In the publication under review, Dewid Laspe addresses a question that at first glance seems unoriginal and somewhat antiquated. Numerous ancient historians have attempted to reconstruct the sequence of events of the battles of Marathon and Salamis, but no clear, undisputed, detailed conclusion has been reached regarding the initial situation, course of events, participants, or significance of either event. Of course, it would be unrealistic to expect agreement among the sources for a pair of battles so heavily laden with ideological significance, said to be part of an epoch-making conflict between Western and Eastern cultures.
With his investigation, Laspe is therefore venturing into challenging terrain that has already been ploughed through many times with very different intentions. Although his largely event-based approach is somewhat traditional, he succeeds in introducing some aspects that have received little attention in previous research. The author claims to analyse the material primarily from a military science and practical warfare perspective, thereby arriving at more precise and realistic ideas about the course of the battles than previous efforts have been able to achieve.
There is no systematic, broad introductory doxography, but this is not missed because, on the one hand, the positions taken by previous researchers are widely divergent and, with regard to the two battles to which Laspe’s historical analysis is limited, they mostly depend on the general assessment of the Persian Wars by various authors. Those who see these conflicts as a heroic struggle for defence and freedom by an inferior, small polis world unjustly attacked by barbarians will evaluate the events differently than a more sober view, which recognises them as a power struggle between two sides that compete under very different conditions, both having strengths and weaknesses, advantages and disadvantages. Nevertheless, it is clear that Laspe takes appropriate account of key questions concerning the specific circumstances of the battles and details of their course, as those questions have arisen in previous research.
The author refrains from providing a broad-brushed overview of the sources, however, and instead takes a more pointillistic approach to ancient historiography. Although Herodotus is extensively acknowledged as the main author on the Persian Wars and his shortcomings as a military historian are outlined, his contemporary or later colleagues, who logically should gain in importance in view of these shortcomings, are hardly examined critically in terms of sources.
Important information from authors such as Aeschylus, Diodorus or Plutarch is used for individual points in the reconstruction of the battles and checked for validity, but there is no stemma of mutual dependencies between the source works. Such a diagram could have provided further parameters for classifying relevant but controversial or uncertain details, but Laspe attaches greater importance to other factors and experiences, namely those relating to military science and practical warfare. This methodology is also what makes his work original.
The author defines the term ‘decisive battle’ in the title as a military conflict that determines the the dynamics of warfare between the warring parties:according to this definition, the victorious party wins not only the battle but, more importantly, the power of action and can implement its strategy and, as a result, has significantly increased opportunities for development: Decisive momentum changes to the winning side. This pleasantly restrained view sees these moments as turning points, but not necessarily as the end of a prolonged war.
In light of these criteria, Laspe classifies only Marathon (490 BC) and Salamis (480 BC) as ‘decisive’ among all the battles of the so-called Persian Wars. Both events broke the momentum of the Persian forces’ attack and gave the Greek defensive troops new dynamism. According to Laspe, this cannot be said for the other battles of the Persian Wars, such as those at Artemision, Thermopylae, Plataea or Mycale. These merely confirmed the direction of military development that was already underway. It is therefore entirely logical to pay special attention to these two battles, the legacy of which is iconic in any case.
The military science premises, which Laspe does not intend to use uncritically in his study, were first compiled in a 1964 article by Whatley[1] and prepared with regard to the interpretation of ancient sources: The five ‘aids’ to reconstructing a battle, as Whatley called them, consist of consideration of geography and topography; comparison with modern warfare and its laws; considerations of factual plausibility; deductions from circumstances (the so-called Sherlock Holmes method); and knowledge of ancient military systems and their functioning.
As Lapse emphasises, these factors cannot be isolated with precision, but careful and restrained recourse to such practical foundations of warfare in the analysis of relevant ancient written sources nevertheless allows for approaches that go beyond those that can be gained from purely text-critical source interpretation.
Both battles, which are the focus of the book, are meticulously examined using these multi-perspective tools, their course analysed taking into account the interests, strengths and weaknesses of the warring parties, army sizes, and topographical conditions, as well as the sequence of events, gains, losses and consequences. In the case of Marathon, this results in a fairly plausible picture of the course of events, which, admittedly, does not reveal any completely new insights. According to this, the Persians landed with a force that included hardly more warriors than the Athenian army, and probably only a few horsemen; they were also the ones who attacked, because waiting would have been of no use to them and would have played into the hands of their opponents.
