Brill’s companion to the campaigns of Philip II and Alexander the Great

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[Authors and titles are listed at the end of the review]

This volume in the Brill’s series Warfare in the Ancient Mediterranean deals with the campaigns of Philip II and Alexander III in Greece, the Balkans, and the East. It constitutes a remarkable contribution to the understanding of the warfare of the two most famous Argead kings, addressing military tactics, propaganda, logistics, training, organization, equipment, and the maintenance of the Macedonian army, together with its allies and mercenaries. Edward Anson and his team aim to “transcend traditional battlefield discussions of strategy and tactics and leadership” by examining “those elements that went into contributing to the military activities of the two kings and which ultimately made possible their success or occasional failure” (Brice, Introduction, p. 2). Indeed, the volume moves beyond the battlefield and also sheds light on the care of diseased and injured soldiers, as well as the psychological impact on both conquerors and conquered of the campaigns led and fought by these two kings.

The volume consists of twenty-two chapters divided into eight thematic sections, framed by a useful introduction by Lee L. Brice, maps, and a rich index.

In Section One, The Combat and Campaigns of Philip and Alexander, Frances Pownall joins the debate on whether the modern term “grand strategy” can be applied to Philip II. Following Paul Kennedy, Pownall defines grand strategy as “the capacity of the nation’s leaders to bring together all of the elements, both military and non-military, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation’s long-term (that is, in both wartime and peacetime) best interests” (p. 17). She argues that Philip developed and refined his grand strategy over time and successfully created a solid army that not only unified Greece but also enabled Alexander to conquer Asia. Matthew Sears discusses Alexander’s major battles—Granicus, Issus, Gaugamela, and Hydaspes—and what made them “decisive”. The chapter concludes with an illuminating comparison between Philip and Alexander as fighters: the former organized the army, laid the foundations for the Persian campaign, and was “a more responsible leader” (p. 57); the latter, though reckless and fortunate to inherit his father’s well-trained army, achieved something unprecedented in Greek and Macedonian history. In Chapter Three, Anson applies modern military terminology—such as Rapid Dominance, inner-front or stability operations, and Insurgency/COIN policies—to ancient warfare, concluding that “while times do change and added military technology and modern sensibilities seemingly should alter outcomes, nevertheless, with all the modern technology, the similarities with the past remain” (p. 85). Joseph Roisman challenges the idea that Philip founded a powerful Macedonian navy thanks to the timber and manpower of port towns under his control in Macedonia, Thrace, and Thessaly. Examining the sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium, Roisman argues that for Philip—and later for Alexander during the Persian campaign—the navy played only an auxiliary role, while cavalry and infantry formed the backbone of the army. Elisabeth Baynham reflects on siege warfare in antiquity, comparing Philip’s sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium with Alexander’s sieges of Tyre, Gaza, and the Sogdian Rock.

Section Two focuses on the combatants, namely Philip and Alexander’s Macedonian heavy infantry (Graham Wrightson); the Macedonian and Thessalian cavalry (Carolyn Willekes); mercenaries (Franca Landucci); and infantry allies and subjects (Sulochana Asirvatham). Wrightson sheds light on recruitment, training, armament, and internal command structures of the sarissa phalanx and elite troops (see Pezhetairoi under Philip and Hypaspists under Alexander; Asthetairoi and Argyraspids). It was this high level of professionalism that enabled Philip and Alexander to unify Greece and conquer the East; moreover, the sarissa phalanx instituted by Philip remained the mainstay of Macedonian-style armies for nearly three centuries. Willekes highlights the importance of horse breeding in Macedon and Thessaly, shaped by both topography and social structure: the rural character of these regions favored hippotrophia, which underpinned strong cavalry forces. Landucci demonstrates that both Philip and Alexander employed mercenaries under Macedonian command; in Iran and Central Asia, Alexander also used mercenaries in garrisons and military settlements. While mercenaries played an auxiliary role relative to the Macedonian phalanx, Alexander’s use of allies and subjects within the phalanx was more varied. Asirvatham therefore examines the evidence for Greek, Balkan, and Asian foot soldiers.

