[Authors and titles are listed at the end of the review]
This volume is the result of several years of years of collaboration among international experts, and provides a new framework for understanding key legal concepts, practices, and historical contexts across five ancient legal traditions: Near Eastern (including Egypt), Greek-Hellenistic, Roman, Chinese, and Indian. Each multi-authored chapter has one lead author. The volume avoids positioning Rome as the default reference—a refreshing choice, especially for Romanists. The work aligns with global history [p. xiii] and draws on anthropology, focusing not only on formal systems but also on legal practices outside them.[1] It adopts a historical rather than doctrinal approach, integrating trends like bottom-up and postcolonial perspectives.[2] The book includes twelve, a preface, comparative timelines, and lists of maps, figures, and contributors. While some topics—like land and environment—are absent, the thematic organization is broad and coherent.
Chapter One, Orientation (led by David Ibbetson), outlines the types of source material—primarily written law—as well as the main characteristics of the legal traditions examined in the volume. By classifying the types of sources as ‘normative,’ followed by more technical categories such as documentary records or case reports, the chapter successfully avoids dichotomies like ‘law and norm’ or ‘public and private,’ which could have hindered heuristic comparison across diverse legal cultures.
Chapter Two, Law as text (led by Michael Gagarin), defines law as rules written to be recognized as such. Its most original contribution is its examination of laws through their emergence, production, use, and audiences, in their social contexts. Questions remain about the relationship between law and text. For instance, what led actors to commit some transactions to writing while leaving others unwritten, especially when writing was not a formal requirement for certain agreements, such as Roman consensual contracts?[3] These questions, however, are still subject to debate within the field and may require more dedicated study.
In Chapter Three, Legal Science (led by Dario Mantovani), the authors begin by defining science from a socio-intellectual perspective, employing concepts such as “epistemic community” and “shared validity” to explore how different legal traditions understood the question: what is law? Central to the chapter is the insight that divergences between legal systems stem from the distinct societal roles played by legal experts within their respective epistemic communities. At the same time, the similarities arise from the fact that legal thought developed through a continuous dialogue with both contemporary and historical norms and interpretations, forming a chain of legal reasoning across time.
Chapter Four, War, Peace, and Interstate Relations (led by Katelijn Vandorpe), centers on the interplay between war and peace. Interstate relations provide a particularly promising lens through which to understand the dynamics of these two complex phenomena, especially when comparing societies with vastly different political systems and cultures. This comparative approach helps explain, for example, why practices such as arbitration are found only in the Greek world, while concepts like neutrality appear uniquely in Indian and Greek thought. Despite these cultural differences, broadly comparable ideas emerge across regions. For instance, the ancient Egyptian view of the enemy as a collective group rather than an individual bears some resemblance to the Roman notion of hostes, who could constitute a populus.[4] One overarching anthropological insight of the chapter is that similar principles and customs appear across diverse ancient legal cultures, and that this is likely rooted in a form of ‘natural’ law grounded in values intrinsic to human nature.
In Chapter Five, Law and the State (led by Mark McClish), the authors explore the complex relationship between law and the state by focusing on five key areas: constitutional norms, legislative power, jurisdiction, the structure of the legal system, and legitimacy. They examine how legal concepts evolve and sometimes serve to legitimize various actors. Chapter five might benefit from a deeper reassessment of the role of historiography in shaping later conceptions of the relationship between law and the state.[5] Their analysis is framed by the dichotomy between formal and informal normative frameworks, offering a nuanced view of the idea that this relationship is as much about suasion as it is about structure. Religion is a complex aspect of the formal/informal distinction, as it permeates both spheres, often in ways that are difficult to trace due to the nature of surviving sources or oral transmission.
Chapter Six, Law and Religion (led by Bruce Wells) starts by stating the complexities of distinguishing religion from other social phenomena since religious beliefs and practices permeate households, business and politics. Across ancient legal traditions, law and religion were tightly interconnected through shared aims of maintaining social order and legitimizing authority. Rulers commonly derived their legal power from divine sanction, while legal procedures often incorporated religious rituals like oaths and ordeals. Religious elites played key roles in legal interpretation and enforcement, as seen in Israel, India, and Mesopotamia. Though the balance of power varied—shifting, for example, from priestly to secular authority in Rome—law and religion consistently reinforced each other to uphold governance, morality, and communal stability.
