[Authors and titles are listed at the end of the review.]
The reviewed volume originated within a research group at MF Norwegian School of Theology, Religion and Society in Oslo. Its title reflects the variety of sources considered to reconstruct the reception of the Delphic precept “know thyself” across the first four centuries AD and various intellectual traditions. The editors have two stated objectives: to check the flexibility of the concept of self-knowledge in the range of interpretations it gives rise to through various contexts; and to assess the possibility of comparing modern conceptions of the self with those derivable from ancient sources. I start by summarizing the chapters, leaving to the end a comprehensive evaluation of the originality of the volume in relation to some other studies on the Delphic precept and self-knowledge.
The introductory chapters by Filtvedt and Schröter take stock of the ethical, epistemological, and theological implications that γνῶθι σαυτόν assumes over the course of its hermeneutic history. It is taken by ancient thinkers as the starting point of a reflection that develops along three main lines: examining the nature of the true “self” of man, in the maturation of the concept of individual identity and social identity; evaluating the possibilities that the individual has to know himself and improve himself through self-scrutiny; and verifying to what extent self-knowledge is preparatory to the realization of the supreme goal of life, the knowledge or assimilation to divinity (mediated, in Christian authors, by assimilation to Christ).
The first two aspects are already highlighted in Wasmuth’s essay, dedicated to the Delphic precept in pre-Christian Greek philosophy. There she traces the steps of a conceptual transformation process of the γνῶθι σαυτόν, from a popular saying (with Ion of Chios), to the expression of an ethical ideal (the virtue of σωφροσύνη: Heraclitus, Aeschylus), to an iconic synthesis of a cognitive journey referring both to human nature in general and to the nature of the individual. It is Platonic reflection that represents a true turning point in a psychological and intellectual sense in the way of understanding self-knowledge: dialogues such as the Republic, the Phaedrus and the Alcibiades I open new paths of investigation in the history of thought, including the effort to establish the mereology of the self, then the limits of self-knowledge, and finally its social implications.
Regarding the theological interpretation of the Delphic precept, it ultimately also goes back to Plato: more precisely, to a debated passage in the Alcibiades (133c8–7), which asserts that true self-knowledge can be achieved only by looking into the brightest mirror, which is God. The text is evaluated differently by supporters of the authenticity of the dialogue, scholars who reject it, and those who conceive those lines as the beginning of a ten-line interpolation. Wasserman examines the passage against the backdrop of the textual tradition of the Alcibiades, demonstrating how this part of the mirror metaphor could be considered a later Middle Platonist interpolation, subsequently adopted by Christian authors because it was perceived to serve the apologetic needs of the new religion; but nevertheless he is slightly inclined to consider it as originally belonging to Plato’s dialogue.
Wasmuth and Wasserman’s essays set the stage for the main chapters that follow, which can be divided into two major sections, on the Judeo-Christian tradition and on the pagan philosophical tradition of the late Imperial age. Wyss’s essay constitutes the ideal link between the first and second parts of the volume, as it focuses on the “transversal” author Philo, who, in his references to the Delphic precept, recovers the Socratic-Platonic conceptual legacy and makes it compatible with the allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures. The result of this operation is the accentuation of the transformative dimension of “know thyself” (as a strategy of self-purification) and the attribution of an apophatic dimension to the maxim, in the close connection established between God and the soul of man (never fully knowable).
The emphasis on the pedagogical dimension of self-knowledge – carried out through a daily exercise of self-scrutiny – also characterizes the ethical reflections of two “therapists of the soul,” Seneca and Epicurus. However, the two thinkers diverge in their reading of the γνῶθι σαυτόν. Seneca’s position, as demonstrated by Holtz, is more “pessimistic,” as he aims self-knowledge, understood as meditatio mortis and the awareness of human frailties, at controlling the passions, only to foreshadow later, in the Naturales Quaestiones, the transcendence of the self in the acquisition of a cosmic perspective through the study of natural phenomena (sui naturaeque cognitio). Epictetus’ vision, by contrast, according to Wehus, is more optimistic, as his interpretation of the Delphic precept is connected to the appreciation of the concept of προαίρεσις, which defines the quintessential aspect of being human and serves as a reminder of one’s exceptionality.
