first known example of feud between the cities occurs with the expulsion of the tyrants (510-507/6), as a result of which Athens annexed Eleutherai and aligned with Plataea; shortly thereafter, Athens and Plataea, in alliance, confronted the Persians at Marathon (490), possible only if a rapprochement had occurred between Athens and Thebes. The tradition of Theban medism should be treated with circumspection: against the bleak account of Herodotus (7.132; 233.2), the Boeotian patriot Plutarch centuries later pointed out that, until Thermopylae, Thebes had supported the anti-Persian resistance (Hdt. Mal. 31), a tradition made more credible by the absence of revanchist action; the worst Boeotia may have suffered was a fine, as suggested by an inscribed document dating from the 470s[4], by the fact that Boeotia was included in the Panhellenic games (P. Ol. 7.84; I. 3.10; P. 11), and by bronze vessels which illustrate that Athens participated in Theban athletic events.[5] The so-called ‘First Peloponnesian War’ (458-446) presented an interval of hostility between the neighbours; Thebes joined Sparta in the Peloponnesian War proper (431-404) and advocated the destruction of Athens in 404 but sponsored the democratic restoration less than a year later. After 403, Thebes formed an anti-Spartan alliance with Athens, Corinth, Argos, and Persia, only to join the Second Athenian Confederacy in 378/7. After 371, with the defeat of Sparta at Leuctra, Thebes and Athens were at loggerheads once more, but the activities of Epameinondas, though geared to undermine Athenian hegemony in the sea, were not bellicose. When Athens and Thebes cemented relations to resist Macedon, they buried the hatchet, but van Wijk understands this more as an attempt to normalise relations between two cities which, for accidental reasons, had fallen into rivalry.
Herodotus (6.108) and Thucydides (3.68.5) refer to Athenian diplomatic involvement in Boeotia dating from the second half of the sixth century. Whilst some scholars have tried to synchronise these passages, van Wijk argues that they refer to different events, Herodotus to the affairs of 507/6, when the Boeotians in alignment with the Peloponnesian League invaded Attica, Thucydides to an earlier episode, in 519, when Athens made first diplomatic overtures to Plataea. The original treaty did not precipitate difficulties between Athens and Thebes but stood in conformity with an established Peisistratid habit of forming familial ties in central and northern Greece; it was only after hostilities broke out in the last decade of the sixth century that Plataea became a sticking point. Hipparchus’ dedication at the Apollo Ptoios shrine illustrates positive relations with Thebes after the Athenian alliance with Plataea.[6] A century later, at the time of the Peace of Nicias (421), Athens and Thebes entered repeated truces, which D. Kagan understood to have put longstanding hostilities into abeyance, but which van Wijk views more optimistically as an effort to revive and normalise an older mutual friendship.[7] At the end of the 370s, after Thebes had been liberated from Spartan garrisons and started to re-assert herself militarily, the souring of relations with Athens were far from straightforward: Athens invited Thebes to join in the peace conference of 371 (X. HG. 6.3.1-2); though the Thebans were not signatories in the end, there is no trace in the Athenian negotiations of an anti-Theban alliance between Athens and Sparta put on the table. After Leuctra, Theban families moved to Athens for safety (D.S. 15.52.1). Athens split between supporters of Sparta and Thebes, and, though officially in alliance with Sparta, anti-Spartan feeling is still in evidence in the 360s (RO 31). Literary, inscriptional, numismatic, and archaeological evidence across over two centuries indicates the working of reciprocity in cementing ties, notably the honorary decree for Boeotian exiles after the capture of the Cadmeia in 382 (IG II2 237). Thebes projected an image as the birthplace of Heracles and Dionysus, shown by coinage from the late fifth century.[8] There is evidence that the cult of Athena Areia was celebrated at Plataea and Acharnai (RO 88). The Boeotian self-image as heir to the Heraclid line legitimised the Thebans as Greek brethren, which made it easier to establish alliances when the time was suitable.
For most of the sixth century, relations along the borders between Attica and Boeotia were peaceful. A kioniskos found at Phyle along the frontier (SEG 56.521) indicates that Athens in the late sixth century asserted herself militarily in the region: the fragmentary inscription concurs with Herodotus (5.74) in all but one respect, namely that Athens captured Phyle, not Hysiai. A bronze inscription referring to Eleutherai (SEG 60.506) clarifies that Thebes had begun to assert control over its hinterland against the competing claims of Athens and Megara; dedications at Rhamnous and Sounion, on the other side of the frontier, flaunted Athenian claims.[9] From these testimonia van Wijk contends that territorial disputes between Athens and Boeotia arose only when agreements were broken, but otherwise control over borderlands did not reflect hostility; this changed in the mid fifth century with the First Peloponnesian War and the Athenian involvement in Boeotia, which ended abruptly with the defeat at Coroneia (446). Fortification of border demes reflects periods of conflict between Athens and Thebes, not local animosity among their populations; neighbourly relations were adversely affected only when one or the other violated established agreements over the exploitation of the Mazi and Skourta plains. It made sense for the two polities to cooperate over frontier territory. Van Wijk argues that the Spartan decision after the end of the Corinthian War (395-386) to splinter Boeotia into rival polities and dissolve the koinon was aimed at hobbling Athenian interests and that for most of history Athens treated Boeotia as a military buffer, rather than a foe to be kept at bay; paradoxically, therefore, the establishment of hard borders was about maintaining friendship.