Chapter Seven, on Legal Procedure (led by Patrick Olivelle), shows how procedure served as the structural foundation of ancient legal systems. While forms varied, all traditions relied on transparent, accepted rules for adjudicating disputes. Notably, many cultures lacked formal treatises on procedure, reflecting its transmission within specialist circles or “epistemic communities” (as discussed in Chapter Three). Organized chronologically, the chapter traces procedural steps from court formation to appeals and examines themes like judicial impartiality and the public/private distinction (p. 310). One underlying question that the chapter explores is the extent to which procedure gives law its meaning. Here, the chapter highlights differences such as Rome’s view of procedure as intrinsic to law, versus India’s more classificatory approach, which reveals how societies define and value legal processes. The case reveals how a society’s legal practices reflect its broader cultural and social understanding of law.
Chapter Eight, Status and Family (led by Timothy Lubin), begins with a statement that encapsulates several of its key conclusions: status refers to an individual’s position before the law in relation to specific social groups and the state (p. 376). This framing makes clear that personal status is socially constructed. As legal and social categories are deeply interconnected, their boundaries can often be ambiguous (pp. 444–445). The chapter also examines the concept of family, which serves as the primary structure through which legal personhood and authority are defined. However, status distinctions extend beyond the family, fulfilling broader functions such as maintaining social hierarchy, aligning law with moral and religious norms, and reinforcing state authority. The structure of the chapter follows the most often encountered distinctions that shape and justify status: kin units and larger clan affiliations determined by birth; political divisions and governing bodies; and voluntary corporate groups. In addition to its inherent complexity, personal status is also subject to change through customary norms, ritual acts, or other culturally recognized mechanisms. While these allow for some degree of social mobility, status remains a socially constructed and legally defined category.
Chapter Nine, Crime, Redress and Social Control (led by Ari Bryen), presents crime and punishment in ancient societies as deeply political, serving to reinforce social hierarchies and state authority. Structured into three sections, on statecraft, punishment methods, and the rationale behind criminal law, the chapter shows how legal systems used prohibition and penalty to regulate society. While mechanisms of redress and forms of punishment varied, such as Rome’s use of exile to preserve elite dignity (p. 455) versus China’s practice of collective familial penalties (p. 466-7), they all reflected local norms and governance priorities. While the chapter offers a coherent comparative framework, its state-centered approach limits recognition of the independent agency of non-state actors like private groups and associations, presenting them mainly as interpreters or enforcers of state-derived claims.
Chapter Ten, Property (led by Joseph G. Manning), underscores that no single, linear narrative can capture the development of ownership across ancient societies. Despite this, comparison is possible because property was central to both economic and social life, shaped by kinship and state regulation. Two key themes emerge: first, property often predated legal codification, as seen in China where family tenure preceded state control; second, although inheritance and kinship structured ownership universally, rules varied. While modern economic theories like New Institutional Economics offer useful insights, the chapter cautions against reducing property to transactional terms, emphasizing its deeply embedded social and cultural dimensions.
Chapter Eleven, Commerce and Contracts (led by David Ibbetson), examines how ancient societies managed trade through diverse contractual practices, from informal community norms to formal legal systems like Rome’s. It highlights three key points: not all economic activity is archaeologically visible; trade did not always involve merchants; and exchange could take non-contractual forms such as barter or gifting. The chapter reflects critically on the role of written contracts, providing examples that also highlight the prevalence of oral or unwritten agreements, and furthermore revealing what a society considered worthy of formal documentation. For instance, in China, written contracts were used primarily for valuable items like weapons. This discussion sets the stage for the section on the contract of sale, which was recognized across ancient legal systems as a central commercial transaction, although its formal requirements and conceptualization varied. While Rome developed a clear, consensual model based on mutual agreement and price, other cultures—such as India, Egypt, and China—anchored sales in delivery, ritual, or documentation, rather than in abstract legal theory. Despite these cultural differences, all traditions devised mechanisms, whether written or oral, formal or customary, to manage obligations, reflecting both local legal norms and broader transregional influences on commerce and legal form.
