[Authors and titles are listed at the end of the review]
Modal-causal phenomena, such as the capacity of a magnet to attract iron, or the potential of seed corn to become acorn, or the possibility that porcelain may shatter if dropped, have always been of central interest to mankind, because understanding them allows us to predict them, and thus channel nature’s powers according to our needs and wants. A mainstream approach, in classical antiquity as much as today, is to treat such modal-causal phenomena as explananda whose central, common explanans are causal powers.
Powers/capacities/dispositions/potentialities are properties of things that are essentially defined by the type of change that they or their possessors bring about in appropriate circumstances; everyday examples of such properties are fragility, magnetism, etc. The type of change that powers can bring about is their manifestation/exercise/activity/actuality. For instance, the porcelain’s fragility manifests in its breaking, the magnet’s magnetism in attracting metal, etc. Typically, powers may exist as inactive/in potentiality or in an active state/in activity/in actuality. A magnet for instance may never happen to be near metal; it has nevertheless the power to attract metal, if the appropriate circumstances arise.
In contemporary philosophy, we witness a constantly growing list of philosophical problems in relation to which powers are considered explanatorily useful: e.g., in philosophy of science, for giving an account of laws of nature; in philosophy of mind, of free will, action theory and even the capacities of artificial systems to ‘think’; in ethics, of virtuous behaviour; in philosophy of religion, of God’s divine attributes. Beyond philosophy, Nancy Cartwright and John Pemberton, among others, have stated about modern science that “it could not be done” without positing Aristotelian powers.[1] Their reference to Aristotle’s power ontology is indicative of the interest that contemporary philosophers, as well as historians of philosophy, have developed in recent decades for the history of the metaphysics of powers, going back, unsurprisingly, to classical Greek philosophy.
With their edited volume, Adrien Lecerf, Ghislain Casas, and Philippe Hoffman contribute to bringing to the fore what the ancient Greeks thought about powers, with the merit of including in their study also thinkers who may be considered ‘marginal’ in the history of philosophy. Their book includes studies that span Aristotle, Plotinus, Proclus, John Philoponus and Maximus the Confessor, but also rhetoricians (such as Hermagoras, Theodore of Gadara and Quintilian), and medical doctors (such as Galen), and even what we can learn on the topic of powers from the so called ‘Greek magical papyri’.
Regrettably, notwithstanding the ‘openness’ of the volume’s overall approach in including less salient figures in Greek thought, the volume takes the ‘conventional’ approach that Aristotle is the earliest thinker to theorise about powers (or more precisely the ‘triad’ ousia – dynamis – energeia, on which more to follow), without considering his predecessors and most notably Plato.[2] Further, the generality of the volume’s title might mislead the reader because in fact, even if miscellaneous, the volume deals mostly with Neoplatonic authors. It is however understood that any editorial team must make choices, and Lecerf, Ghislain and Hoffmanm have made theirs.
What is less understandable is why Lecerf presents in the volume’s Introduction, as the motivation driving their editorial project, a ‘constat d’absence’ (p. 9), by which he means lack of an established state of the art with respect to the study of the triad ousia – dynamis – energeia in ancient Greek thought. Lecerf calls it even a paradox, wondering why such important ideas, which are a ‘véritable fil rouge’ across much ancient thought, have been neglected in the scholarship. I am afraid this rhetoric is misleading. It might be fair to claim that the existing literature – perhaps – has been mostly anglophone, but the bibliography to the volume’s Introduction shows that the author does not take into consideration existing excellent work such as for example Charlotte Witt, Ways of Being: Potentiality and Actuality in Aristotle’s Metaphysics (2003)[3] and Aryeh Kosman, The Activity of Being: An Essay on Aristotle’s Ontology (2013).[4]
The variety of ancient thinkers considered in the volume showcases the view that Lecerf puts forward in the Introduction, presumably on behalf of the three editors, that dynamis, energeia and ousia are ‘polysemantic’ words in ancient Greek – thus, it is only to be expected that what each ancient author thought about them varied significantly. Yet, Lecerf implicitly takes an overall interpretative stance, by claiming that in Greek thought dynamis, energeia and ousia, always occur as part of what he calls a ‘triad’; they are always ‘pris ensemble’, even if there is a ‘relation dynamique’ among them, meaning that different thinkers conceive differently the relations within the triad, and thus that the internal structure of the triad changes over time. Here it would have been very helpful for the reader to have some explanation of what Lecerf thinks this triad is, metaphysically: what emerges from the Introduction is that it is an ‘ensemble’ of related (co-varying?) terms/concepts/items in the ontology (?). Here may also lie the justification of the editors’ choice to take Aristotle as their temporal starting point of their investigation; they may want to argue that there is no ‘triad’ dynamis – energeia – ousia in Plato, for instance; but an argument for this view is missing.
In a commendable effort to systematise conceptually what by his own lights he considers a very complex and fluid nexus of concepts, Lecerf tries to give a developmental account of the ways the ‘triad’ changes, matching his general descriptions of successive new ‘versions’ of the ‘triad’ with specific examples provided in the chapters of the book. Methodologically, a caveat if not a concern is in place here: Lecerf is redescribing at a higher level of generality and abstraction the specific claims about the ‘triad’ that the individual book chapters provide, but without a suitable range of multiple study cases, and without deriving by argument his broad conclusions. Further research to underpin such conclusions would make them more warranted. Lecerf further provides an Appendix to his Introduction where he identifies and describes 8 senses of the Greek word dynamis, 6 of energeia, 5 of ousia.
