With this important work, Ricardo Salles completes a research project he began over two decades ago, starting at least with his 2003 essay in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy (24: 253–272). This was followed by other 18 contributions, focusing on the various problems raised by the Stoic cosmological theory and, in particular, on the topic of conflagration and rebirth and everlasting recurrence.
The questions raised and the answers given in the ancient theory ended up influencing modern physical concepts and modern theories about the universe and its becoming, iconically summarised in the dazzling and well-known aphorism 341 of Nietzsche’s Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, which Salles decided to place, in English translation, as exergo of the volume.
In many cases, we find summaries of issues that Salles has previously addressed, but new, and sometimes original, solutions are proposed. Above all, we are clearly dealing with a work that is extremely accurate in its analysis of the extant evidence and its reorganisation. The author himself proposes and discusses a general framework from which we can deduce how the great cosmogonic/cosmological theses of the Stoa are explored and explained in a coherent manner.
After a useful methodological introduction, which also includes a Synopsis of the Argument (pp. 1-11), Chapter 1 offers an ‘Overview of the Stoic Cosmos’ (pp. 12-34) where the question of the universe as a Living Cosmos of which God is the Basic Principle is addressed.
Chapter 2 (pp. 35-63) addresses the theme of Conflagration with respect to its fundamental physical (combustion and absorption) and cosmological characteristics, and its role in Stoic Elemental Theory. The problem of the ‘duration’ of the conflagration is also discussed.
Chapter 3 (pp. 64–96), ‘Presocratic Antecedents of the Stoic Conflagration’, aims to place the key doctrine of Stoic cosmology within the development of previous philosophical thought (with specific clarifications regarding Aristotle’s presentation).
Chapter 4 (pp. 97-124), ‘The Cosmology’, compares Zeno’s theory with that of Cleanthes and then of Chrysippus.
Chapter 5 (pp. 125-173), ‘The Metaphysics of Everlasting Recurrence’, is the logical completion of the insights previously discussed and questions, among other things, whether and how the new cosmos is identical to the old one and to the one that follows.
Chapter 6 (pp. 174-212), ‘The Recurring Cosmos: Why Identical?’, addresses the most original proposal of the Stoic physical-cosmological theory, highlighting the three versions that can be reconstructed based on the surviving evidence and from a historically reliable perspective; above all, however, it relies on an openly theoretical line of reflection.
Chapter 7 (pp. 213-246), ‘The Paradox of Destruction and Restoration’, focuses on the paradoxical aspects of the doctrine: among others, the contrary powers of fire in Zeno and Cleanthes, and desiccation and conflagration as Timaean concomitants.
Chapter 8 (pp. 247–262), ‘Concluding Remarks’, completes the discussion of the key issues raised. However, it leaves open at least a couple of purely theoretical-theological questions that do not find plausible answers with respect to the cosmogonic-cosmological theory proposed by the ancient Stoa: 8.1, ‘Why would the Chrysippean God want the conflagration?’, and 8.2, ‘When does the Stoic God design the cosmos?’
The volume concludes with a list of Works cited and the Index locorum.
I believe it is important to underline here the effectiveness of the method followed, the accuracy and completeness of the use of sources and testimonia[1] (always in the original and with reliable, carefully checked translations), and – above all – the theoretical tension that underpins the discussion of the issues addressed.
Chapters 5 and 6 are the most significant in the volume.Salles revisits his previous insights and analyses but attempts to resolve in an innovative way what had still remained unclearly discussed.Chapter 5 addresses the Stoic doctrine of becoming which, drawing on the theories put forward in a previous essay in 2018,[2] focuses on the concept of ‘event’. Its correct application allows us to rethink ‘the relation between the cosmos issued form the cosmogony and the cosmos previously destroyed at the conflagration.’Is this always the same cosmos? Hence the issue of identity (strategically distinct from individuality) and how to conceive of the event in relation to it. In this regard, Chapter 6 examines three different Stoic theories of everlasting recurrence that oppose one another on this question. This discussion proceeds from two key testimonies: (a) Plutarch, CN 1081c and (b) Plutarch, CN 1081d (SVF 2.519). From these arises a first problem concerning the reality of the present: ‘It is philosophically reasonable to assume that, in order for a time or stretch of time to be really present, it must be distinct from the past and the future. But how could a time, or stretch of time, be present if it is indeed fully divisible into times that are either past or future?’ (p. 126). Consider also the tension that can be felt between the assertions of Chrysippus reported by Stobaeus [SVF 2.509 = LS 51B = BS 20.10] whereby [A] ‘no time is wholly present’ (οὐθεὶς ὅλως ἐνίσταται χρόνος); and [B] ‘only the present belongs (μόνον δὲ ὑπάρχειν φησὶ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα), whereas the past and the future subsist (ὑφεστάναι), but do not belong in any way (ὑπάρχειν δὲ οὐδαμῶς).’
