In this brief book, Dominic Scott sets out to “examine contemplation from a political perspective” (p.1) by evaluating its significance for individuals and, in particular, for the city in Plato’s Republic and in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. To advance his aim, Scott divides the issue into two interconnected questions. First, he differentiates between the intrinsic and instrumental value of contemplation, for both individuals and the city. Then, he poses the question of whether civic happiness should be understood in aggregative or organic terms. According to the aggregative perspective (A), civic happiness is merely the aggregate of individual happiness; alternatively (O), it is an organic or holistic quality that arises from the structure of the city. The breakdown of the main issue into several questions is highly beneficial for readers, as it enables a clearer understanding of the topic and clarifies what is genuinely at stake.
Regarding the Republic, Scott argues that for the individual (I), contemplation possesses both intrinsic (I1) and instrumental (I2) value, whereas for the city (C), it only has instrumental (C2) value, not intrinsic (C1), because Plato espouses an organic view of happiness (and, perhaps, of the city). Scott barely discusses the intrinsic value of contemplation for the individual (I1), since it is quite uncontroversial. Regarding the instrumental value of contemplation (I2), Scott contends that this can be demonstrated from two perspectives: (a) it offers the greatest and purest kind of pleasure (book IX), and (b) it fosters moral virtues.
When it comes to civic happiness, Scott briefly shows that contemplation is instrumental to civic happiness (C2)—which, again, is widely accepted. Yet, to determine whether contemplation is also intrinsically valuable to the city, he takes a detour. That contemplation is intrinsically valuable for the city means that it is a component of civic eudaimonia. But what is civic eudaimonia? Arguing against Vlastos,[1] Scott compellingly contends that Plato was committed to an organic view of eudaimonia: the city’s goal is to ensure the happiness of the entire city, even if this involves some sacrifice by certain parts (e.g., philosopher-rulers cannot contemplate forever and must occasionally return to the city). If this is correct, then the possibility that “merely by contemplating and without actually ruling, the philosophers contribute intrinsic value to the state” can be dismissed (p. 17). This is because such a view would require an aggregative view of happiness. Then, Scott takes a further step and claims that, since “civic happiness just is proportion, harmony and unity”, and because contemplation is not among these constituents, it cannot be intrinsically beneficial to the city within an organic conception either (p. 17).
The discussion of Aristotle’s texts follows a similar pattern. Scott maintains that, regarding both the individual and the city, contemplation has only intrinsic value (I1 / C1). The claim that contemplation must possess intrinsic rather than instrumental value directly derives from Aristotle’s view that contemplation is for its own sake, not a means to reach another end. For, if contemplation is to be done for its own sake, it can scarcely bear any instrumental value.
It is quite clear and generally admitted that contemplation can be intrinsically valuable for the individual. However, what implications does this have for the city? To address this question, Scott examines whether Aristotle is committed to an aggregative (A) or an organic (O) view of happiness. Weaving together the strengths of the two main contemporary perspectives of the issue, Scott contends that Aristotle endorses both views: contemplation holds intrinsic value for the city (C1) both because its citizens contemplate and by doing so attain happiness (A), and also because “contemplation is something around which the city is structured” (O), being sponsored and supported by its rulers (p. 43).
The final section of the book focuses on how contemplation—which in NE was portrayed as a largely solitary activity—can be integrated into the life of the city and contribute to its overall happiness. Scott contends that in the Politics contemplation is not separated from the political sphere, because promoting philosophy and contemplation is integral to the realisation of civic happiness (p. 41). He also argues that Aristotle understands contemplation as extending beyond mere theoria of divine beings. Since contemplation can cover other subjects, such as mathematical theorems or biological phenomena, many citizens—and not just a few marginal individuals—can attain happiness. As a result, the whole city can reach a state of well-being.
The book is very clear, well-written, and thought-provoking: the arguments are solid and textually grounded. Everyone working in ancient ethics and politics will benefit from reading it, despite its brevity. In fact, I have only one major query and some very minor complaints.
