Scholars of Aristotle’s practical works will welcome the appearance of a monograph devoted to the ergon argument. Jakub Jirsa’s thesis is that the ergon argument supports Aristotle’s various treatments of eudaimonia. The book addresses more and less than the title, The Function Argument in Aristotle’s Ethics, suggests, since it begins with Plato, Republic I and Aristotle’s Protrepticus (admittedly “not a work devoted to ethics per se,” 28) as conjecturally restored from Iamblichus by Hutchinson and Johnson, but does not consider the Magna Moralia or the De Virtutibus et Vitiis, in both of which ergon also occurs. It includes the usual front and back matter, and about a quarter of the volume is devoted to endnotes.
The introductory first chapter describes the structure of the book. It devotes considerable attention to eliciting a version of the ergon argument from Republic I, describing it is “part of a tradition which lays down the groundwork of ethics by examining human nature and its particulars when pitted against other forms of life” (9). In its Republic version, according to Jirsa, the ergon argument is “the first proactive step” in showing that the just life is the most beneficial life (10) or “the first productive step in Socrates’ argumentation” (12). In the author’s view, “Plato links ergon to nature (physis), combining meanings such as social descent and natural talent”; it “reflects their essence” (17; see also 134). Aristotle will, in the Protrepticus and the Nicomachean Ethics, trace the relations of ergon to activity and virtue to produce a “double ergon scheme,” so that the ergon of an entity is distinguished from the ergon of its excellence (19).
Chapter 2, on the Protrepticus, develops the double ergon scheme, drawing on Alexander of Aphrodisias’s commentary on the Topics, which indicates that contemplation is “appropriate for a human being (oikeion tōi anthrōpōi)” (22). This move, which the author says is “pivotal” for his interpretation, is used in arguing that the ergon argument is “a transition from formal or conceptual analysis to substantive ethical discussion” (28). “Formal” here indicates the ‘for the sake of which’, the self-sufficient, and other conditions outlined in EN I.7. The “core” of the ergon argument, which uses the double ergon scheme, is said to be that the most authoritative ergon of the entity is the ergon of its excellence (33; see also 40). The author finds a difficulty, however, since Aristotle says that “both truth and understanding are erga” (42). Which is supreme? The author opts for truth but qualifies this option with the observation that, for Aristotle, the two “cannot be entirely separate” (58).
Moving on to the Eudemian Ethics in Chapter 3, the author argues that the role of the ergon argument is the same in this work as in the Protrepticus—serving as a “transitional step from a formal discussion of ethical concepts to a substantive discussion in moral philosophy,” even though it differs in concluding to kalokagathia as complete excellence and stressing the human relation to the divine (61). This conclusion is reached, according to the author, by Aristotle’s identifying the ergon of the excellence with the ergon of the entity and with the goal (72) and by defining eudaimonia as the activity of a teleia life according to teleia excellence, as Aristotle gives it in 1219a38–39. Here the Greek is rendered by “perfect” rather than “complete” (74), although three pages later one finds “perfect (teleon) in the sense of being complete” (1219a35–36). Further: “The natural goods within kalokagathia acquire their value through their contribution to . . . contemplative activity” (81). (“Natural” here must mean something other than inborn since, for Aristotle, while at birth there may be different capacities for health and strength and so on in different people, these qualities are developed during the course of a lifetime by application.)
Chapter 4 addresses the Nicomachean Ethics, in which the ergon argument “should in fact be regarded as the basis of Aristotle’s ethical theory” and still, according to the author, “bridges the gap” from formal to substantive (83), though the results are different again, so that eudaimonia is theōria. The next chapter begins with a thematic statement of this position (111). This chapter contains an extended discussion of the inclusivist-exclusivist controversy and considers the related question whether teleios ought to be rendered by “complete” or by “perfect.” In criticism of Ackrill, the author observes: “In 1100a1–5, Aristotle does not discuss virtue but life span (bios) and ‘teleia aretē’ is only mentioned to clarify that this perfect or complete virtue still requires a complete life as well” (103). The Greek, however, shows a parallel kai … kai … construction, which does not suggest the afterthought qualification signaled by Jirsa’s “as well.”
Chapter 5 recapitulates what has gone before under the rubric “The ergon argument and eudaimonia.” For the author, “eudaimonia is a certain activity (energeia) and … this activity is contemplation [theōria]” which “is virtually the same for the gods as it is for humans,” though their bios differs (112). The chapter goes on to consider again the inclusivist-exclusivist controversy and some expressions that are important to the author’s argument, including zōē, bios, and teleios. The result is qualified: “eudaimonia is indeed a single activity,” though a happy human life “entails many other activities and actions” (131).
