Plato’s Moral Realism is divided into eight chapters, including a detailed introduction in which Lloyd Gerson outlines his hermeneutic stance, and brief concluding remarks. This is a dense and, I believe, potentially groundbreaking work. The point it makes is that Plato’s ethics can only be understood satisfactorily within a metaphysical system structured around Plato’s theory of principles. To do so, it accurately circumscribes the prudentialist or Socratic readings of Plato’s ethics as its principal adversaries. If it is given the attention it deserves, this is one of those rare books with the potential of shaking down deeply rooted convictions and laying the groundworks of a new “standard” or “default” approach to Plato’s metaphysics and ethics in English-speaking scholarship.
The monograph argues that the universality that Plato expressly demands of his ethical prescriptions is attainable within neither naturalist ontology, nor consequentialist, prudentialist, or any variant of utilitarian ethical frameworks. The exceptionless universality expected of Socratic paradoxes such as “injustice is never beneficial” is coherent if and only if, Gerson argues, it is supported by a robust moral realism[1] based on metaphysics, one in which, furthermore, the superordinate Idea of the Good, identified with the One (expounding the nature of the Good is the endeavour of Chapter 2), acts as the source and cause of integrative unity. At the confluence of procession and reconversion towards the superordinate Idea of the Good, integrative unity according to kind is, respectively, endowment and achievement, and the key to understanding and enacting virtue. Plato’s “Socratic paradoxes” (covered in Chapters 3-5), his conception of the good life (Chapter 6) and his political constitutions, as the collective implementation of integrative unity (Chapter 7), must be based on more than a mere definitional understanding of Justice. It must be founded on the dual axiological and ontological source of goodness and existence: the superordinate Idea of the Good.
The core difference between Gerson’s take on these issues and the standard one is that Gerson incorporates Aristotelian doxography into his understanding of Plato. Aristotle informs us, in fact, that Plato’s ontology is based on two founding principles: the One (among many other passages, see Met. A.6, 987a18-25), and the Dyad (Phys. IV. 209b11-16; 209b32-210a3). As a principle of determinacy, the superordinate Idea of the Good, by providing ousia, provides existence and cognoscibility: it allows for something to be this and not that, which, in turn, makes it existent and knowable. Let us briefly see how this applies to the Form of Justice and compare Gerson’s approach to some of the most distinguished alternatives. It is very largely agreed upon that the Good must be superior to Justice. This is why we desire Justice. If Justice were only just, however, one could simply opt out and prefer a more beneficial way of life, say, a life of tyranny. As a matter of fact, the quality of any alternative psychological configuration to Plato’s would, I presume, be judged upon variable sets criteria and might be, upon evaluation, deemed preferable. So, Christopher Rowe[2] and Terry Penner[3] understand the Good as a Form of Advantage. This adequately explains why Justice, as understood by Plato, is beneficial or advantageous, but it dismisses the other functions of the Good. Gerson points out that a Form of Advantage does not provide any explanation for Circularity (p. 32-35). It could be added that it does not explain cognoscibility, nor tell us how the Good provides essence and existence to everything that is.
Hence, Gerson proposes a different explanation for the relation between the Form of Justice and the superordinate Idea of the Good, which leads to a different explanation of Socratic paradoxes. Why is Justice always beneficial? Popular belief, indeed, suggests the opposite: How can it not be advantageous to become a tyrant? Why is there no alternative to the “just” soul depicted in the Republic? Prudentialist answers will point out that most tyrants of the past have ended badly. Prudentialist accounts, however, have little to say if the unjust soul “makes it” and never regrets until the very end, precisely because of its obsessive and unscrupulous ambition. The only exceptionless solution, Gerson claims, is rooted in Plato’s metaphysics. Although there may be a psychological distance between what is good simpliciter and what is good for me, there is no ontological distance separating them, because the Form of Justice receives its defining οὐσία, i.e. its specific determinacy, from the superordinate Idea of the Good, which is, in turn, the ultimate cause of all that is good. So, it may be possible to attain apparent goods outside of Plato’s framework, but there can be no exceptions pertaining to the full veridical good. This entails that “intellectualism” does not merely concern definitions. If a proposition containing F-ness of Justice were sufficient, then teaching justice would be as easy as pouring fluid from one recipient into another. Why would philosophy still be necessary? Gerson argues, convincingly in my view, that a full understanding of Justice is possible in the light of the knowledge of the superordinate Idea of the Good. Only then does it become possible to understand to what extent Justice is Good-like (agathoeides), thus definitely collapsing the psychological distance between Good simpliciter and good for me. (p. 75-111)
