[Authors and titles are listed at the end of the review]
The decades between the death of Severus Alexander and the establishment of the tetrarchic government under Diocletian have long loomed large in scholarship on the Roman world. The period is widely framed as a time of existential challenges (“crisis”): standard narratives hold that the Empire, when it recovered, emerged as a significantly different political, military, and ideological organism. Those who have studied this period from the perspective of the imperial center have traditionally framed the transformation(s) of the 3rd century CE in rather negative terms. Central to the discussion have been aspects such as (a) economic downturns; (b) the decentralization of political power (which German scholarship in particular saw as detrimental to the efficiency of Roman governmentality and almost antithetical to the very definition of Empire); (c) the contraction of trading activities in the Indian Ocean; and (d) the devastating forays into the Mesopotamian provinces by the rising Sāsānid power. At the same time, it has not escaped specialists that the “crisis” was neither generalized across the Empire nor uniform in its intensity. In some cases, it did not even manifest itself at all. Perhaps the most famous—although, in many respects, quite peculiar—case of a community that turned the more general “crisis” into an opportunity is that of Palmyra. Its power and wealth rose to unprecedented heights precisely during the “crisis”, with its fortunes declining right when the imperial center under Aurelian got a stronger foothold for the first time in decades and decidedly reasserted itself throughout the provinces.
The contributions collected in Palmyra, the Roman Empire, and the Third Century Crisis approach the period innovatively in their attempt to make sense of this and similar (apparently paradoxical) discrepancies. The volume takes a trans-local perspective. On the one hand, it is scaling up, as the subtitle has it, beyond the Syrian frontier as far away as Inner Asia and, following the Palmyrene diaspora, to Aksum and the Indian Ocean. On the other hand, it is zooming in on microhistories brought to the surface, quite literally, through archaeological fieldwork; through the rich record of funerary inscriptions and sarcophagi; and through the personal networks established within the city and across the broader region that do not (fully) overlap with the caravan enterprises for which Pearl of the Desert has traditionally attracted scholarly attention.[1] In doing so, the volume presents a compelling holistic overview of the famous city in its broader historical context, emphasizing chronological unevenness in the economic, political, and religious development which affected not just Palmyra but the broader Syrian borderland (with important comparative focuses on Dura or Ḥaṭrāʾ, for example) and beyond. On a theoretical level, the editors’ introduction and several individual chapters go to some length in redefining the very concept of “crisis”—although, it bears emphasis, not all, and not all in similar ways. Crisis is an intrinsically ambiguous concept, which, at its core, stresses the processual aspect of the phenomenon. In keeping with this, the volume approaches the “crisis” as a time of irrefutable challenges, at times existential in their depth, extension, and intensity; and it points out that the Empire as a system emerged successfully, drawing new lifeblood to rule the broader Mediterranean world for almost two centuries more (detailed terminological and historiographical discussion in Kai Ruffing’s chapter). The important concluding chapter by Emanuele Intagliata shows that this judgement can to a certain extent be extended to Palmyra as well. Surely enough, Palmyra’s hegemonic bid failed, and its civic life was significantly affected by the Roman (re)conquest. But it would be wrong to speak of outright decline: under the auspices of a frontier town, the town maintained a significant regional role in the transformed provincial landscape of Syria well after Zenobia’s downfall, and in Late Antiquity it became home to a rather vibrant multi-religious landscape (a point discussed, from the standpoint of Jewish and Manichaean history, by Nathanael Andrade).
