The book under review is the sixth instalment of the ambitious project directed by Lucio Bertelli and Mauro Moggi to provide a new Italian translation of Aristotle’s Politics, with introduction and comment. This volume contains the last two books (7 and 8); it will be followed by a final volume, a guide to Aristotle’s Politics which will offer a bird’s-eye view of the entire work together with a critical assessment. Under the auspices of the Italian Institute for Ancient History, Bertelli (a classical philologist and a long-time expert on Aristotle’s political thought) and Moggi (a Greek historian who specializes in political and institutional history) lead a team of top-level younger scholars with different specializations—classical philologists, historians of political thought, ancient historians, and scholars of historiography and the classical tradition.
Books 7 and 8 contain Aristotle’s view on the best regime and represent the culmination of his reflection on political matters. In the previous books he had given his famous definition of the polis as a natural product conceived to enable human beings to achieve human flourishing (eudaimonia) and of man as “by nature a political being”; with the implication that human beings can flourish only in the political community, and more specifically in a good form of government (Book 1). Aristotle then turned to the question of the best regime, stating that one must not examine only the absolute best, but also those actual constitutions that are considered good and others that have been imagined and are held in esteem. He accordingly examined some actual political regimes, such as Sparta’s oligarchy, Crete, and Carthage, together with some theoretical attempts at devising the perfect regime: thanks to his curiosity and search for an exhaustive treatment, we learn of the imaginative projects of the architect Hippodamus of Miletus and of Phaleas of Chalcedon; we also read his respectful but very critical examination of Socrates’ political ideas (Book 2). After giving us an elaborate theory of the forms of government which will remain canonical in the history of Western political thought (Books 3-6), Aristotle finally gives us his proposal for the best political arrangement conducive to human flourishing. He premises his examination by saying that it is the task of the conscientious lawgiver to consider how a city, a family of man and any other partnership can share in a good life and the happiness possible for them (7.3, 1325a7-10).
The editors’ introduction is extremely rich. Lucio Bertelli authors the first part. He addresses right at the start the general purpose and meaning of Aristotle’s work and the significance of his outline of the perfect political community: Bertelli identifies the core problem in the different appreciation of the possibility of implementing the best regime which characterizes Aristotle in contrast with Plato. Aristotle himself, in Politics 2, had tackled this issue while reviewing Plato’s proposals for the perfect city in the Republic and the Laws: he concluded that Plato’s ideas were not feasible and that, in any case, their implementation was not desirable. There he had made an important methodological point: in sketching the best political community “for all those who are most able to live according to their wishes” (kat’euchen) we may make assumptions freely but should avoid impossibilities (2.6, 1265a19). “Città auspicabile”, roughly “desirable city ”, and “città destinata a costituirsi secondo i migliori auspici” (“city meant to be constituted according to the best auspices) are Bertelli’s and Canevaro’s translations for the political community built kat’euchen, very good literal choices in Italian, which perfectly render Aristotle’s meaning. The same point is repeated in Book 7: in examining the “presuppositions” (hypotheses) of the “community constituted according to the best auspices” we may consider many purely imaginary conditions, but nothing impossible (7.4, 1325b39-40). Bertelli accordingly considers Aristotle’s description of the spoudaia polis in Books 7-8 a feasible project in its author’s mind, and thus very different from Plato’s Kallipolis, which is a “paradigm in heaven” (Resp. 9, 592b1). This conclusion, we may add, is very much in line with Aristotle’s general view that “philosophy concerning human matters” has action, and not merely knowledge, as its end.