The ethical implications of self-knowledge then take a back seat to the theological ones in Plutarch’s De E apud Delphos, which Hirsch-Luipold examines. In this treatise, the recognition of the fullness of divine being (expressed by the mysterious E dedicated within Apollo’s temple) is dialectically linked to the awareness of human insignificance, providing an impetus to transcend the limits of material existence to achieve assimilation to the divine. This same theological dialectic is also present in the writings of Plotinus, with an exceptional focus on what Emilsson defines as the self-reflective aspect of self-knowledge. The philosopher of the Enneads acknowledges different levels of the (notion of) self, ranging from ordinary consciousness, discursive reason (διάνοια), to the “true self” of the soul, considered independently of the body, to the “higher self,” never entirely descended from the intelligible world. The movement from one self to another is carried out through an inward turn that leads discursive reason progressively to adopt the self-identical and absolutely perfect model of knowledge of the divine Intellect.
The works of Plotinus, but even those of Plutarch, represent significant points of intersection between ancient philosophy and the development of theological models of Platonic thought in the context of early Christianity (p. 211). It is important to emphasize how in the works of authors such as Clement of Alexandria, Irenaeus, and Tertullian, the theological and anthropological reflections prompted by the Delphic precept are stimulated by critical engagement with both the classical philosophical tradition and opponents of different doctrinal orientations. In the case of Clement, anti-pagan and anti-Gnostic polemics lead the Alexandrian, as reconstructed by Hägg, to draw on Philo and Middle Platonist sources in associating γνῶθι σαυτόν with the exegesis of Genesis 1:26–27 and in portraying the Christian gnostic, called to recognize in himself the image-bearer of the divine, and to achieve the likeness to God, under the guidance of the divine pedagogue. For Irenaeus, however, the discussion of true self-knowledge in Against Heresies 3 and 5 can be read, according to Kaufman, as contrasting with the false self-knowledge of the heretic Marcus. Against pagans (and Platonizing heretics) is also Tertullian’s interpretation of the maxim, which Sandnes highlights for its richness of nuance: it is an invitation to recognize in Christ the full expression of self-knowledge and to become aware of human nothingness even at moments of greatest success (such as the military rite of triumph); it is manifested in collective prayer within the Christian community.
In the essays considered so far, the authors are careful to highlight how, in ancient sources, objective and subjective elements of self-knowledge become intertwined: knowing oneself means starting from the recognition of one’s limitations in the face of objective truths/realities that transcend the self and then striving to make those truths operative in one’s life. This is so even in the case of the Hermetica, discussed by Bull: in those treatises, the goal of self-knowledge is to realize that one’s true self totally lacks particularity. This is also true in the case of Origen, whose writings reveal in the clearest way two new motifs added by Christians in their reinterpretation of the Delphic precept, namely eschatology and Christology. Origen’s works are the focus of contributions by Ramelli, Filtvedt, and Sødal Tveito, among the most substantial in the entire volume. Ramelli traces significant developments from Origen to Gregory of Nyssa, with respect to the usage of the maxim in their interpretations of the Song of Songs. Furthermore, she explores the link between self-knowledge, Origen’s theology of the Image, and his doctrine of apokatastasis: “the soul should know itself and its beauty, which it received at the beginning, because it is in the image of the God, and it ought to strive to recover it, after sinning, at the apokatastasis” (p. 439). Filtvedt focuses on the Christological implication of self-knowledge through a comparison between the Gospel of John and Origen’s commentary on the Gospel of John. In both texts, it is Jesus who is portrayed as knowing himself, and this kind of self-knowledge is, according to Origen, a model to be emulated. Regarding the path suggested by the Alexandrian theologian to his students for achieving self-knowledge, it is highly probable that it included the partial recovery of anthropological and ethical motives common to the classical philosophical tradition. This is evidenced by Gregory the Wonderworker in his Address of Thanksgiving to Origen, which is the subject of Sødal Tveito’s contribution.
Introspection, the theology of the Image, eschatology, and ecclesiology all converge in Augustine’s interpretation of the Delphic precept, the subject of Drever’s contribution, fittingly placed at the conclusion of the volume. The Bishop of Hippo truly stands at the culmination of a dual tradition, progressively transforming in his writings the quest for self-knowledge from an individual inward exercise (agnosce te) to a corporate exercise (agnoscamus) embedded within the liturgy of the church.
In conclusion, it can be affirmed that the volume certainly achieves the programmatic objectives set by the editors. It distinguishes itself from the classical studies of Pépin 1971 and Courcelle 1974 by paying attention to the echoes and interpretations of the Delphic precept in Christian and pagan sources that have been scarcely explored until now (also interesting is Cirafesi’s essay on the “Know Yourself” Skeleton Mosaic discovered beneath the monastery of San Gregorio in Rome). It aligns with the orientations of the most recent historiography on the subject (Taylor 1989; Gill 2006; Remes and Sihvola 2008; Moore 2015) which emphasize both the parallels and the differences between the modern conceptions of the “self” and that of the ancients, who were not inclined to radical forms of self-reflexivity, and never entirely isolated from social identity, and especially from an ethical ideal of self-formation. Overall, the contributions are all well-edited and the reading is facilitated by the final Indices of Authors and Biblical and Classical Sources.