The running stride of the Athenian hoplites, described admiringly by Herodotus, served, if it took place at all, at most to outrun the Persian long-range weapons such as bows and arrows, and could therefore only have covered a short distance. Similar exaggerations and constructs in the main source can be seen in Herodotus’ emphasis on the role of Miltiades and the shield sign that an Athenian is said to have given the Persians for circumnavigating Attica. In Laspe’s view, the decisive factor in the outcome of the battle was that the Athenian leadership succeeded in establishing their phalanx in the narrow Varna Valley in good time, with sufficient supplies, which forced the Persians to act quickly, as they were running out of time and supplies while the Athenians could hope for reinforcements from Greek allies. In this way, the strengths of the Persian army, namely its light long-range weapons, were of no avail, while those of the Greek fighters in heavily armed close combat were highly advantageous in the circumstances.
In the case of the Battle of Salamis, too, according to Laspe’s argument, the commanders of the Greek fleet made optimal use of the terrain and the conditions of the rugged and fragmented coastal topography between Attica and Salamis. The eastward-facing front line of the Greek fleet between the mainland and the island was secured from the rear by a Corinthian squadron (which, contrary to Herodotus’ claim, had no intention of fleeing) and supported by a flanking attack by the Aeginetan fleet, which dealt a decisive blow to the Persian armada. The author convincingly rejects the hypothesis that the Persian fleet was encircled at Salamis: this cannot be reasonably justified by nautical, military or source-critical considerations.
Laspe’s methodology results in comprehensible theses summarising the course of the battle; the goal of providing plausible, source-based descriptions of the battles is thus achieved in both cases. This is valuable, not least because it allows absurd myths, militarily untenable theories, and heroic exaggerations of individual protagonists to be rejected in a detailed and plausible manner. Anyone wishing to study the battles of the Persian Wars in the future cannot do without Laspe’s book.
But what insights are gained beyond the practical military facts and realities of war? The big picture of the Persian Wars, in which an ancient superpower more or less actively opposes smaller powers on its western border and is unable to prevail militarily, is not touched upon, and the political, cultural, economic and historical consequences are hardly discussed, if at all. There is no attempt to embed the events of the war in a cultural or social context. Despite its methodological merits, the book’s focus on purely military matters makes it seem from a historical perspective somewhat narrow.
Table of contents
Verzeichnis der Karten (S. 7)
1.Einleitung (S. 11–31)
1.1 Einführung (S. 11–12)
1.2. Was ist eine Entscheidungsschlacht (S. 12–16)
1.3 Fragestellung, Methodik und Whatleys Hilfen (S. 17–26)
1.4 Herodot und der Nebel des Krieges (S. 26–31)
- Marathon (S. 33–101)
2.1 Die Inseln, Karystos und Eretria (S. 33–37)
2.2 Warum Marathon? (S. 38–44)
2.3 Die Topographie der Marathonebene (S. 44–49)
2.4 Der griechische Anmarsch (S. 49–52)
2.5 Die Archäologie der Marathonebene (S. 52–58)
2.6 Die Schlacht (S. 59–90)
2.7 Die Verluste und der persische Abzug (S. 90–96)
2.8 Paros (S. 96–101)
- Salamis (S. 103–184)
3.1 Von Thermopylai nach Athen (S. 103–109)
3.2 Die Aktivitäten vor der Schlacht (S. 110–114)
3.3 Die Strategische Ausgangslage der Schlacht von Salamis (S. 114–120)
3.4 Die Topographie und Archäologie von Salamis (S. 120–131)
3.5 Die griechische und persische Flottenstärke (S. 131–139)
3.6 Die Botschaft des Themistokles (S. 139–146)
3.7 Die Schlacht (S. 146–180)
3.8 Die Verluste und der persische Abzug (S. 180–184)
- Conclusio (S. 185–194)
Quellenverzeichnis (S. 195f.)
Literaturverzeichnis (S. 196–204)
Orts- und Namensverzeichnis (S. 205–210)
Notes
[1] N. Whatley, “On the Possibility of Reconstructing Marathon and Other Ancient Battles,” JHS 84 (1964), 119–139. The paper was originally delivered orally in 1927 and published more or less as is.