Section Three, Organization and Structure, opens with Waldemar Heckel’s overview of the cavalry and infantry divisions and commanders of Alexander’s army. Alexander’s success, Heckel argues, depended in part on the diversity of his forces and his ability to integrate troops from across the empire for different purposes. Alexander Meeus tackles the fragmentary evidence for military compensation, showing that although it was a “complicated and multifaceted affair” (p. 259), monetary payment existed in both Philip’s and Alexander’s armies alongside booty, land donations, bonuses, and honor. Meeus concludes that Macedonian soldiers needed more than material rewards: to feel properly compensated for danger and hardship, Alexander also had to demonstrate care for his men and publicly honor them. In one of the most engaging chapters of the volume, Jacek Rzepka discusses recruitment and training in Macedon. Drawing on Diodorus (16.3.1), Polyaenus (Strat. 4.2.10), and Frontinus (Strat. 4.1.6), Rzepka argues that Philip introduced systematic infantry training, including marching endurance and technical exercises for maneuvering in packed units. He argues that the gymnasium network was underdeveloped in Macedon at the time, so military training took place in provisional camps. This helps explain why Macedonian warriors lacked the physical prowess of their southern Greek counterparts in short encounters, yet excelled in endurance during prolonged fighting.

Section Four addresses the maintenance of the army—food, logistics, and healthcare. James Lacey moves beyond Engels (1978; 2013)[1] to show that Alexander adapted his logistical arrangements to circumstances and, using mathematical models, demonstrates that the Macedonian was never under serious financial strain. David Karunanithy examines Macedonian royal interest in medical practice. Inspired respectively by Xenophon and Aristotle, Philip and Alexander recognized the importance of medical support for soldiers. Medical practice evolved during the eastern campaign as doctors combined practical improvisation with the knowledge of indigenous healers. A three-tier medical system was in place: the upper tier consisted of elite physicians and their trained assistants, primarily responsible for the king and senior officers but also available to the troops; the middle tier comprised independent itinerant physicians and healers following the army on campaign and offering services for a fee; the lowest tier consisted of the soldiers themselves providing basic care to one another. Karunanithy is to be commended for combining literary sources (the Alexander historians, the Hippocratic corpus, Xenophon, and Theophrastus among others) with archaeological evidence to illuminate both the tools available to Alexander’s surgeons and the broader importance of medicine in sustaining an army.

Section Five explores the psychology of war through campaigning conditions and indiscipline (Brice), military propaganda (Jenn Finn), and religion (Jeanne Reames). Brice argues that soldiers’ lived experience is essential for understanding indiscipline: although Macedonian troops were generally loyal and disciplined, stress, exhaustion, and poor conditions during prolonged campaigns could lead to insubordination. This is a natural phenomenon, yet the absence of major violent threats to Philip’s or Alexander’s rule testifies to their leadership. Finn defines propaganda as “a deliberate effort to broadly spread messages that are meant to persuade a certain audience” (p. 392) and highlights the importance that military propaganda had during Alexander’s rapid conquest of the Persian Empire. Alexander appealed to history (the Panhellenic war of revenge), mythology (e.g. the Gordian knot, the emulation of Heracles and Semiramis), and annihilation of cities and peoples (e.g. Thebes). Reames examines how the five extant historians—Arrian, Curtius, Diodorus, Plutarch, and Justin—depict formal cult, divination, spontaneous prayer, claims of divine favor or assistance, and events perceived as omens by the soldiers. Philip, Alexander, and the historians understood the importance of religion in reasserting and fashioning their leadership, however, the way the kings’ religiosity and religious acts are portrayed is heavily influenced by the historians’ own beliefs, interests and agenda.

Section Six, Nature of Command, features Carol King’s analysis of Macedonian military leadership. The Macedonian king resembles a Homeric leader who “holds his position of power largely by virtue of his prowess as a war leader” (p. 480). Philip’s reforms, discipline, and close relationship with his soldiers established him as a successful and popular leader. Alexander inherited this army, whose veterans were crucial to his victories over Darius III. After 330 BCE, however, with the death of Darius and the end of the Panhellenic campaign of revenge, tensions grew: Alexander became increasingly impatient with old commanders and praise of Philip (Curt. 8.1.20–52), while Macedonians grew weary of prolonged warfare, Persian customs, and the inclusion of Iranians. Despite this deterioration, King argues that Alexander’s death made clear how deeply the army still depended on him. In fact, as a Homeric leader, Alexander shared command, risk, joys and rewards with his men. Monica D’Agostini further explores this affective dimension of command, showing how Philip used personal bonds to legitimize appointments among relatives (and Alexander is a clear example of this, as well as Cynnane), and how Alexander cultivated emotional ties with his Companions (philoi/amici), foot-companions, and somatophylakes (see Cleitus, Hephaestion, and Peucestas).

