In Wine and Ecstasy in Plato, Eva Anagnostou-Laoutides explores Plato’s discussion of drinking wine. She contends that inebriation is used metaphorically to illuminate the transcendent experiences of philosophy. This metaphorical use of “inebriation” as a higher state beyond reason is contrasted with ordinary “intoxication” or “drunkenness”—the sort familiar to many undergraduates on weekends. The book comprises an introduction, four chapters, a conclusion, notes, a bibliography, an index locorum, and a general index.
After the Introduction outlines the aims, surveys competing approaches, and summarizes the chapters, Chapter 1 lays the groundwork for the book by discussing the conceptual framework in detail. After explaining what she means by “consciousness” and “altered consciousness,” Anagnostou-Laoutides explores the nature of metaphor. She begins with Aristotle’s theory of metaphor and then moves to Lakoff and Johnson’s account of “conceptual metaphor.” In particular, Anagnostou-Laoutides is interested in “structural metaphors,” in which one concept is structured metaphorically in terms of another, such as “love is madness.” Anagnostou-Laoutides argues that Plato is doing this with “philosophy is inebriating.” In doing so, Plato not only renders “Socrates’ unusual proclivities intelligible and justified in the eyes of a contemporary audience” but also helps capture “the ecstatic experience” of philosophy which “is not easily described to those who have not experienced it” (21). Anagnostou-Laoutides supports her account of “Platonic inebriation” through an examination of the vocabulary of mania in the Symposium and the Phaedrus, drawing connections to Euripides’ Bacchae. In doing so, Anagnostou-Laoutides contrasts the mundane, sloppy experience of intoxication (think Alcibiades in the Symposium) with the enlightened, yet eccentric, creativity of Socrates.
Chapter 2 deepens this account of Platonic inebriation by bringing into the conversation the medical terminology surrounding mania and intoxication in Plato’s day. Anagnostou-Laoutides demonstrates the ways in which medical discussions of humoral balance and the effects of wine on it shape Plato’s discussions of inebriation. Additionally, utilizing this terminology allows Plato to playfully and creatively describe philosophical activity in ways akin to mania but connected to cognitive transformation. Yet, at the same time, Plato can do this in a way that shows that, despite his unusual appearance, Socrates is neither mad nor drunk. Anagnostou-Laoutides notes that after experiencing philosophical ecstasy, one must subject one’s experience to rational reflection (Timaeus 71e–72b). She writes:
Irrationality often accompanies ecstatic incidents; the experience per se is unreflective and must be followed by careful exercise of judgment before its value is realized. Judgment distinguishes the philosopher from other subjects of intoxication because it represents sober intellectual synthesis after a cathartic and likely disturbing experience. (66)
This sober reflection involves distance: physical distance from others, so one can think, but also evaluative distance from the superficial pursuits of society. Such distance can make the many perceive philosophers as strange or mad individuals.
Chapter 3 examines the civic aspects of drinking parties. Central to her discussion is the “test of wine” in Laws 1. The basic idea is that bouts of drinking can expose one to situations in which one might act shamefully. Those with sound character, however, will still behave appropriately even under the influence of wine. Beyond testing one’s character, drinking parties led by sober leaders can foster a renewal of civic ethos and reinvigorate the spirits of the elderly, who have grown lax, tired, and grumpy with time. Anagnostou-Laoutides argues that this test of wine is also at work in the speeches of the Symposium. Plato presents a stark contrast between the drunken and obnoxious Alcibiades and the moderate Socrates. In his intoxicated state, Alcibiades declares himself the symposiarch and reveals aspects of his character that cast him in an unflattering light, much like those who fail the test of wine in the Laws.
While Alcibiades fails the test because of his tyrannical nature, Anagnostou-Laoutides contends that Aristophanes fails because of his sophistic nature. She argues that Plato’s portrayal of Aristophanes challenges the type of humor that would have been culturally accepted at symposia, showing what might have been seen as “stylish banter” as “sophistic hyperbole” (72). Anagnostou-Laoutides argues that “Plato sets out to discredit Aristophanes and his version of truth. Thus, he revises Aristophanes’ portrayal of Socrates as an eccentric sophist, revealing the former as the one who in fact resorts to sophistic devices” (95). I am sympathetic to Anagnostou-Laoutides’ interpretation of Alcibiades, but I disagree with her interpretation of Aristophanes. Barring Diotima’s speech, his seems to be more favorably treated in the Symposium than the others.
Chapter 4 examines what becomes of Plato’s metaphor in the Hellenistic and Roman periods. Anagnostou-Laoutides argues that during this period Platonic inebriation loses its metaphorical force and is reduced to moralistic lessons about overindulgence or superficial decorum during parties under the guise of philosophical insight, which drew criticism from Lucian and Horace. Anagnostou-Laoutides contends that this change results from shifts in political structure, moving from the Greek polis to Hellenistic kingdoms and eventually to the Roman empire. However, in Philo, Platonic inebriation regains its metaphorical force, coming to be understood as an allegory for humanity’s encounters with God.
A brief conclusion follows, synthesizing the book’s central ideas, explaining the role of reason and unreason, and looking forward to the author’s next project. It is worth noting that the Notes and Bibliography are quite extensive. The Notes are almost as long as the chapters, spanning nearly 150 pages, and the Bibliography approaches 100 pages. Beyond the sheer quantity of scholarship engaged, there is also a remarkable range of sources: classical, historical, philosophical, literary, scientific, and medical. As such, beyond its fascinating defense of the metaphor of Platonic inebriation, the book serves as an excellent scholarly resource.
This excellent book left me with two general objections, one directed at Anagnostou-Laoutides and the other at Plato. First, I worry that Anagnostou-Laoutides’ understanding of Platonic inebriation downplays the role of genuine anti-rationality in the educational process. Belfiore’s (1986) insight is that, in the Laws, Plato adopts a kind of Yin-and-Yang interpretation of reason and anti-rational elements—that is, elements opposed to reason, not merely non-rational ones—in which both contribute to the formation of character. Although I disagree with how far Belfiore takes this reading, she is right to emphasize the important role that anti-rational elements play in Magnesia (see Baima 2017). My concern with Anagnostou-Laoutides’ interpretation is that a passage in the Laws endorsing literal intoxication is mapped onto a notion of metaphorical inebriation. Yet the former appears to affirm anti-rational elements, whereas the latter does not; indeed, Anagnostou-Laoutides’ account of Platonic inebriation introduces a distance between the two.
Second, I have been studying philosophy since 2002, and I still have no clear idea what Plato is describing when he discusses the ecstatic experience of philosophy. Nor have I ever gazed upon the “great sea of beauty” (Symposium 210d), so perhaps the problem lies with me. In all seriousness, while I appreciate a good metaphor or poetic turn of phrase as much as the next person, I question whether such language truly elucidates anything. Leaving aside my own possible shortcomings, I nevertheless recommend this book to anyone interested in Plato’s conception of mania, metaphor, ecstatic experience, and intoxication.
References
Baima, Nicholas R. 2017. “On the Value of Drunkenness in the Laws.” History of Philosophy and Logical Analysis 20: 65–81.
Belfiore, Elizabeth. 1986. “Wine and Catharsis of the Emotions in Plato’s Laws.” The Classical Quarterly 36 (2): 421–437.