This implies a rejection of the “traditional” developmentalist paradigm. Developmentalist interpretations frequently posit that Socratic intellectualism develops into irrationalism, as Plato develops a complex psychology. The development should lead Plato to accept the possibility of akrasia (incontinence). Protagoras 352d-358d is often cited to support its impossibility for the Socratic Plato. Gerson points out that the passage which demonstrates this impossibility is not meant to reveal Plato’s actual position, but merely the consequences of the premise εἰ ἄρα τὸ ἡδύ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν (“if, therefore, that which is pleasant is good”, 358b7). So, Socrates is neither affirming nor denying the possibility of akrasia. But, as Good is not pleasure, the μετρική τέχνη cannot be understood within a hedonistic framework (pp. 132-133). Gerson goes on to claim that, as akrasia presupposes a psychological distance between “good simpliciter” and “good for me”, it is ultimately based on nonveridical beliefs. “This possibility disappears in both cases when there is not belief, but knowledge about one’s own good, namely, the knowledge that the Good is one thing and that it is identical to my good.” (p. 137). The ubiquitous nature of akrasia in real life shows how difficult it is to achieve the transformation of philosophy and knowledge of the Good. In turn, this reinforces the earlier argument that if intellectualism could be based on mere knowledge of the F-ness of Justice, it would be common knowledge by now. On the contrary, Gerson insists on the transformative aspect of philosophy, leading towards the homoiosis theoi through integrative unity, pretty much in line with very metaphysical-leaning authors such as Jens Halfwassen or those such as Pierre Hadot, who emphasises how true philosophy is not only conceptualising a set of doctrines, but a spiritual elevation through a philosophic way of life.
This ethical framework is based on a metaphysical system which posits an emanation from the One which overflows and produces taxis. This implies that the Good is above οὐσία, as stated in Resp. 509b8:
Therefore, you should also say that not only do the objects of knowledge owe their being known to the good, but their being and essence is also due to it, although the good is not being, but superior to it in rank and power.[4]
Before I present Gerson’s position, I shall give an outline of the main exegetic alternatives surrounding this passage. Grube translates καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν by “being and essence”. He then interprets ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας as “superior to it (being)”. Rendering ἐπέκεινα by “superior” is an interpretative translation, as the Greek original says “beyond” or “above”. But the superiority is implied. Grube also renders οὐσία by “being” rather than “essence”. This is by no means uncommon, and it is the most traditional interpretation in all major philosophical languages (jenseits des Seins / al di là dell’essere / au-delà de l’être). After all, when Plato enumerates the two, the symmetry with 509b3-4 makes it reasonable to believe that, although he only says “above essence”, he means both essence and being. The philosophical meaning of this passage is much debated and highly consequential. Distinguished scholars, such as Luc Brisson point out that the Good is also said to be εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος (Resp. 526e4-5),[5] herewith within the bounds of Being. This leads Brisson[6] to dismiss Resp. 509b8 as a mere poetic image. Others take 509b8 to mean what it says. The superordinate Idea of the Good is beyond being, identifiable with the One, as Aristotle reports. It is because it is above being that it can be the determining principle of all. This “all” can be understood, as Plotinus understand it in VI.9.2.44-47, as τὸ ὄν or τὸ ὅλον ὄν (see VI.9.2.22). And those passages clearly say that the One (the Good) cannot be identical to τὸ ὅλον ὄν. This leads authors such as Halfwassen[7] to read 509b8 alongside the first hypothesis (H1) of the Parmenides. In Parmenides 137c4, the hypothesis is that the One is One, as opposed to being, which is the second hypothesis (142b). The result is that if the One is One, it does not participate in being in any way (οὐδαμῶς ἄρα ἔστι τὸ ἕν, 141e9-10), and that it is ineffable[8] and unknowable.[9] Such an interpretation reinforces the continuity between Plato, Speusippus and Xenocrates and, moreover, between inner-Academic Platonism and Neoplatonism—topics dear to Gerson. One would think this is the option he would adopt, as it fulfils the requirements of his understanding of Plato’s moral philosophy and finds sufficient backing in the dialogues.
