Since Servius, many scholars of Virgil have felt that the predominant role of fate in the Aeneid could be somehow related to the equally significant role that fate plays in Stoic philosophy. However, until now, no one had dedicated an entire monograph to the subject.[1] Graham Zanker’s work is un doubtedly the most complex and articulate attempt to study the possible influence of Stoicism on Virgil’s poem. It is a work of great dedication and importance, deserving not only to be read but also to be thoroughly analyzed. For this reader, the main theses of the book and many of its interpretations of Virgil are ultimately unconvincing, yet grappling with these arguments is fruitful.
The book is structured nto five chapters and three appendices. Following an introduction that situates the book within the history of studies on Virgil and philosophy, the first chapter forms the theoretical core: Zanker swiftly presents his interpretation of Chrysippus’ compatibilist thought on fate and human responsibility; demonstrates that Virgil could have had easy access to Stoic doctrine on fate, either directly or indirectly; illustrates supposedly tangible signs of the Aeneid’s engagement with “Stoic World Fate” (such as the simile of the top or the admittedly sporadic use of Stoic-like terminology); introduces the novel concept, attributed to Stoic doctrine, of events “in suspension,” which he connects with the discussion of the ideas of fatum and fortuna; and finally considers the inevitable modifications that the Aeneid imposes on its Stoic philosophical core: emotions are permitted by human necessity and epic convention; a certain degree of eclecticism is sometimes unavoidable; and above all, the poem overlays its underlying Stoicism onto a Homeric template.
Chapter 2 aims to apply the author’s “Chrysippean” approach to fate and human responsibility to the love story of Dido and Aeneas. Chapter 3 is dedicated to the gods of the Aeneid, analyzing the roles of Jupiter, Juno, and Venus as, respectively, the “Mouthpiece,” “Opponent” and “Devious Proponent” of Stoic World Fate. Chapter 4 does the same with the humans in the poem, considering in sequence the Trojans of Book 2, the inhabitants of “Laurentum,” namely Amata and Latinus,[2] Turnus, and Aeneas himself. Chapter 5 suggests that Virgil intertwines Stoic concepts of World Fate, human responsibility, and providence with the narrative of Rome’s foundation and imperial destiny, neither fully aligning with Augustan propaganda nor adopting a straightforwardly anti-Augustan stance. Virgil offers a form of “realistic optimism” about Rome’s role in the world and the potential for Augustus to align his rule with Stoic principles of benevolent governance. Appendix 1 is a glossary of philosophical terms used in this book; Appendix 2 presents an annotated list of the words used in the Aeneid to indicate what the author calls, respectively, “Stoic World Fate,” “Stoic Individual Fate,” and “Ordinary Chance”; Appendix 3 is an exploration of Aeneas’ aristeia after the death of Pallas, aimed at mitigating the negativity of the hero’s conduct.
The central thesis of Zanker’s book is that Virgil’s vision of human responsibility in the Aeneid is profoundly influenced by Chrysippus’ theory of “‘giv[ing] assent to’ what is the inevitable” (p. ix). At pp. 9-18, Zanker offers a simplified and somewhat watered-down version of the relevant Stoic arguments, which are quite intricate, and he limits himself to mentioning only a few works from the vast bibliography on the subject. For example, Zanker places great importance on the analogy of the dog and the cart, but without mentioning the controversies regarding its actual applicability to Chrysippus’ system of causal determinism.[3] In any case, I believe that Zanker has failed to argue his thesis convincingly.
