Lora Mariat, Professeure agrégée of Philosophy at the University of Franche-Comté, offers a rigorous investigation in Les Savoirs de l’invisible: De la météorologie ancienne à la philosophie platonicienne.
During my early academic training, my first encounters with Plato’s dialogues were marked by the idea that the philosopher of the Academy served as an intellectual “sounding board”. From this perspective, the various currents of his time, along with the philosophical heritage that preceded him, are absorbed and recalibrated to produce an entirely different resonance. Epic and lyric poetry, tragedy, comedy, and historiography, among other genres, undergo assimilation into the Platonic dialogues and are recontextualized within a novel observational framework. This phenomenon was famously codified nearly a century ago by Auguste Diès as the transposition platonicienne,[1] an approach that Lora Mariat explicitly acknowledges in the introduction of her splendid study.
While the general perspective of the book aligns with this hermeneutic line, the originality and academic value of Mariat’s interpretation lie in demonstrating with philological acuity how certain fundamental passages within the Platonic corpus exhibit deeper levels of meaning when juxtaposed in direct and polemical dialogue with significant texts (especially those of Aristophanes and the anonymous Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine) and how Plato positions himself with a critical attitude, skilfully adopting the strategy of surenchère —here understood as a rhetorical escalation or ‘doubling down’ in which an opposing premise is appropriated and intensified to strengthen Plato’s own position.
Mariat establishes a precise historical framework for understanding the genesis of philosophy, conceptualizing it not as a spontaneous emergence of human thought, but as a discipline forged in the crucible of fifth-century BCE polemics. The author contends that philosophy, as a distinct category, was preceded by a broader and more undifferentiated “knowledge of the invisible.” This nascent intellectual movement sought to unravel the hidden mechanisms of the cosmos—“the things above” (μετέωρα) and those beneath the earth (ὑπὸ γῆς)—setting aside the divine narratives of traditional myth in favor of material and causal explanations through the elements—specifically air, ether, and water—and the interaction of qualities organized in pairs, such as hot-cold, wet-dry, and so forth. Within the caricatured framework offered by Aristophanes in The Clouds, Socrates does not appear as an explicit denier of the existence of the gods, but as a sage who reconfigures visible and invisible (ἀφανῆ) things, situating the latter within a rigorous system of material causality. This kind of paradigm shift brought with it a series of hostile reactions. Legislative measures, such as the decree of Diopeithes (ca. 433–432 BCE), sought to criminalize these investigations under the rubric of impiety, insofar as they supplanted the gods with physical necessity. As demonstrated by the trials of Anaxagoras and Socrates himself, the general environment in which these materialistic inquiries flourished was intrinsically polemical and conflict-ridden.
In her book, Mariat identifies and focuses on two key phases of this intellectual controversy: first, the detractors of this type of knowledge—notably Aristophanes in The Clouds and the anonymous author of On Ancient Medicine—who, without distinction, grouped a heterogeneous and multifaceted group of “thinkers” (astronomers, sophists, physicians, and others) investigating “the things above” under the rubric of “meteorologists”; and second, the defenders of this kind of knowledge, primarily Plato, who incorporated the criticisms of the first group to establish philosophy as a distinct and self-grounded discipline. In this sense, Mariat’s main objective is to analyze how Plato systematically rehabilitated this “meteorological” stigma, established above all in the Athenian scene of Aristophanic comedies, to construct the positive identity of “the philosopher” as a category.
The volume comprises two symmetrical parts, each containing four sections and a discussion framing Plato as the primary antagonist to both the Aristophanic and Hippocratic traditions. In Part I (pp. 27-137), Mariat examines the meteorological object of study through the lens of Aristophanes. In this context, “air” (ἀήρ) stands out as the object of study par excellence, not so much for its physical properties as for its elevated position in the cosmos. Air appears to be associated with ether (αἰθήρ), which is said to lie even higher, and also with the sky above the earth. This framework depicts the intellectual as politically detached, with his “feet in the air,” preoccupied with certain physical and medical theories (especially with those of Diogenes of Apollonia) that makes air, particularly that which is in a higher position and in a purer state, the cause of intelligence. In this sense, Plato is far from trying to dissociate Socrates from Aristophanic accusations—as Xenophon intended, for example, according to whom Socrates was interested in the practical application of abstract knowledge as well as ethical questions. By contrast, Plato strategically appropriates the caricature, transfiguring the comic “reversal” of the thinker into a method of intellectual transcendence, especially in the philosophical excursus of the Theaetetus. By shifting the focus from physical study of the sky and the things above to a metaphysical inquiry into the Ideas, Plato transforms philosophy into a “hyper-meteorology.”