Following the observations of M. Barbato that variant memories in different contexts could be presented to the same audience, van Wijk argues for a malleable presentation of the hostilities between Athens and Thebes.[10] The commemorative monuments studied include the Serpent Column at Delphi, the Statue of Zeus at Olympia, the Aegospotami Monument, the Athenian Golden Shields at Delphi, the Temple of Apollo Ptoios in Akraiphnia, and the rededicated quadriga of the Athenian victory at Oenophyta (458). If the defeat of Athens or Thebes was ever commemorated in a Panhellenic space, it was to serve a wider memory that extended beyond the dyadic relationship between the two local polities. What is most notable throughout the Classical period is the near total silence of Panhellenic sanctuaries about strife between Athens and Thebes, which came into play only when the conflicts involved wider participants, such as Sparta. Van Wijk argues that Athenian self-championing on local and Panhellenic monuments as leader in a national struggle was less about demonising its northerly neighbour and more about advancing the view of Athens as the natural prostates of Greece; likewise, the inclusion of a Boeotian admiral on the Aegospotami Monument was less about flaunting enmity between Thebes and her southerly neighbour and more about promulgating the view that victory over Athens in 404 was not a solely Spartan achievement.
Van Wijk argues with a fresh and stimulating vigour, and there is much in his study to be commended. I nevertheless have several reservations. At a technical level, the written English is not always of the highest quality, and the book has the irritating habit of using Hellenised and Romanised spellings of names interchangeably. Sometimes the provenance of the translations of ancient texts is given, other times not. At the macrolevel, I worry that the case which van Wijk makes underestimates the most important objection, namely that the length of time over two centuries which Athens and Thebes spent in mutual alliance is dwarfed by the period of time spent on opposing sides. Their time in alliance totals no more than seventeen years – to count the Corinthian War (395-387/6), the anti-Macedonian pact (339/8), and the renewal of war with Sparta after the liberation of the Cademia (378-371), , while the time in opposition totals fifty-seven years – to count periods from Thermopylae to Plataea (480-79), Tanagra to Coroneia (458-446), the war with Athens (431-404), the Theban hegemony (369-362), and the Third Sacred War (357-346). Absence of conflict does not equate to friendship. It seems easier to argue that the start of the fourth century, when Thebes and Athens entered an unaccustomed alliance, was the exception that proved the contrary rule, as was the pact against Philip of Macedon in 339, contracted to prevent Thebes and Macedon joining hands in a common invasion of Attica. Methodologically, if van Wijk chooses to view rivalry between the two neighbours as an accidental contingency, he is required to approach the rare periods in which we encounter the cities in alignment through the same theoretical lens, though he is reluctant to apply such a methodology consistently. The unholy pact between Athens and Boeotia in 395, which (almost unthinkably) drew in Persia, to combat a burdensome Spartan hegemony in Greece was surely more about contingency than about reviving an old friendship in deep-freeze. As modern experience shows, an entente cordiale does not cancel or negate deeper suspicions or rivalries. Perhaps the preferable model is to envision Athens and Thebes as both enemies and friends, with either potential being ready to surface depending on the direction of the wind on the Panhellenic stage.
Notes
[1] F.I. Zeitlin, ‘Thebes. Theater of self and society in Athenian drama’, in J.J. Winkler and F.I. Zeitlin (eds), Nothing to Do with Dionysos? Athenian Drama in its Social Context (Princeton, 1990), 63-96.
[2] See, inter alia, S. Fachard, A.R. Knodell, E. Banou, ‘The 2014 Mazi Archaeological Project (Attica)’, AK 58 (2015), 178-86; Fachard, K. Papangeli, Knodell, ‘La plaine de Mazi et les frontières attico-béotiennes’, Revue Archéologique 69 (2020), 171-8.
[3] S. Larson, ‘Boeotia, Athens, the Peisistratids and the Odyssey’s Catalogue of Heroines’, TC 6.2: 412-27.
[4] P. Siewert and H. Taeuber, Neue Inschriften von Olympia: Die ab 1896 veröffentlichten Texte. (Vienna, 2013), no. 5.
[5] N. Papazarkadas (ed.), The Epigraphy and History of Boeotia: New Finds, New Prospects (Leiden, 2014), 223-51.
[6] L. Bizard, ‘Fouilles du Ptoion (1903)’, BCH 44 (1920), 227-62.
[7] D. Kagan, The Peace of Nicias and the Sicilian Expedition (Ithaca, 1981), 24-5.
[8] C.M. Kraay, Archaic and Classical Greek Coins (London, 1976), 111.
[9] See also J. Paga, Building Democracy in Late Archaic Athens (Oxford, 2021), 176-245.
[10] M. Barbato, The Ideology of Democratic Athens (Edinburgh, 2020).