Let us consider Zanker’s concept of events “in suspension,” which he emphasizes greatly (23-33 and passim). He observes that “the poem also has moments where it is clear that there is some leeway, some room for negotiation, within the inevitable march of events, and these need to be accounted for” (24). An example is the scene where Juno persuades Jupiter that the people born from the merging of Trojans and Latins should not have the name of Trojans, nor their language, nor their clothing; the goddess describes this possibility as nulla fati quod lege tenetur (12.819). It seems clear to me that Juno’s statement here does not align with Stoic orthodoxy. It would be inconceivable for a Stoic to state that the things Juno pleads for are exempt from fate, since for a Stoic everything is determined by fate. Virgil, however, can say this precisely because he does not adhere strictly to Stoic orthodoxy. In arguing that Virgil is a Stoic even here, Zanker relies on a passage from Seneca, Natural Questions 2.37.2, cited by Heinze (1915: 295-6 = 1993: 239), to construct a “Stoic” theory of events “in suspension”, though there are no other traces of this in the sources or in the bibliography. The same passage from Seneca is, in fact, highly controversial because the notion that there are events “in suspension” (suspensa), which are decided by human prayers, finds no support in Stoic doctrine: “To say that some things are suspensa, undetermined, is not orthodox Stoicism” (Hine 1981: 369). Other scholars argue against suspensa meaning “undetermined”.[4]
Zanker argues that Seneca’s supposed notion of suspension finds parallels in Stoic thought. Still, the two passages he cites, without bibliography (Plutarch, De Stoicorum repugnantiis 1051B-C = SVF 2.1178 and Cicero, De natura deorum [ND] 2.167, cf. 3.86, 90 = SVF 2.1179-80), are equally controversial: the idea that god (or the gods) do not concern themselves with individuals and particulars is a commonplace in ancient thought, primarily associated philosophically with Aristotelianism, and is indeed attributed to the Stoics as well.[5] The idea arises from a desire to explain the presence of evil in the world, but it directly contradicts the established Stoic doctrine of pan-providentialism.[6] It does not seem appropriate to construct a “Stoic” theory of events “in suspension” on the basis on these passages. This was already clear to Edwards 1960: 158, who, after rejecting the potential relevance of Cicero’s magna di curant, parua neglegunt (ND 2.167) to the Aeneid, concluded: “It must be assumed therefore that this idea of individual destinies in essential conflict with each other had no basis in fundamental Stoic thought; and in fact it is doubtful if Fate’s decree is credited with such all-embracing power in Virgil.[7]
Zanker would like to postulate an equivalence between suspensa and fortunae understood as “individual fates”: “The opposition was pioneered in Stoicism, once again, by Chrysippus, who argued that alongside heimarmene, our World Fate, there operated a force he called tuche, or ‘chance’, which, however, he defined as ‘a cause which is unclear to human reasoning’. The Stoics understood the concept to mean what we are referring to as ‘individual, indifferent fates’” (27-8), and in support of this last statement Zanker refers to Servius on Aeneid 8.334 (= SVF 2.972). This use of evidence is incorrect and seriously misleading. For the Stoics and Chrysippus, tuche is not “a force” that “operates” “alongside heimarmene”. For them, tuche simply does not exist: tuche is just what men, with their imperfect knowledge of the workings of fate, call connections of events that are inexplicable to them; indeed, “a cause which is unclear to human reasoning”, a formula that Zanker quotes, but without drawing the necessary conclusions.[8] Servius’ note on Aeneid 8.334 is a mess that does not reproduce authentic Stoic doctrine, and surely not Chrysippus’ thinking.[9]
In interpreting on this basis Nautes’ words in 5.709-10 (nate dea, quo fata trahunt retrahuntque sequamur; | quidquid erit, superanda omnis fortuna ferendo est), Zanker improperly conflates the ethical level with the ontological one: it makes little sense to speak of “a Stoic distinction between heimarmene, unalterable World Fate, and things that are fated but ‘indifferent’, adiaphoros” (28-9). The notion of adiaphora does not fit within the context of Stoic determinism, and “indifferent” cannot be used synonymously with suspensa in the sense posited by Zanker.[10]
Fundamentally, Zanker appears to misunderstand the concept of fate itself: the Stoics uphold a doctrine of causal determinism; Stoic fate is the “chain of causes” and cannot be easily equated with the World Fate of the Aeneid, which pertains to Rome’s imperial mission. Chrysippus identifies the chain of causes with divine providence, but Stoic fate does not and cannot have a telos defined as that of the Aeneid is. Virgil does occasionally allude to Stoicism, among other doctrines, and an Aeneas with ethically “Stoic-like” traits is easily recognizable throughout the poem. Still, any attempt to frame Rome’s fate in terms of orthodox Stoic determinism will fail.[11]
As mentioned, Zanker occasionally acknowledges Virgil’s eclectic approach (“Departures from Stoicism: Eclecticism”, 34-6). Besides the classic case of Anchises’ speech on metempsychosis, Zanker defines his position on the relationship between Jupiter and fate here: “Virgil separates World Fate from a unity with Jupiter, presenting him as fate’s mouthpiece and occasional guardian” (35); this is developed in the section “Jupiter: Stoic World Fate’s Mouthpiece” in Chapter 3 (70-80). This separation aligns with Virgil’s eclecticism, as orthodox Stoicism, particularly Chrysippus’ doctrine, holds that heimarmene is identified with Zeus. As Zanker states, “In separating World Fate from Jupiter, Virgil is not modelling the king of the gods on Stoic lines of thought” (5).