Subsequently, the author undertakes an analysis of the investigative method proper to meteorology, primarily based on the Hippocratic treatise On Ancient Medicine (Part II, pp. 139-261). Here, certain innovative physicians are criticized for adopting the methodology of natural philosophers (Empedocles or Anaxagoras) when making their diagnoses and elucidating the aetiology of maladies: they employ unverifiable hypotheses pertaining to intrinsically invisible principles (for example, pure heat, pure moisture, and so on). Those who proceed in this way are labelled “charlatans” who only exhibit verbose argumentation. In this context, Isocrates, for example, endeavoured to dissociate philosophy from speculative sciences, championing instead its pragmatic application, the culmination of which resides in rhetoric, particularly due to its utility within civic political discourse. Plato, in contrast, elected to employ hypotheses, as articulated by his Socrates in the Phaedo, as a constituent element of dialectical progression, which ultimately leads to an unhypothetical (anhypotheton) principle. Furthermore, in the Phaedrus, Plato posits that both medicine and rhetoric—notwithstanding Isocrates’s counterposition—ought to be underpinned by speculative knowledge, which facilitates the comprehension of the individual in relation to its encompassing totality.
One of the particularly salient aspects of Mariat’s analysis appears to be the presentation of an initial conflicting situation (Aristophanic derision and the Hippocratic stance) against which a group of thinkers react, differing from each other in the position they adopt (Plato, Xenophon, Isocrates). Another salient aspect is the attitude of the philosopher Plato, who intensifies his intellectual endeavour by incorporating antecedent philosophical tenets into his own conceptual framework, thereby imbuing them with renewed significance and impetus. Among the greatest achievements of Mariat’s approach is the delineation of the relationship between the whole and its constituent parts, particularly emphasizing the pre-eminence of the soul—both individual and cosmic—within Plato’s philosophy, serving as the organizing intelligence that perpetually seeks the Good (pp. 215-261).[2] This conceptualization and perception of the holistic framework within his philosophy—in contrast to the perspectives of contemporary sages, traditional rhetoricians, and physicians—appears to constitute a clear demonstration of the Platonic surenchère, a nearly inherent impulse of the philosopher Plato toward intensification and progressive philosophical elaboration.
By way of conclusion, I shall briefly address some of the key strengths of Mariat’s research while also noting some limitations.
Regarding the work’s strengths, first and foremost is Mariat’s refined prose and command of primary sources –spanning Attic drama, Hippocratic medicine, Presocratic thought, and the Platonic dialogues– which, complemented by concise recapitulations at the end of each section, ensures a clear elucidation of the central arguments. Building upon this, the book offers a significant advancement in framing the polemic surrounding “meteorological” knowledge as a natural continuity of the intellectual development of philosophy. Finally, and perhaps most laudably, Mariat demonstrates a remarkable philological sensitivity in connecting the various analysed passages. A notable example is her analysis of Republic 488a7–489a6 and Statesman 299b3-c4 (pp. 202-205), where she identifies Plato’s veiled responses to his detractors through the strategic recovery of significant terms such as ἀδολέσχης (p. 202, n. 153; similarly, εὐήθης on p. 211, n. 170), μετεωροσκόπος (p. 203, n. 154), and the like. This interpretive depth is further enriched by her identification of the historical targets of the criticized method: the Hippocratic author of On Breaths and his hypothesis of air-based causality; Philolaus of Croton, who replaces the principles of physics with those of mathematics; Empedocles’ reliance on invisible elements to explain the reality of the universe; and, possibly, Anaxagoras’s proposal of νοῦς as the invisible organizing principle of the cosmos.