Finally, the conclusion of Chapter Twelve, by Caroline Humfress, serves as a manifesto for many of the principles that have guided this volume, particularly the decision to explore ancient legal traditions beyond Rome and to challenge the stereotype of ancient law, save Roman, as “primitive.” To overcome these limitations, the volume emphasizes that “thinking historically about ancient law thus necessitates thinking about change and continuity through time and across multiple, changing broader contexts” (p. 601), as well as engaging with the complexity and plurality of ancient geographical and socioeconomic landscapes. Building on the themes introduced in her opening chapter, Humfress stresses that the study of the various ancient legal traditions featured in the volume reveals that multiple forms of legal ordering existed beyond direct state control. While some states allowed space for these alternative frameworks, they also helped shape distinctive normative ideas and practices that reflected the identities of different communities, associations, and networks (p. 609). The chapter concludes with a powerful statement—also an invitation for future research—not only in comparative studies but in legal history more broadly: perhaps it is time to reshape the scale of analysis in the study of law, moving toward a broader, more global conception of ancient law.
Authors and Titles
- Orientation (David Ibbetson)
- Law as Text (Michael Gagarin, Ernest Caldwell, David Ibbetson, Timothy Lubin, Geoffrey MacCormack, Joseph G. Manning, Martha T. Roth)
- Legal Science (Dario Mantovani, Ernest Caldwell, Sophie Démare-Lafont, Caroline Humfress, David Ibbetson, Geoffrey MacCormack, Patrick Olivelle, Robin Osborne, William Tooman, Bruce Wells)
- War, Peace and Interstate Relations (Katelijn Vandorpe, Sophie Démare-Lafont, Geoffrey MacCormack, Mark McClish, Patrick Olivelle, Nicolas Wiater)
- Law and the State (Mark McClish, Ari Bryen, Sophie Démare-Lafont, Geoffrey MacCormack, Robin Osborne)
- Law and Religion (Bruce Wells, Noah Bickart, Donald Davis, Edward Harris, Caroline Humfress, Geoffrey MacCormack, Robin Osborne, Katelijn Vandorpe)
- Legal Procedure (Patrick Olivelle, Michael Gagarin, Caroline Humfress, Geoffrey MacCormack, Joseph G. Manning, Bruce Wells)
- Status and Family (Timothy Lubin, Ari Bryen, Sophie Démare-Lafont, Michael Gagarin, Caroline Humfress, Geoffrey MacCormack, Joseph G. Manning)
- Crime, Redress and Social Control (Ari Z. Bryen, Timothy Lubin, Geoffrey MacCormack, Robin Osborne)
- Property (Joseph G. Manning, Edward Harris, David Ibbetson, Timothy Lubin, Geoffrey MacCormack)
- Commerce and Contracts (David Ibbetson, Ernest Caldwell, Edward Harris, Geoffrey MacCormack, Joseph G. Manning, Patrick Olivelle)
Conclusion (Caroline Humfresss)
Notes
[1] Humfress, C. “Law and Custom under Rome”. In: Rio, A. ed. Law, Custom, and Justice in Late Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages: Proceedings of the 2008 Byzantine Colloquium. (Centre for Hellenic Studies 2011), 47.
[2] e.g. Courrier, C. and Magalhâes de Oliveira, J.C. Ancient History from Below. Subaltern Experiences and Actions in Context (Routledge 2022).
[3] Plessis, P.J. Letting and Hiring in Roman Legal Thought: 27 BCE – 284 CE. (Brill 2012), 18–21.
[4] D. 49.15.24 (Ulp. 1 inst.).
[5] For example on the role of Mommsen’s work Römische Staatsrecht (1871-1888) and its subsequent translations have contributed to shaping the conception of the relationship between law and the state as one primarily defined by public law.