As is well known, some Virgil scholars (such as Heinze, Bailey, and Lyne) believe that in the Aeneid fate should be identified with Jupiter’s will, while others argue that the two should be kept separate. I believe Virgil is inconsistent on the matter, deliberately reproducing the inconsistencies of Homeric theology.[12] In any case, there are passages where it is implied that fate should be identified with the will of Jupiter, starting with the dialogue of the god with Venus in Aeneid 1. Zanker’s analysis of this passage, and his refutation of Lyne’s arguments (70-3) are not convincing. Another passage suggesting the identification between fate and Jupiter’s will is 3.375-6 (the beginning of Helenus’ prophecy): sic fata deum rex | sortitur uoluitque uices, is uertitur ordo.[13] Zanker cites the passage twice, once on p. 71 n. 4, and again in Chapter 4, on p. 132: the first time he correctly translates sic fata deum rex | sortitur as “thus the king of the gods allots fate,” but he strangely explains that “sortitur … implies that Jupiter is acting in response to a force external to himself in his allocation of fate”; the second time, Zanker translates “thus the king of the gods receives fates,” but, as the context and Virgil’s use of the verb elsewhere make clear, Jupiter does not “receive,” but “assigns” fates.
The analysis of the behavior of the human characters in Stoic terms that Zanker conducts in Chapters 2 and 4 does not lead to more convincing results.
One of Zanker’s central ideas regarding Dido is that she is not simply manipulated by the gods, first by Jupiter through Mercury, and then by Venus through Ascanius/Cupid: “Dido is, because of her own personal history, naturally receptive to the idea of love and companionship” (42); “Dido has a natural disposition (in Stoic terms, her diathesis or habitus) which informs her passion for Aeneas” (47). Not only is there no reason to apply Stoic terms to the actions and characters of the poem in a systematic way, but this interpretation overlooks the fact that the pre-Virgilian Dido (excluding speculations about her possible role in Naevius)[14] was stubbornly and irreducibly unreceptive to the idea of love and companionship. The influences of the gods on Dido do not act upon a predisposition to love; instead, they overturn and revolutionize her total aversion to love, which, in the pre-Virgilian version of the story, led her to suicide.
The concepts drawn from Stoic psychology of action (such as phantasiai, assent, “akataleptic” impressions) are irrelevant for analyzing the behaviors of the characters in the Aeneid. There is nothing to suggest that Virgil intended to invoke them; moreover, they would need to be invoked for every minor decision and action of the characters, not just for significant ones like Dido yielding to love or Aeneas obeying Jupiter. For the Stoics, the dynamic of impression-assent-impulse-action (in the case of Chrysippus) occurs continuously for every agent, and it does little sense to apply it only to significant decisions and actions.
There are many other observations to be made about Zanker’s book, which space does not allow here. In conclusion, I want to emphasize that although I do not agree with most of the arguments in this book, it is a work of great interest. By reflecting on it, studying the Stoic doctrine of fate, and probably disagreeing with Zanker, scholars of Virgil will better understand the nature of fate in the Aeneid, one of the poem’s fundamental concepts.
References
Armisen-Marchetti, M. 2000. “Sénèque et la divination,” in P. Parroni (ed.), Seneca e il suo tempo. Atti del Convegno internazionale di Roma-Cassino, 11-14 novembre 1998, 193-214. Rome.
Bailey, C. 1935. Religion in Virgil. Oxford.
Bobzien, S. 1998. Determinism and Freedom in Stoic Philosophy. Oxford.
Brouwer, R. 2011. “Polybius and Stoic Tyche,” GRBS 51: 111-32.
Casali, S. 2023. “The Books of Fate: the Venus-Jupiter Scene in Ovid’s Metamorphoses 15 and Its Epic Models,” in J. Farrell, J.F. Miller, D. Nelis, and A. Schiesaro (eds.), Ovid, Death and Transfiguration, 386-411, Leiden/Boston.
Dobbin, R.F. (ed.). 1998. Epictetus, Discourses: Book I. Oxford.
Edwards, M.W. 1960. “The Expression of Stoic Ideas in the Aeneid,” Phoenix 14: 151-65.
Farrell, J. 2014. “Philosophy in Vergil,” in M. Garani and D. Konstan (eds.), The Philosophizing Muse: The Influence of Greek Philosophy on Roman Poetry, pp. 61-90. Newcastle.
Frede, D. 2003. “Stoic Determinism,” in B. Inwood (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, 179-205. Cambridge.
Hahmann, A. 2019. “The Stoic Definition of Chance,” Ancient Philosophy 39: 175-89.
Hankinson, R.J. 1999. “Determinism and Indeterminism,” in K. Algra, J. Barnes, J. Mansfeld, and M. Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, 513-41. Cambridge.
Heinze, R. 1915. Virgils epische Technik, 3rd ed. Stuttgart.
Heinze, R. 1993. Virgil’s Epic Technique, transl. H. and D. Harvey and F. Robertson. Berkeley.
Hine, H.M. 1981. An Edition with Commentary of Seneca Natural Questions, Book 2. Salem, NH.
Horsfall, N. (ed.). 2006. Virgil, Aeneid 3: A Commentary. Leiden.