Chapter 6 restates what has been said about the three Aristotelian works under examination—“the ergon argument is always positioned in such a way that it forms a transition from an analysis of ethical concepts to a substantive account of human goodness, happiness and the happy life” (138). Here Jirsa claims to have resolved the inclusive-exclusive controversy about Aristotle’s view of eudaimonia by distinguishing a happy bios (inclusive) from eudaimonia (exclusive). Part of the argument relies on Physics 194a30–33, cited at least three times in this book: here Aristotle mentions a poet who speaks geloiōs in using the term teleutēn. The facetiousness seems to have to do with an expression which has more than one sense, both fulfillment and end of life, which is apposite in Aristotle’s discussion of causes in the Physics. Bios as way of life is contrasted with zōē as living—a position reached by de-emphasizing the temporal dimension of bios despite the frequent occurrences of temporal uses, and although Aristotle does not have a phrase corresponding to “way of life” (despite Greek has the resources to provide it, perhaps using tropos, as in Republic 352d6—where, however, the phrase is tropon chrē zēn; see 10).
Since the book’s argument depends in some cases on inventive translations, including bios as way of life, it may be useful to look closely at the language. Many of the 75 occurrences of bios in the Nicomachean Ethics, of which some are reflected in the index locorum, have temporal uses, including the five occurrences of dia biou. Others rely on a contrast with mia hēmera (1098a18), or mention biou teleiou (1100a5, glossed by kata ton bion in the next line), or note that people may be affected so that they may or may not tuchein biou according to merit (1100a25), or indicate that, while bits of misfortune may not weigh life (zōēs) down, many and great developments may make ton bion more blissful (1100b26). A happy bios appears to be mentioned four times in the Nicomachean Ethics—at 1153b14, 1172a25, 1177a2, and 1179a9 (according to the TLG). In the first, Aristotle is explaining why all men think that the happy life is pleasant. Aristotle will observe shortly that no impeded activity is complete (teleios). The second is in the introduction to EN X, where Aristotle is talking about the effect of loves and hates on excellence of character, which stretches through all of one’s life (diateinei dia pantos tou biou—a temporal occurrence of bios); this is one of the five occurrences of dia biou mentioned above. In the third, Aristotle says that the happy life seems to be kata (“in accordance with”) excellence; he has just noted that people need rest because they are unable to labor continuously (sunechōs), reinforcing the point that he is taking a temporal view of bios here. The fourth occurrence says that the bios of the one who is active with excellence will be eudaimōn. Only the first and last of these instances are to be found in the index locorum, and none is given in the section ‘Happiness and happy life’ (130–32)—although both places do mention the section in which the third occurs (EN 10.6).
The argument of this volume is associated with other translation choices as well. One of these, as suggested above, is teleios, which Bonitz in his Index gives as “syn ὅλος” (with examples), and although the Latin perfectus ordinarily has the sense of “complete”. Nevertheless, Jirsa often prefers “perfect” to “complete.” A casual reflection on usage indicates that “perfect” in English often has a more favorable emotive meaning than “complete” and a different descriptive meaning as well, even though, as the OED shows, one sometimes can be used for the other. Also, while physis is associated by the author with essence, Politics 1252b32-34 (οἷον γὰρ ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης, ταύτην φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἑκάστου, ὥσπερ ἀνθρώπου ἵππου οἰκίας) is not referenced. Here one speaks of physis when the development is complete, because the man or horse is completely developed, not still an incompletely developed child or a colt (see also, for example, 1275a17). The issue is complicated further when the author associates understanding with the human essence (96), since that leaves out the immature whose understanding is not yet developed, the superannuated whose understanding is in decline, and others who may lack understanding. The importance of this matter is underscored by the statement in the book’s conclusion that human beings must “perfect the essence of their being” (138). Again, the author offers a qualified intellectualistic reading of theōrein (115–123) where Bonitz (s.v.) gives “oculis contemplari,” and “inde θεωρεῖν omnino refertur ad ea quae sensibus, usu, experentia cognita et observata sunt,” and “opp. πράττειν.” These translation choices together make it easier, with respect to the Nicomachean Ethics at least, to incline toward an exclusivist position, focused on a perfect (teleios) way of life (bios) rather than on a complete life (117–21). Some readers will have hoped for a more comprehensive discussion of the language, which might have suggested a somewhat different result, and may wonder whether an argument which yields different and apparently conflicting conclusions actually is a single argument after all. As it is, while the author has presented a position which some readers are likely to find attractive, the question remains whether it is Aristotle’s position.
The book requires far more editing, copyediting, and proofreading than it has received. Perhaps the many typographical errors will be corrected in subsequent printings and the notes will be presented at the foot of the page where they will be much more helpful; or, if they must be kept at the end, the publisher will provide running heads with the chapter and page numbers to which they pertain to make using them easier for readers.