[Authors and titles are listed at the end of the review.]
Cause and Explanation in Ancient Philosophy, edited by Alberto Ross and Daniel Vázquez, gathers twelve studies on the concept of aitia, ranging from Homer to Islamic thought, passing through Plato, Aristotle, and the early Stoics. The chronological, thematic, and methodological variety of the contributions makes this collection very stimulating and wide-ranging. In all, the chapters are of high quality, offering rich, clear, and well-argued insights into how ancient philosophers understood the notions of cause, explanation, and responsibility.
The volume begins with an introduction by Alberto Ross, who highlights the broad semantic range of the word aitia and correctly notes that it typically answers “Why?” questions. Then, Ross provides a concise overview of the volume’s contents.
The first chapter explores the original meaning of aitios. Drawing primarily on Homeric texts, David Lévistone shows that the earliest uses of this adjective consistently avoid taking a genitive, while they are often accompanied by a dative indicating the person “to whom” or “for whom” someone is aitios. This usage reveals the word’s subjective roots: one is aitios for someone—not absolutely. Accordingly, the core sense of the term likely refers not just to someone who ‘plays’ or ‘takes’ a part, but to someone who ‘has taken a part from…’ another. This original negative charge also explains why Presocratic thinkers refrain from using it when describing their first principles. Additionally, Lévistone shows that, over time, the use of aitios with the dative becomes less frequent, probably reflecting a shift from considering someone aitios only for personal reasons to regarding them as such for the whole society. This would eventually lead to the broader and more abstract meaning of the word.
Chapters 2–5 are devoted to some of Plato’s dialogues. Mary Margaret McCabe’s contribution addresses the explanatory and causal power of the Form of the Good. McCabe starts from the Phaedo’s “simple-minded answer,” according to which particulars are beautiful because of the Beauty itself (100d), and investigates what kind of reality should be ascribed to properties like beauty or the good in this account. Traditionally, scholars commit Plato to ultra-realism, in which the Forms are actual, mind-independent, and objective. However, this interpretation fails to account for (a) the difference between properties like being square or pink and being good or beautiful and (b) the subjects’ disposition to find something to be a certain way. By relying on the image of the Sun, McCabe proposes a ‘mediated’ view, where the goodness or beauty of something arises from the complex relationship between real evaluative features (something has a disposition to goodness) and the subject’s ability to respond (someone has a disposition to find something good).
Saloni De Souza and Daniel Vázquez analyse the cosmological myth in the Statesman and illustrate its underlying causal architecture. Three aspects stand out in their analysis. First, they draw a distinction between ‘subordinate’ and ‘terminal’ causes, claiming that god’s goodness is the ultimate or ‘terminal’ cause which explains and is responsible for all other causes but itself requires no explanation. Second, they suggest that the god’s “letting go” of the cosmos exemplifies “causation by removal”: the removal of an activity explains the subsequent behaviour of the world. Lastly, they argue that the myth points to a “backward causation”, which prompts questions about whether Plato endorsed it and why we are so eager to reject it.
Viktor Ilievski analyses the complex interplay of necessity, chance, and demiurgic intelligence in the Timaeus and contends that they progressively approximate one another. Ilievski first shows that tuchē (chance) denotes a type of cause whose effects are necessary but purposeless. Then, Ilievski turns to anankē (necessity), contending that, in one sense, it overlaps with tuchē because both describe non-teleological constraints that the Demiurge must take into account. Finally, Ilievski concludes that Plato introduces an additional form of necessity—“the necessity of the good”, embodied by the Demiurge—which displays the features of both Aristotle’s efficient and teleological causes, and is necessary for the creation of the cosmos.
The central part of the volume contains four chapters (6–9) focused on Aristotle. A. Ross takes a close look at Aristotle’s account of aitia by analysing its eidē (material, formal, efficient, final) and its tropoi (prior/posterior; proper/accidental; potential/actual). He contends that this division illustrates different ways of explaining things, which are not inherently tied to a specific cosmology. This is because, according to Ross, Aristotle holds that the various ways in which things can be explained should be defined before any specific explanations are sought.
Cristina Viano addresses the debate regarding whether Aristotle is committed to the existence of prime matter. Modern scholarship often treats prime matter as a conceptual abstraction with no independent reality, whereas the traditional interpretation regards it as a genuine indeterminate substratum. Viano surveys the textual evidence and argues in favour of the traditional perspective: prime matter functions as the underlying substratum of the qualities that define the elements.
José María Llovet’s chapter addresses the following question: Can accidental causes be effective within Aristotle’s theory of causation? The chapter opens with the examination of the notions of accident (to sumbebēkos) and accidental causes. Then, Llovet shows that although most accidental causes are ineffective, some appear to be operative. This is particularly true in the case of chance events: while their causes are accidental, they can still successfully explain what happens. Finally, Llovet demonstrates that, while the causes of chance events may seem causally ineffective within a teleological framework, they may be effective within a different one. For instance, lifting a bull and getting injured may be deemed accidental from a teleological standpoint; however, a physicist might offer a natural explanation that makes the injury non-accidental.
María-Elena García-Peláez examines Aristotelian biology, focusing on the influence of environmental and climatic conditions on animal generation. García-Peláez shows that Aristotle attributes explanatory value to celestial bodies (notably the sun and moon), local environments, and regional landscapes. While celestial bodies serve as broader causes of generation, local and general factors affect the stature, shape, and temperament of inhabitants. The quality of air and water is also important. Drawing, probably, on the Hippocratic treatise Airs, Waters, Places, Aristotle claims that north and south winds can influence traits such as the sex of offspring. Thus, the traditional view that Aristotle considers only matter and form when explaining generation is unsatisfactory, for it overlooks the material nature of the seed and its vulnerability to weather conditions.