Yet Gerson sets himself apart by underlining the distinction between “beyond essence” and “beyond Being”—albeit briefly. This solution is, I find, elegant and innovative. Taking as precedent the translations of Shorey and Chambry, who both render καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν as “existence and essence”, Gerson distinguishes being above essence, which the Good is, and being above existence, which it is not. So, the One still exists in some sense that preserves its pure unity; it is outside of Being understood as τὸ ὅλον ὄν, but not in the sense of ὕπαρξις. Gerson’s very interesting thesis is that Plato adopts a variation of saint Thomas’ argument, according to which God’s Being—in the sense of existence—and essence are the same (Summa Theologica Ia, q.3, a.4).[10] So the One might be outside of Being in general, probably understood here as the Plotinian τὸ ὅλον ὄν, and be (exist) nonetheless.
In conclusion, this monograph is—or at least should be in my view—a necessary interlocutor for future research on Plato’s ethics. Gerson rightly places the metaphysical first principle—the Idea of the Good—back at the centre of Plato’s moral philosophy, whilst never overlooking its primordial ontological function. This book moreover proposes an interesting solution to an old hermeneutic dilemma concerning the first principle and bridges the abyss, in recent scholarship, between the axiological and ontological functions of the Good, and, consequently, between Plato and Platonism.
Notes
[1] Gerson (p. 10) bases his argument on the categorization of G. Oddie, Value, Reality and Desire, Oxford, 2005, pp. 22 ff.
[2] C. J. Rowe, “The Form of the Good and the Good in Plato’s Republic” in Pursuing the Good: Ethics and Metaphysics in Plato’s Republic, edited by D. Cairns, F.-G. Herrmann, and T. Penner, Edinburgh: 124-153.
[3] T. Penner, “The Good, Advantage, Happiness, and the Form of the Good: How Continuous is Socratic Ethics with Platonic Ethics?” in Pursuing the Good (see n. 2 above), 93-123.
[4] Resp. 6 509b6-10 (trans. G. M. A. Grube, rev. C. D. C. Reeve): Καὶ τοῖς γιγνωσκομένοις τοίνυν μὴ μόνον τὸ γιγνώσκεσθαι φάναι ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ παρεῖναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ εἶναί τε καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν ὑπ’ ἐκείνου αὐτοῖς προσεῖναι, οὐκ οὐσίας ὄντος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἔτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας πρεσβείᾳ καὶ δυνάμει ὑπερέχοντος.
[5] Resp. 526e2-5. “And we say that anything has that tendency if it compels the soul to turn itself around towards the region in which lies the happiest of the things that are, the one the soul must see at any cost.” (τείνει δέ, φαμέν, πάντα αὐτόσε, ὅσα ἀναγκάζει ψυχὴν εἰς ἐκεῖνον τὸν τόπον μεταστρέφεσθαι ἐν ᾧ ἐστι τὸ εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος, ὃ δεῖ αὐτὴν παντὶ τρόπῳ ἰδεῖν.) See also Resp. 518c9, where the Good is said to be “the brightest of that which is” (τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον).
[6] L. Brisson, Lectures de Platon, Paris, 2002, pp. 83-87. In English, see his “For Plato, Forms Don’t Come to Be” in Plato and the Ideas. A Very Complicated Story, eds. M. Migliori, A. Fermani and A. Lanoue, Leiden, forthcoming.
[7] J. Halfwassen, Auf den Spuren des Einen, Tübingen, 2015, pp. 91-108.
[8] Parm. 142a3-4: Οὐδ’ ἄρα ὄνομα ἔστιν αὐτῷ οὐδὲ λόγος οὐδέ τις ἐπιστήμη οὐδὲ αἴσθησις οὐδὲ δόξα.
[9] Parm. 142a4-6: Οὐδ’ ὀνομάζεται ἄρα οὐδὲ λέγεται οὐδὲ δοξάζεται οὐδὲ γιγνώσκεται, οὐδέ τι τῶν ὄντων αὐτοῦ αἰσθάνεται.
[10] Gerson says, p. 30 n. 58: “The Good is certainly beyond finite reality, meaning any limitations imposed by essence or oὐσία. But that it is not beyond reality in the sense of being nothing at all is refuted by the fact that the Good is ‘the happiest of that which is (εὐδαιμονέστατον τοῦ ὄντος)’ (526E4-5), that it is ‘more beautiful (κάλλιον)’ than knowledge and truth (509A6), and that it is ‘the brightest of that which is (τοῦ ὄντος τὸ φανότατον)’ (518C9).”