The query concerns Scott’s attempt to show that Aristotle endorsed both an aggregative and an organic view of civic happiness. According to Scott, this is not implausible: Aristotle posits two types of eudaimonia, primary and secondary; therefore, he might support either the aggregative or the organic view of civic happiness depending on the nature of activity being identified with eudaimonia. If the activity involves practical reason, then the type of happiness will be an organic or holistic property; if the activity involves theoretical contemplation, happiness would be the sum of happinesses of contemplating individuals. Ingenious as it may be, this reading seems ultimately to lack a firm textual basis. Additionally, it could potentially be weakened by Politics VII.3, where Aristotle describes the degenerative form of contemplative life for the city. In this context, Aristotle does not portray the contemplative city as one in which most citizens engage in pointless and impractical activities, but rather as a city leading an antisocial life, with minimal or no interactions with other cities. As a result, it might be argued that the city can be said to engage in contemplation, and that this form of contemplation does not depend upon the citizens of the city.[2]
My minor complaints concern issues that have not been addressed, but could have been relevant to the book’s aims. Regarding Plato, Scott briefly mentions that contemplation has intrinsic value for individuals. This is not a primary focus of the book, which is mainly dedicated to civic happiness. Yet it could have been helpful for the reader to have a short discussion on whether contemplation is a necessary or also a sufficient condition for eudaimonia. To put it otherwise: is it possible for Plato to be happy solely through contemplation, even within an unjust city, or is a good city required to attain eudaimonia?[3] At certain points, Scott appears to consider this issue; however, I could not find any clear answer to the question. A more detailed discussion of this topic could also have been helpful in relation to Scott’s account of the instrumental role of contemplation in producing virtues (perspective (b) on I2). Famously, the philosopher is said to return to the city. But what if no one could compel him to do so, or if the philosopher chose to disobey and spend his time contemplating? Aronson famously observed that this would make the philosopher happy but unjust.[4] If so, contemplation could not serve an instrumental purpose for the individual, in the sense required by (b)—quite the contrary.
In the section dedicated to Aristotle, given that the intrinsic value of contemplation in NE is commonly accepted, Scott could have considered whether contemplation is only a necessary or also a sufficient condition for eudaimonia. In other words, can someone be happy solely through contemplation, or must they be virtuous first to attain the highest form of happiness? If the latter, then contemplation might hold some indirect instrumental value: only by developing virtues, can one then contemplate and achieve the ultimate, godlike eudaimonia.
No attention is given to the Protrepticus, which, however, could have proved quite relevant to understanding theôria and its connection to action in Aristotle, and might have nicely completed the reconstruction provided—bridging, as it were, the gap between Plato and Aristotle.[5] I also note that Scott does not consider Ward’s recent book on theôria in Plato and Aristotle,[6] nor the collection of essays devoted to theôria edited by Destrée and Zingano.[7] In keeping with the brevity of the book, the bibliography is essential, and the vast majority of the scholarly literature is in English.
Notes
[1] G. Vlastos, “The Theory of Social Justice in the Polis in Plato’s Republic”. In Studies in Greek Philosophy, edited by D. Graham, vol. II. Princeton University Press: Princeton, 1995: 69–103.
[2] D. Morrison, “Aristotle on the Happiness of the City”. In L’excellence politique chez Aristote, edited by V. Laurand and J. Terrel. Vrin: Peeters, 2017: 11–24.
[3] Discussion of these issues can be found in M. Vegetti, “How and Why did Plato’s Republic Become Apolitical?”. In Dialogues on Plato’s Politeia (Republic). Selected Papers from the Ninth Symposium Platonicum, edited by N. Noburo, and L. Brisson. Academia Verlag: Sankt Augustin, 2013: 3–15. See also R. D. Mohr, “The Eminence of Social Justice in Plato”, Illinois Classical Studies, 16, 1991: 193–9 (not cited by Scott).
[4] S. H. Aronson, “The Happy Philosopher—A Counterexample to Plato’s Proof”, Journal of the History of Philosophy 10, 1972: 383–98 (not cited by Scott).
[5] See, for instance, C. Bobonich, “Why Should Philosophers Rule? Plato’s Republic and Aristotle’s Protrepticus”, Social Philosophy and Policy 24, 2007: 153–75.
[6] J. K. Ward, Searching for the Divine in Plato and Aristotle. Philosophical Theoria and Traditional Practice. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge , 2021.
[7] P. Destrée and M. Zingano, Theoria. Studies on the Status and Meaning of Contemplation in Aristotle’s Ethics. Louvain-la-Neuve: Peeters, 2014.