Carlo Natali investigates the relationship between causality and moral responsibility in Aristotle. By focusing on the notion of what “depends on us” (to eph’ hēmin), Natali argues that Aristotle avoids determinism without endorsing the idea that choice is completely gratuitous. He thus challenges scholars who ascribe to Aristotle the view that we are free to choose only before our character is fully formed. To do this, Natali first asserts that choices are among ta eph’ hēmin. Then, he points out that our choices are always directed towards an end, namely the final cause. He concludes that, since the final cause does not force us, human decisions are caused without being compelled.
In Chapter 10, Daniel Vázquez argues that the early Stoics develop various theories of causation that share family resemblances. He highlights three main internal distinctions. First, although Zeno engages in detail with Plato’s Phaedo and the Sophist, later Stoics appear more detached from the Platonic tradition. Second, Zeno differentiates between causes and consequences, while Chrysippus refines the vocabulary and identifies four components in the causal process: the cause (aition), the effect (dia ti), the logos of the cause, and the affected body. According to a third Stoic theory of causation, causes possess a dual relationship, one with the affected bodies and another with the effects they produce. Finally, while probably building upon Zeno’s reflections, Chrysippus is more interested in reconciling determinism with moral responsibility. According to Vázquez, the increasing complexity of Stoic causal accounts may reflect their growing focus on how moral responsibility can fit a deterministic framework.
The concluding chapters (11 and 12), by Michael Chase and Luis Xavier López-Farjeat, focus on Islamic thinkers. Chase discusses al-Naẓẓām’s theory of latency and manifestation, according to which all things were created once and for all by God. At first, they existed in a state of total mixture; gradually, everything emerged from it. Chase then examines al-Naẓẓām’s view that human beings have power only over phenomena within their bodies, while external occurrences depend on the natures God inscribed in each thing, and reconstructs al-Naẓẓām’s critiques of both the proto-occasionalistic and deterministic doctrines prevalent in his time. López-Farjeat examines Ibn Taymiyya’s view on creation. In contrast to Avicenna and Averroes, Ibn Taymiyya advocates a form of perpetual creation without asserting that all things existed from eternity. In his view, although God’s activity is continuous, each created entity comes to be in time. This is possible because Ibn Taymiyya interprets creation as the activity of producing one entity after another.
This volume provides a comprehensive and insightful discussion of causation, explanation, and responsibility. It summarises, expands, and revisits the state of the question, taking into account contributions from several languages. Some chapters show that aspects usually considered as causally ineffective—such as tuchē (chance), cases of removal, and environmental conditions—were in fact relevant to ancient philosophers. The reader can also find new takes on familiar texts, as well as topics or texts often overlooked in the scholarship. As a result, the volume makes a highly valuable contribution to the field and will benefit readers interested in ancient philosophy and its legacy.
That said, the volume’s ambitious scope and editorial choices sometimes weaken its coherence. Contributions speak to one another only sporadically. Also, there is some tension brought about by the inclusion of Islamic thinkers under the title “ancient philosophy.” Conversely, there are some unexpected (and glaring) gaps. For example, the volume does not address the juridical, historiographical, and medical uses of the words aitia and aitios (although this may be understandable given the focus on philosophy), nor does it discuss Middle- and Neoplatonic perspectives. To be sure, as Ross acknowledges in the introduction, “it is impossible to offer an exhaustive revision of this subject in only one volume” (p. 7); yet including these topics would have nicely completed the work and enriched it in a most welcome way.
A few minor formal issues also detract slightly from the overall quality of this collection. Citations and transliterations are inconsistent. There are variations in the use of Greek script versus transcription and, when transcribed, in the use of the macron and marking of accents, and the rendering of letters such as ‘υ’ (‘u’ or ‘y’) and ‘χ’ (‘ch’ or ‘kh’). While editorial flexibility is not inherently problematic, this approach may confuse non-Greek readers. Also, it can introduce inconsistencies, which even Greek readers may find problematic. In the index, for instance, planōmenē aitia appears as planomene aitia, and logos is printed as lógos. I also note that the index contains minor errors, such as “Donini, Pierre” instead of “Donini, Pierluigi”.
Authors and titles
Introduction, Alberto Ross
- “Note on the Original Meaning of Greek Aitios”, David Lévistone
- “What Good Is the Form of the Good?”, Mary Margaret McCabe
- “That’s What Makes the World Go Round: Causation in the Myth in the Statesman”, Saloni de Souza and Daniel Vázquez
- “Chance, Necessity, and Demiurgic Causation in the Timaeus”, Viktor Ilievski
- “Cause and Explanation in Aristotle: Logos, Eidos, and Tropos, Alberto Ross
- “Aristotle With Prime Matter”, Cristina Viano
- “Aristotle on the Efficiency of Accidental Causes”, José María Llovet
- “The Relevance of Environmental Conditions as Causes for Animal Generation in Aristotle”, María-Elena García-Peláez
- “Aristotle’s Causes and the Problem of the Necessity of Our Actions”, Carlo Natali
- “Theories of Causation in Early Stoicism”, Daniel Vázquez
- “The Scientific Epistemology of al-Naẓẓām”, Michael Chase
- “Recovering Causality? Ibn Taymiyya on the Creation of the World”, Luis Xavier López-Farjeat