Section Seven addresses the human cost of war. Elisabeth Carney examines the status and treatment of elite, non-elite, and captive women under Philip and Alexander. She highlights an often-overlooked issue: the immense social and economic burden borne by Macedonian women left behind by their men campaigning with their kings, a subject largely absent from our sources. In another thought-provoking chapter, Sabine Müller discusses war crimes under Philip and Alexander. By modern standards, both kings would be liable for serious violations of human rights; however, it would be anachronistic to judge them by contemporary legal frameworks and sensitivities. Although no codified international humanitarian law existed, there was nevertheless an ancient awareness of acceptable and unacceptable conduct in war (see, e.g., the fair treatment of ambassadors). Müller analyzes instances of extreme violence during Philip and Alexander’s rule and how such actions could serve to legitimize royal authority, as well as how ancient authors perceived them.

Section Eight contains Anson’s concluding reflections on the goals of war and the means considered acceptable in achieving them. Building on Müller’s chapter, Anson asks whether Philip and Alexander were seen as violators in their own time. The answer is no, since war, destruction, enslavement, and torture were common practice in antiquity: “the Greek concept of war was as the definer of superiority and inferiority” (p. 600). Moreover, the Panhellenic campaign was justified, as “revenge was also a just cause for war” (586).

I commend Anson for producing such a rich and valuable volume and for assembling an outstanding group of contributors, though the inclusion of early-career scholars would have been welcome. The book is beautifully written and edited, with only minor typographical errors (e.g. Krathanasis for Karathanasis in fn. 2, p. 88), and is especially remarkable given its length. This companion will be invaluable not only to academics but also to university students interested in Macedonian history, offering insight into both Macedonian warfare and the society that sustained it. In the introduction Brice also points to new opportunities for further research, such as the study of the environmental history of the campaigns and the life of non-combatants who accompanied and supported the army. While no single book can cover every aspect of Philip’s and Alexander’s campaigns, this volume comes remarkably close.

Authors and titles

Introduction: Not the Usual Treatment of Philip II and Alexander III of Macedon by Lee L. Brice

Part I: The Combat and Campaigns of Philip and Alexander

1. Philip’s Grand Strategy by Frances Pownall
2. Alexander’s Battles by Matthew A. Sears
3. Modern Military Terminology and Ancient Practices by Edward M. Anson
4. Philip’s and Alexander’s Naval Warfare by Joseph Roisman
5. The Sieges of Philip and Alexander by Elizabeth Baynham

Part II: The Combatants

6. The Macedonian Heavy Infantry of Philip II and Alexander the Great by Graham C. L. Wrightson
7. Macedonian and Thessalian Cavalry by Carolyn Willekes
8. The Role of Mercenaries by Franca Landucci
9. Infantry Allies and Subjects by Sulochana R. Asirvatham

Part III: Organization and Structure

10. Commanders and Command Structure in Alexander’s Army by Waldemar Heckel
11. Money and Honor: Military Compensation in the Armies of Philip and Alexander by Alexander Meeus
12. Recruitment and Training by Jacek Rzepka

Part IV: Maintenance

13. Food and Conquest: Getting beyond Engels by James Lacey
14. The Medical Corps in the Army of Alexander the Great by David Karunanithy

Part V: The Psychology of War

15. Conditions of Service and Indiscipline in Macedonian Armies, 359–323 BCE by Lee L. Brice
16. Military Propaganda in the Campaigns of Alexander the Great by Jenn Finn
17. Philip’s and Alexander’s Use of Religious Cult in Our Extant Sources by Jeanne Reames

Part VI: Nature of Command

18. Relationship of King and Army by Carol J. King
19. The Affective Nature of Command by Monica D’Agostini

Part VII: The Human Cost of War

20. Women in War by Elizabeth D. Carney
21. War Crimes? by Sabine Müller

Part VIII: In Closing

22. Conclusion: “We Are the Champions”: the Underlying Reality of Ancient War by Edward M. Anson

Notes

[1] Engels, D. (1978) Alexander the Great and the Logistics of the Macedonian Army. Berkeley; (2013) “Logistics: Sinews of War,” in Campbell, B. and Tritle, L. A. (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Warfare in the Classical World. Oxford: 351–68.