Bertelli then criticizes those interpreters, especially in the English-speaking tradition such as Christopher Rowe and Richard Kraut, who depict Aristotle’s best polis as a ‘utopia’. More specifically, Bertelli criticizes Rowe’s statement that the constitution depicted in Books 7-8 is a standard by which to evaluate and reform existing political arrangements, arguing that Aristotle states clearly that the criterion for evaluating existing regimes is stability, whereas the best constitution has as its telos virtue and human flourishing. He emphasizes that Aristotle’s search for the best regime starts with the question of the best way of life for a human being: the search has therefore an ethical bent, which is in line with Aristotle’s idea that the task of politics is to prepare the conditions for human flourishing. Aristotle concludes this part stating that human flourishing consists in an activity (praxis) and identifying eudaimonia with eupragia, “acting well” (7.3, 1325b15); however, he includes in the notion of praxis also the “thoughts and reasonings” that are ends in themselves.
After dealing with the best way of life for an individual and for a city, Aristotle examines the “presuppositions” (hypotheseis) of the best regime. The primary elements are the number of inhabitants and the territory. Aristotle maintains that the correct number of citizens is not determined by their quantity but rather by their capacity to make the city self-sufficient as concerns living well; the city should therefore be neither too small nor too big in order to be self-sufficient and should be “taken in at a single view” (7.4, 1326b25). He then addresses the question of the location of the city, well knowing Plato’s aversion to a location near the sea: Aristotle suggests that the city should be between the sea and the inland territory, in order to make it easy to defend and to facilitate the transportation of goods. He also examines the question of the best location weather-wise, taking inspiration from the Hippocratic medical treatises. After this comes an examination of the features of the city, the function of walls, and the organization of space such as the location of the agora, the temples, and the buildings for the magistrates.
Chapters 8-10 are devoted to the distribution of offices and property. Aristotle notes that in the best city the two most important functions are held by the military (to polemikon) and by those who make decisions (to bouleuomenon): should these functions belong to the same people or to different people? Aristotle rejects Plato’s solution of a permanent division of functions among citizens and argues that there will be a natural division in the perfect city: young people are strong and should have the military function, while elderly people are wise so they should make decisions. In Chapter 13, Aristotle addresses the question of the constitution, but still in an ethical perspective, namely asking what qualities and virtues should the rulers have to secure the happiness of the civic body and how should the citizens be educated.
The subsequent part of the introduction is authored by Mirko Canevaro, who observes that the question of education is a central topic, for the correct education enables citizens to pursue eudaimonia, which is their telos both singularly and as a city. Aristotle picks up again here his distinction between a rational and an irrational part in the soul, arguing that the education of the latter, through habituation, must take precedence, because the irrational part develops first. Canevaro notices that in this section, and in Book 8, there is no specific treatment of the education of the rational part of the soul. This is but one hint of the incomplete status of Books 7 and 8: both are full of promises to examine topics which are never fulfilled, such as the treatment of slaves, the modes of music, and the quality of bodies in view of procreation. Canevaro dwells on another important topic in Book 8: Aristotle’s strong support for public education of children in the perfect city, as contrasted with the typical private education of Greek cities. Aristotle’s educational path is divided into periods of seven years and has Plato’s proposals, especially those of the Laws, as a constant reference point. Canevaro emphasizes how innovative this proposal is, although it is to be inserted in the contemporary debate about education which produced new laws in some cities: it is therefore to be considered a pragmatic proposal not a mere contribution to a theoretical debate. This fact supports the view that Aristotle considered the perfect city described in Books 7 and 8 feasible.
The final section of the introduction, authored by Lucio Bertelli, addresses the questions of the place of Books 7-8 in the Politics and the nature of the best form of government according to Aristotle. The two questions are connected because at the end of Book 3 Aristotle says that he is going to examine next the question of the best regime: is he referring to the politeia described in Books 4-5, which is the result of the examination of existing constitutions, or to the constitution “according to our wishes” described in Books 7-8? Bertelli observes that this latter constitution is without doubt an aristocracy of virtue characterized by ruling and being ruled in turn. The reasons he adduces for this classification are textually convincing, although mentioned very briefly: the best city is founded on virtue with eudaimonia in view, an evidently aristocratic idea. Bertelli goes on to argue that the reference to the search for the best regime at the end of Book 3 cannot be to the political arrangement described in Books 7-8; for in 3.18 the best constitution is ruled by one person or a few people or a family with extraordinary virtue, whereas in 7.14 this is explicitly ruled out in order to have rotation of ruling and being ruled. In the Commentary to 7.14 the editors also observe that the definition of the political community as “a community of rulers and ruled” is unique in the entire Aristotelian corpus. The reference at the end of Book 3 should thus be considered an interpolation.