The volume has not been organized into separate sections. The editors might have considered this unnecessary, preferring the general unifying thread linking the essays under the rubric of “the crisis” (its effects in and beyond Palmyra, and its very existence as such). The decision was perhaps slightly infelicitous, as readers could have benefited from some internal organization (e.g. thematic, with a clearer distinction between the zooming in and scaling up chapters) in navigating the arguments of individual chapters and cross-referencing argumentative threads and bodies of evidence across chapters. Nevertheless, it is still possible to single out several focal points in the volume’s discussion. On the zooming in end of the spectrum, there are the essays devoted to the city’s material and epigraphic culture, such as the chapters by Olympia Bobou and Rubina Raja, Sarah Madole Lewis, Françoise Briquel-Chatonnet, and Jean-Baptiste Yon. One of the most intriguing insights of this group of studies is that uneven wealth concentration and social inequalities were intensifying already before the imperial power-bid under Zenobia. Several contributors even argue that Zenobia’s bid might have functioned, at least partly, as a safety-valve, or an emergency measure, responding to a more generalized economic downturn that may have resulted from the assertive policies of the Sāsānids, discussed and contextualized against the broader framework of the Īrānian world by Matthew Canepa. Briquel-Chatonnet’s reflections on the sociology behind Aramaic writing by comparing Palmyra itself and Edessa are equally illuminating: they shed light on the capacity of religiously driven literacy to form trans-local bonds and shape cross-cultural communities. The resilience of these communities proved stronger than the one built on the economic activities that was intimately tied up with Palmyra’s elite, despite the existence of a prominent diaspora. In a sophisticated, highly self-reflective, and literary-inspired chapter, Jen Baird questions the impact of the Roman army on the Syrian frontier during the height of the Sāsānid power projection into the East. Bridging economic analysis, studies in material culture, and histoire bataille, Baird’s chapter leverages contemporary insights from the Syrian civil war and the concept of “domicide” (silent destruction and ruination of the living space, which is forcibly experienced by individuals who, for different reasons, cannot leave). There has, to be sure, been no lack of scholars arguing that the presence of the Roman military in Palmyra (and elsewhere) led to overall positive outcomes, such as agricultural development or by functioning as an economic multiplier. However, Baird points toward archaeological evidence for expropriation, overcrowding, and other signs of a general deterioration of the living experience across the urban landscape of Roman Syria; and she uses this to draw attention to how changing times were experienced by people whose voices do not usually make it into the historical record. (This includes children: toys recovered in the hastily built ramparts of places like Dura, at times cutting directly through entire habitational blocks, point to processes of alienation and displacement not recoverable in other ways by the modern researcher).
A second block of chapters can be singled out for investigating the topic of cults, religious practices, and general religious trends (addressed from the perspective of continuity and (or?) rupture, but in different ways, by Wolfgang Spickermann, Lucinda Dirven, and Andrade). These are among the volume’s essays in which the “crisis” is less visible, not least due to the challenging evidence. These authors (especially Dirven) emphasize the resilience of locally structured cults and religious practices. This is perhaps at least in part a consequence of the community’s social organization, even though archaic-looking cults may hide theological developments that the available sources make difficult to grasp. The once popular view that the increasing appeal of mystery cults and soteriological religions (including Christianity) was a response to the failure of traditional gods and rituals appears now rather questionable. Rather, Palmyra appears to conform to longer-term trends not extraneous to other parts of the Empire (as pointed out in Spickermann’s chapter) while at the same time retaining a distinctive religious tradition tied deeply to the history of Semitic communities in the area (including mobile pastoralists, a point emphasized in Dirven’s chapter).
Two chapters (by Michael Speidel and Andrew Wilson) focus on the military aspect of the “crisis”. They highlight how different local and (trans)regional actors are responsible both for the challenges of the imperial infrastructure in the broader Syrian theater, as well as for some of the responses that the Empire eventually managed to put in place, which ultimately secured its survival as an integrated and, overall, effective system. While both authors do not deny the momentous scale of the pressure faced by Rome’s security infrastructure during the decades of the “crisis”, Speidel emphasizes the system’s capacity for adaptation and resilience, not least due to its ability to count on the (self-interested) support of local rulers and their social networks, which often stretched well beyond the “radius of action” of imperial institutions.[2] By not (or not exclusively) drawing on imperial resources for the defense of territories (and revenues) that the Empire nevertheless claimed, even ambitious warlords like Odainath could act in the interest, and, eventually, in support, of the Empire. On the other hand, Wilson stresses the downside of this very same process of “secondary state formation” in borderlands or frontier zones. Wilson sees the growth in Palmyrene power and Zenobia’s push into Egypt in particular as responsible for the thinning of military personnel in the Eastern desert, who were essential for guaranteeing safe passage as well as the upkeep of the vital infrastructure behind the land-based leg of the Ocean trade. The instability brought by the Palmyrenes’ foray emboldened frontier actors such as the Blemmyes. This in turn brought about more instability, it increased transaction costs, and it eventually caused a shrinkage in trade, which had become unprofitable in light of soaring entrepreneurial risks.