In such a complex and well-articulated investigation on the history of the Delphic precept, however, it is surprising to notice the absence – except for a few references – of mentions of the methodological and doctrinal importance that the maxim assumes in post-Iamblichean schools. In these schools, the Alcibiades I is placed at the beginning of the Platonic curriculum, and the “know thyself” becomes a technical definition that summarizes the entire course of philosophical learning.[1] These aspects have been highlighted by recent studies (Renaud and Tarrant 2015, Ambury 2024) dedicated to the commentaries of Proclus and Olympiodorus on the Alcibiades, whose potential points of contact with contemporary Christian reflections on γνῶθι σαυτόν would be useful to study. An analysis of the possible intersections between the two perspectives – Neoplatonic-Iamblichean and Christian – on the Delphic precept could likely yield interesting discoveries in the near future.
References
Ambury, James. Neoplatonic Pedagogy and the Alcibiades I: Crafting the Contemplative. Cambridge 2024.
Courcelle, Pierre, Connais-toi toi-même: De Socrate à Saint Bernard, Vol. 1. Paris 1974.
Gill, Christopher, The Structured Self in Hellenistic and Roman Thought. Oxford 2006.
Moore, Christopher, Socrates and Self-Knowledge. Cambridge 2015.
Remes, Pauliina, and Sihvola, Juha, Ancient Philosophy of the Self. New York 2008.
Renaud, François, and Tarrant, Harold, The Platonic Alcibiades I: The Dialogue and its Ancient Reception. Cambridge 2015.
Taylor, Charles, Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity. Cambridge 1989.
Authors and titles
Part 1: Introductory Chapters
- Ole Jakob Filtvedt and Jens Schröter, “The Delphic Maxim Interpreted: Aims, Scope, and Significance of the Present Study”
- Ole Jakob Filtvedt, “Ancient Self-Knowledge: Exploring Some of the Scholarly Debates”
- Ellisif Wasmuth, “Interpretations and Echoes of the Delphic Maxim in Pre-Christian Greek Philosophy”
- Tommy Wasserman, ““Know Your Text”: the Integrity and Interpretation of Alcibiades m. 133c8-17”
Part 2: Main Chapters
- Beatrice Wyss, “Philo of Alexandria and the Transitory and Apophatic Dimensions of Knowing Oneself”
- Gudrun Holtz, “Seneca: Knowledge of Self and Nature”
- Rainer Hirsch-Luipold, “Plutarch: Know God and Know Yourself”
- Glenn Wehus, “Know Your Exceptionality. The Delphic Maxim Know Yourself in Epictetus”
- Wally V. Cirafesi, “Between Self-Knowledge and Self-Enjoyment: ΓΝΩΘΙ ΣΑΥΤΟΝ in the Skeleton Mosaic from beneath the Monastery of San Gregorio”
- Christian H. Bull, “Self-Knowledge as Alienation and Unification in the Hermetica”
- Matthew P. Monger, “Self-Knowledge and the Hidden Kingdom: The Delphic Maxim in the Manuscripts of Gos. Thom. 3”
- John Kaufman, “What does it Mean to be Human? The Delphic Maxim in Irenaeus
- Henny Fiskå Hägg, Know Yourself in Clement of Alexandria: Self-Knowledge, God-Knowledge and the Transformation of Self”
- Karl Olav Sandnes, “When Mortals Become Sinners: Tertullian Grappling with the Delphic Maxim”
- Ilaria L.E. Ramelli, “A Maxim of Greek Philosophy Found in Scripture: “Know Yourself” in Origen and Reflections in Gregory of Nyssa”
- Ole Jakob Filtvedt, “Jesus Knowing Himself: Origen and the Gospel of John”
- Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson, “Plotinus on the Delphic Maxim: Knowing and Being One’s True Self”
- Hanne Birgitte Sødal Tveito, “Knowing Yourself as an Essential Part of Origen’s Teaching According to Gregory Thaumaturgus”
- Matthew Drever, “Forged in the Community of Divine Love: Augustine’s Quest through the Maxim of Self-Knowledge for Finite Wholeness within the Infinite God”
Notes
[1] An interesting connection between the terms φιλοσοφία/φιλοσοφεῖν and “know yourself” both in Gregory’s Address and in Julian’s or. 6 is highlighted by Sødal Tveito, p. 538, n. 36.