Before giving us his opinion about the date and place of Books 7-8 Bertelli makes a number of observations converging on the conclusion that these books were written before the ‘empirical books’ 4-6. In Books 7-8 Aristotle never refers to the central Books 4-6, whereas in those there are two references to the city “according to our wishes”. In addition, in Books 7-8 there is an evident influence of Plato’s Laws, as well as reference to Aristotle’s own Protepticus and Eudemian Ethics: all these factors incline Bertelli to consider Books 7-8 early parts of the Politics, a sensible conclusion in my view because the general tenor of the treatment of the problem of the best regime in these books has a distinctive Platonic flavour. More specifically, it is Platonic in the repeated connection between the political community and the soul of the citizens, the emphasis on education, and the neglect of the example of existing political arrangements.
The editors’ choices about problems of dating and interpretation, which are notoriously difficult, are sensible and well argued for. The long commentary (over 400 pages) and the Textual Notes are a treasure of information and help to enlighten the text and explain the editors’ interpretative decisions. For instance, in order to support their solution to the fundamental question of the connection between the end of Book 3 and Books 7-8, Bertelli and Canevaro trace its long history back to Antonio Scaino da Salò and his Quaestiones (1577): Scaino considered the beginning of Book 7 an interpolation modelled on the end of Book 3 and argued for its expunction; he accordingly suggested placing Books 7-8 after Book 3, because they fulfilled the promise to examine the best form of government. The issue was revived by Spengel in 1847 who added more arguments to support Scaino’s solution; as a result, in many nineteenth-century editions of the Politics, including those of Susemihl (1879) and of Newman (1887-1902), Book 3 is followed immediately by Books 7-8. Bertelli and Canevaro observe that there is no trace in the direct or indirect tradition of the text of a different sequence of books; the traditional sequence is kept in the most authoritative modern edition, that of Bekker (1831). They argue that the aristocracy depicted in Book 3 is characterized by the permanence in power of the men with exceptional virtue, whereas in Books 7-8 there is a rotation of ruling and being ruled among virtuous people. In this context, they notice that Aristotle poses the question whether the best life is the same for the citizen and for the city: this question signals a difference from Plato, who took this sameness for granted because of the structural identity between citizen and city (p. 302). To insist on this point the editors comment on Aristotle’s observation at 7.3, 1325b10-12 to the effect that “if there were someone superior in virtue and capable of accomplishing the best actions, it would be good to follow him and it would be right to obey him”. They notice the apparent contradiction with what Aristotle had just stated, namely the necessity of an alternation in power between equals, and the similarity with the statements in 3.13, where the man of superior virtue is likened to “a god among men”. They go on to argue that the contradiction is only apparent and there is in fact “a substantial difference” (p. 334), for the passage in 7.3 makes no reference to being like “a god among men” and therefore above the law; the existence of such men is ruled out in practice a little further on and the necessity of alternation in power is restated. A subtle and sensible solution of the problem.
The Italian translation is accurate, elegant, and close to the text; the critical apparatus to support it is impressive.
The book contains a 104-page bibliography which includes texts in different languages, mostly Italian, English, German and French; the works listed concern the Politics generally speaking, Books 7 and 8 specifically, and other topics examined in the Introduction; there are no significative gaps in it (although a fundamental essay on Aristotle’s best regime by the present reviewer is missing).
The combination of accuracy, perspicacity, and erudition, the well-balanced interpretations of difficult passages, together with the impressive amount of information one finds in the notes and in the Commentary, will reward experienced readers for years. This is a landmark edition of the Politics, which will remain a reference work in Aristotelian studies.