Despite these undeniable merits, the volume presents certain limitations that warrant attention:
- While Aristophanes is framed as the primary critic of “meteorological” sages, the author does not explore whether his caricature was intended seriously. It remains unclear –and perhaps beyond the book’s scope– whether the comedian aimed to provide a substantive critique of the intellectual climate of his own time, or if he simply exploited the stereotype of the “wise man” to entertain his audience.
- A text that deserved some investigation—or at least a brief mention—is the pseudo-Platonic Epinomis. Setting aside the perennial debates about its authenticity, one must wonder what this text could contribute to the academic and historical debates of the analysed period. Or rather, what would the Epinomis contribute through its proposal of the study of number and astronomy as the true piety that sees in the stars intelligent living beings endowed with souls? Did Plato or his secretary Philip of Opus intend, with this opuscule, to respond to the caricatures or to intervene in the intellectual polemic of the era?
- Finally, although the research framework is clear, it would have been worthwhile to consider Plato’s “unwritten doctrines.” Despite being controversial, these doctrines catalyse scholarly debate and deserve attention. If Plato’s writing strategy was typically one of surenchère, could the postulation of “the One” be seen as his ultimate “raising the stakes”?[3] This perspective is missing from Mariat’s portrait of the philosopher Plato. Just as Anaxagoras stopped halfway by not endowing his νοῦς with a soul, and Greek physicians overlooked the soul’s role in physical health, our understanding of the written Plato remains incomplete without including “the One” in our interpretative horizon as the ultimate Principle of Plato’s Philosophy.
While the physical quality of the volume is good, the Greek text contains a discernible number of typographical inaccuracies, specifically, misplaced accents, incorrect breathings, and typos (e.g., αἰθηρ-αἰθήρ, οὑτοιι-οὑτοιί, Ἕπειτ’-ἔπειτα, μουσοποοῦσιν-μουσοποιοῦσιν, among others). Furthermore, for reasons unexplained (possibly to conserve space), the passages from Aristophanes are regrettably rendered in prose chunks rather than lines of verse. The names of the characters from the comedies or the Platonic dialogues, when written entirely in capital letters, require the omission of diacritics.[4]
Notes
[1] A. Diès, Autour de Platon. Essais de critique et d’histoire, G. Beauchesne Éditeur, Paris, 1927, pp. 400-449 (vol. 2).
[2] It is significant—and certainly not coincidental—that the final words of Mariat’s study, prior to the conclusions, are precisely “towards the Good”. This is the ultimate aim of Plato’s written work, a point that the reader should constantly keep in mind.
[3] I am thinking, above all, of Aristotle’s testimony (Metaph. N 4, 1091 b13-15 [= Test. Plat. 51, p. 531 Gaiser]: τῶν δὲ τὰς ἀκινήτους οὐσίας εἶναι λεγόντων οἱ μέν φασιν αὐτὸ τὸ ἕν τὸ ἀγαθὸν αὐτὸ εἶναι κτλ.) and that of Aristoxenus (Elem. Harm. 2. 39-40 Da Rios [= Test. Plat. 7, p. 452 Gaiser]: (…) καὶ τὸ πέρας, ὅτι <τ>ἀγαθὸν ἐστιν ἕν κτλ.) and the numerous allusions to “the One” in the Platonic corpus itself. On this point, see especially K. Gaiser, Platons ungeschriebene Lehre. Studien zur systematischen und geschichtlichen Begründung der Wissenschaften in der Platonischen Schule, Ernst Klett Verlag, Stuttgart, 21968; G. Reale, Per una nuova interpretazione di Platone alla luce delle “dottrine non scritte”, Bompiani, Milan 222010, p. 220-227. For a French perspective on the subject, see Marie-Dominique Richard, L’enseignement oral de Platon: une nouvelle interprétation du platonisme, Paris, Éditions du Cerf, 1986.
[4] This review was initially drafted in Spanish and then translated with the aid of DeepL Translator.