Lanzarone, N. (ed.). 2008. L. Annaei Senecae Dialogorum liber I: De providentia, Florence.
Long, A.A. and Sedley, D.N. 1987. The Hellenistic Philosophers, vol. 1. Cambridge.
Lyne, R.O.A.M. 1987. Further Voices in Vergil’s Aeneid. Oxford.
Mazzetti, M. 2021. Il determinismo degli stoici. Rome.
Nash, C. 2017. Philosophical Readings in Virgil’s Aeneid, DPhil Diss. Oxford.
Nash, C. 2017a. “fatum/a and F/fortuna: Religion and Philosophy in Virgil’s Aeneid,” PVS 29: 135-59.
Pease, A.S. (ed.). 1958. M. Tulli Ciceronis De Natura Deorum Libri Secundus et Tertius. Cambridge, MA.
Setaioli, A. 2004. “Interpretazioni stoiche ed epicuree in Servio e la tradizione dell’esegesi filosofica del mito e dei poeti a Roma (Cornuto, Seneca, Filodemo), II,” IJCT 11: 3-46.
Setaioli, A. 2014. “Ethics III: Free Will and Autonomy,” in G. Damschen and A. Heil (eds.), Brill’s Companion to Seneca: Philosopher and Dramatist, 277-99. Leiden/Boston.
Sharples, R.W. 2005. “Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt,” in C. Natali and S. Maso (eds.), La catena delle cause, Determinismo e antideterminismo nel pensiero antico e contemporaneo, 197-214. Amsterdam.
Weiß, P. 2017. Homer und Vergil im Vergleich: ein Paradigma antiker Literaturkritik und seine Ästhetik, Tübingen.
Zeidler, K. 1954. Die Schicksalsauffassung Vergils und ihre Beziehungen zur Stoa, Diss. Freien Universität Berlin.
Notes
[1] Apart from the interesting dissertation by Zeidler (1954), which is absent from Zanker’s bibliography.
[2] Although, after N. Horsfall, Enc. Virg. s.v. Laurentes 3 (1987) 141-4, one should refrain from calling King Latinus’ capital “Laurentum.”
[3] Cf. Bobzien 1998: 351-7; Sharples 2005; Mazzetti 2021: 154-6.
[4] See Armisen-Marchetti 2000: 201 n. 52; Setaioli 2014: 290-1.
[5] See Pease 1958 on Cic. ND 2.167; Dobbin 1998 on Epict. Diss. 1.12.2-3; Lanzarone 2008 on Sen. Dial. 1.1.3.
[6] Cf. Long and Sedley 1987: 332 (on SVF 2.1178): “… casual suggestions, probably never fully wholeheartedly incorporated into Stoic theology, with which they are scarcely compatible.”
[7] On page 26 n. 62, Zanker admits the non-canonicity of “the Stoic principle of suspension”: “However implausibly the suspensa fit in with, e.g., Chrysippus’ analogy of the dog and cart, they are clearly accommodated by the later Stoa.”
[8] Cf. Hankinson 1999: 535: “In the Stoic universe there is no room for chance”; Frede 2003: 183-4: “Chance and luck are therefore merely a matter of human ignorance: what seem to us like freak accidents are part of the overall order of nature.” On Stoic chance, see Brouwer 2011, esp. 113-20; Hahmann 2019. Nash 2017a: 137-46 frames the issue satisfactorily.
[9] “Una grossolana semplificazione della dottrina stoica” (Setaioli 2004: 13); cf. Weiß 2017: 317. Perhaps Servius misunderstands and distorts the example of Socrates in the Chrysippean response to the lazy argument as reported by Cicero, fat. 30.
[10] On p. 29 I don’t understand the relevance of the citation of Epictetus, Diss. 2.6.9 either.
[11] Zeidler (1954: esp. 149-51) appears more aware of the fundamental difference between Stoic fate and that of the Aeneid, which to me marks a clear incompatibility between the two systems. So also Nash 2017: 86-107.
[12] So already DServ. Aen. 8.398 notandum quod hic Iouem a fatis separat, cum alibi iungat, ut [3.375-6] “sic fata deum rex sortitur.” For my point of view on the issue see Casali 2023. Similarly, Zeidler (1954: esp. 152) sees different levels of meaning operating in this regard. On the relationship between Virgil and philosophy in general, I share the ideas of Farrell 2014.
[13] Cf. Horsfall 2006 ad loc.
[14] Naevius is mentioned only in chapter 5 (183 n. 29), where Zanker says that “the only evidence in favour of the thesis [sc. that Naevius brought Aeneas and Dido together] is the bald statement by Servius (augmented) on 4.9 that Naevius tells us the identity of Dido and Anna’s mother.” This is imprecise to say the least.