At the centre is the question of Presentness, which is necessary to form the basis of a unity of temporal perception of events. The solution to this fundamental problem is proposed by proceeding, on the one hand, with the correct recognition of the meaning and role of the ‘event’, which is anchored to its temporal and causal instantiation (this was already foreshadowed in the 2018 essay); on the other hand (and this is innovative), by taking as a basis the distinction present in Stoic categorical theory (substrate or substance = ὑποκείμενον / qualified bodies = ποιά / bodies ‘somehow disposed’ = πῶς ἔχοντα / bodies ‘somehow relatively disposed’ = πρός τί πως ἔχοντα): this allows for a conception of physical reality that is alternative to the Aristotelian one. In Salles’ opinion, precisely with Chrysippus the most systematic treatment of this issue will be achieved, since with Chrysippus, starting from this innovative categorisation, the centrality of the causal unity of events in the space-time dimension of Presentness is clarified (pp. 146-54).
A second problem (closely related to the previous one) concerns the distinction between identity and individuality of events (and therefore of entities). In this case, the solution is based on the Type/Token Distinction doctrine and how it works in the Stoic theory of events. As in his 2018 work, Salles explicitly refers to the theory developed by Jaegwon Kim (1966), which allows him to distinguish between ‘individual’ and ‘generic’ events. In this way, Salles comes to affirm: ‘Time and Identity are perfectly consistent with one another – two events can be type-identical and occur at different times – if we can prove that being type-identical does not entail occurring at the same time. And this is precisely what a theory of events as property exemplifications such as the one proposed by the Stoics enables us to do’ (p. 164).
This raises another crucial question: ‘What is it that individuates times?’
The next entire discussion (pp. 165–73) is based on Aristotle’s thesis that Time implies Change (see Phys. 4.218b). Responding to the assertion of J. Barnes (1978)[3] that the Stoics, by adopting this thesis, contradict themselves and arrive at a solution inconsistent with respect to their doctrine, Salles offers a series of theoretical proposals well supported by available evidence. On this basis, he confirms his thesis that the Stoics exploited the distinction between event tokens and event types and arrived at a conception of time according to which the individuation of times is a basic feature of reality independent from events. This would allow us to resolve the question of the ‘present’ in relation to the existence of the past and the future and, above all, to explain how the present cosmos can be type-identical to the previous one and the next if they occupy different places in time. Of course, we must recognize that this attractive proposal by Salles to overcome the aporia (to which the Stoic thesis leads) can be safely rejected if we remain anchored to the premises posed by Barnes.
As mentioned above, Chapter 6 addresses the issue of the three distinct versions of the theory of everlasting recurrence. Once the cyclical concept of time is safeguarded, the distinction between identity and individuality appears to be discriminating. Identity requires that the different cosmic cycles are type-identical (for any two cycles C and C*, the events E in C are type-identical to the events E* in C*). Individuality assumes that ‘the recurrent individuals are numerically the same (for any two cycles C and C*, the individuals involved in the events of C are the same in number as those involved in the events of C*’ (p. 175). In fact, individuality corresponds to the actual instantiation of something that appears to be identical. The three different versions of the theory of everlasting recurrence are therefore played out between Identity and Individuality / Individuality without Identity / Identity without Individuality (see the diagram on p. 186).
Chapter 7 opens up new avenues of research. Among other things, it addresses the question of a possible comparison with Plato’s Timaeus, regarding the paradox that arises when the theory of conflagration, and the theories of everlasting recurrence embracing Identity, are combined. This is the paradox of destruction and restoration. Salles sees, in the approach to this paradox, a similarity to Plato’s Tim. 75a4-c7 (pp. 215-19), where an analogous strategic distinction is emphasised between ends, means, and concomitants (concomitants are understood to be effects that are contrary to the end in the long run: they are phenomena that are neither ends nor means to an end; yet they depend for their existence on ends and means). As in the Stoic doctrine, Plato’s threefold distinction between ends, means, and concomitants would be used ‘to explain why, in the ideally well-designed cosmos, we are short-lived given that a longer life is better all else being equal (p. 217). Intelligent logic, evidently, would act in the long term according to both doctrines.
To summarise the main results achieved by Salles, we can quote his own words: ‘The cosmos restored at the cosmogony must be type-identical to the cosmos destroyed at the conflagration given the supremely rational nature of the Stoic god. And this identity is possible given the early Stoic theory of events as property exemplifications and Chrysippus’ theory of the present’ (p. 248).
As for the work itself, it is an important and authoritative work that compares the most significant ancient and contemporary interpretations of Stoic cosmogony-cosmology, offering stimulating and seriously grounded answers, presented with great clarity and systematicity. In his ideal reconstruction of the original Stoic theory, Salles rightly also turns to some of the exponents of late Roman Stoicism. However, a small note: while this strategy has been fully successful in the case of Marcus Aurelius, the attention devoted to Seneca is partial, particularly where Seneca, with great effectiveness and consistency with respect to the doctrine of the ancient Stoa, focused on the concept of time and presentness (key issues in the theses supported by Salles).
Notes
[1] R. Salles and M.D. Boeri published, in 2014, Los filósofos estoicos. Ontología, Lógica, Física y Ética. Traducción, comentario filosófico y edición anotada de los principales textos griegos y latinos, Sankt Augustin, Academia Verlag.
[2] R. Salles, ‘Two classic problems in the Stoic theory of time.’ OSAPh, (2018) 55: 133–83.
[3] J. Barnes, ‘La doctrine du retour éternel’, in J. Brunschwig (ed.), Les Stoïciens et leur logique, Paris, Vrin 1978, rev. and trans. into English as ‘The same again: The Stoics on eternal recurrence’, in J. Barnes, Method and Metaphysics. Oxford, OUP 2011, pp. 412-28.