Perhaps predictably, the most conspicuous cluster of chapters is devoted to the broader context of both Palmyra and the “crisis”. This cluster contains chapters devoted to the Indian Ocean world (by Eivind Seland); to Īrān and its imperial succession under the Arsakids and the particularly relevant Sāsānids (by Canepa); as well as the world of the Chinese Far West and Inner Asia (by Thomas Høisæter). Dealing with a historical horizon that is usually not familiar to Classicists and Mediterranean historians, this last chapter might well be the most original chapter of the volume. Among its significant strengths, the chapter is particularly valuable for the volume in affording a comparative foil and adducing evidence to illustrate how and why even cataclysmic collapse at the center did not herald just ruination but in fact opened up unprecedented opportunities for several “peripheral” actors. For indeed, in the Sinic world, the 3rd century CE did mean the crumbling away of a system of centralized government that had dominated East Asia for some 400 years. And indeed, the kingdom of the Tarim basin provides an unusual but extremely compelling comparative benchmark against which to rethink some structural issues of Palmyrene history anew.
A detailed index of names and places concludes the book. The volume is generally well edited, despite a few typos and inconsistencies across chapters (for example, in naming practices: Odenath/Odainath). A wealth of maps, drawings, and photographs further enrich the collection. The volume certainly marks a valuable contribution to the vibrant field of Palmyra studies, as testified, not least, by the flurry of recent publications on the subject, including those in the same series as the present volume (Oriens et occidens).
Authors and titles
Palmyra and the Third Century Crisis: Entangled Perspectives, Rubina Raja and Eivind Heldaas Seland
Was There a Crisis of the Third Century CE?, Kai Ruffing
The Military in the Third-Century Roman Empire: An Overview, Michael A. Speidel
Religious Trends in the Roman West in the Third Century CE, Wolfgang Spickermann
The Third Century in the Iranian World, a Time of Rupture and Renovation: Palmyra between the Arsacid and the Sasanian Empires, Matthew Canepa
The Crisis of the Third Century in East Asia Political Collapse and Change in East and Inner Asia During the Third Century CE, Tomas Larsen Høisæter
Palmyra and the Indian Ocean World in the Third Century CE, Eivind Heldaas Seland
Sheltering from Crisis: Living the Third Century in Roman Syria, J.A. Baird
Palmyra in the Third Century CE: Looking for the Invisible ‘Crisis’ at Home, Olympia Bobou and Rubina Raja
The Third Century Crisis and the Sarcophagus Market in Syria, Sarah Madole Lewis
The Development of Aramaic Writing Between Palmyra and Edessa at the Turn of the Third Century, Françoise Briquel-Chatonnet
The Third Century Crisis and Religious Life in Palmyra, Lucinda Dirven
Inscriptions in Third Century Palmyra: Where is the Crisis?, Jean-Baptiste Yon
The Palmyrene Revolt, the Eastern Desert of Egypt, and Red Sea Trade in the Late Third Century CE, Andrew Wilson
Third-Century Palmyra After Das palmyrenische Teilreich The Palmyrenes and Their Connections to Jews, Christians, Baptists, and Manichaeans, Nathanael Andrade
What’s New in Palmyra? Notes on Housing, Society, and the Role of the City after the Third Century CE Crisis, Emanuele E. Intagliata
Notes
[1] Rubina Raja, Pearl of the Desert. A History of Palmyra (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2022).
[2] Sebastian Fink, “The Collapse of Early Mesopotamian Empires—A Homemade Disaster?” Journal of Ancient Civilizations 36/1, 1–32 distinguishes between a “radius of direct rule” and a “radius of action” (the zone where the state/empire can intervene militarily). He further identifies “borderlands” (such as where Palmyrene élites’ social network operated) as the zone between the radius of direct rule and the radius of action.