Of the 11 chapters making up the volume, in addition to the substantial introduction by Lecerf, those by Lefebvre and Aubry contrast Aristotle’s views with, respectively, those of Iamblichus, and those of Plotinus and Proclus. These two chapters have in common the effort to illustrate the origin of certain philosophical discontinuities between Aristotle and his Neoplatonic successors. In Lefebvre’s chapter the focus is Aristotle’s De Anima (II.4); the fact that the text is open to two readings (even if only one is a sound interpretation) has, according to Lefebvre, enabled Iamblichus to find in it ground for his own conception of the structure of the ‘triad’ ousia – dynamis – energeia. Aubry, for her part, contrasts Aristotle’s stance on the relation between dynamis and energeia in key passages of the Metaphysics, where energeia is the fulfilment of dynamis, with the later Neoplatonic position that dynamis is perfection (and thus not in need of fulfilment). In Lefebvre’s chapter we are called to witness the adoption of a certain reading of the original text by Aristotle to ground a view very different from his; in Aubry’s chapter we witness a direct challenge to Aristotle’s view, and in this sense a higher degree of originality on the part of his successors in rethinking the triad.
The next two chapters concern later readings of Plato, rather than Aristotle. Chiaradonna’s chapter offers arguments grounded on the study of the ‘triad’ ousia – dynamis – energeia in Iamblichus and Porphyry in support of the view that Porphyry is the author of the commentary to Plato’s Parmenides attributed to him by Pierre Hadot. Lavaud takes us to Proclus’ interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus and the mental activity (energeia) of the Demiurge.
Following this, there are two chapters on Proclus, by Opsomer and Lernould; in the former, the author shows us how Proclus puts the ‘triad’ ‘at work’ to differentiate divine and human souls; and in the latter, the author studies the respective tripartite articulation of the divine and of the material world.
Mueller-Jordan returns to Aristotle’s De Anima through the lens of Philoponus’ commentary, and to the role of light in perception, arguing that the energeia of light for Philoponus is a distinct causal activity with its own causal efficacy, and not the actualisation of the transparent qua transparent (differently from how Aristotle conceived of it).
Lauritzen argues that with Maximus the Confessor the replacement of ousia with energeia as the foundation of the ontology of the divine marks the beginning of a development of a typically Byzantine theology that is grounded on power rather than on substance. This fascinating claim would deserve an in-depth discussion that, while not possible here for reasons of space, will be hopefully taken up by others.
Finally, Woerther, Boudon-Millot and Galoppin offer in their respective chapters interesting descriptions of how rhetoricians (Hermagoras, Theodore of Gadara and Quintilian), medical doctors (Galen) and the anonymous practitioners of ‘magic’ rituals would have used the key words ousia, dynamis and energeia in their respective domains, showing us – today’s readers – what the current understating of the meaning of these terms would have been then. This provides an informative contrast with the philosophical usages of these term that the other chapters cover.
By way of overall conclusion: the editors of this volume have undertaken a difficult and important task, in ‘mobilising’ different researchers with different areas of interest and specialization, to apply their scholarly expertise in bringing to the fore the role of the so-called ‘triad’ of ousia – dynamis – energeia played in different systems of thought of the post-classical period. The task is difficult because of the heterogeneity of the material; but it is also important because our understanding of the ancient ‘roots’ of our current thinking about powers will be enriched by the different historical dimensions that this volume brings out. It is a real challenge to draw some large-scale theoretical conclusions from the partial mosaic of views that this volume presents to the reader; the editors make a valiant effort within the limits of what is feasible. The mosaic can be further filled out by future research on the topic, and in this opening of further research venues lies one of the important merits of the volume.[5]
Authors and Titles
Adrien Lecerf, Introduction. Essence, puissance et activité: quelques repères
David Lefebvre, La triade “ousia dynamis energeia” et l’antériorité logique en De anima II 4. Sens et contresens
Frédérique Woerther, Οὐσία, δύναμις et ἐνέργεια dans la rhétorique de la période hellénistique et des débuts de l’Empire romain. Hermagoras, Théodore et Quintilien
Véronique Boudon-Millot, Entre médecine et philosophie. Substance, faculté et action dans le système medical de Galien de Pergame
Gwenaëlle Aubry, De l’être comme acte à la puissance d’être. Enquête sur un tournant ontologique (Aristote, Plotin, Proclus)
Riccardo Chiaradonna, L’être, l’essence et l’activité dans le premier néoplatonisme grec. Le commentaire anonyme au Parménide de Platon
Laurent Lavaud, Le Vivant, le Démiurge et le mouvement du monde. Proclus interprète du sixième don du Démiurge au monde (Timée, 34a)
Jan Opsomer, Essence, puissance et activité dans la philosophie de la nature de Proclus
Alain Lernould, L’Essence divisible et la triade forme, nature, sensation, chez Proclus
Thomas Galoppin, Dunamis, energeia, ousia. Puissance(s) et rituel dans les “papyrus grecs magiques”
Pascal Mueller-Jourdan De l’acte du diaphane à l’énergie opérative. Notes sur la nature de la lumière dans le commentaire de Jean Philopon au De Anima d’Aristote
Frederick Lauritzen, La triade dynamis-energeia-ousia chez Maxime le Confesseur
Notes
[1] N. Cartwright and J. Pemberton, ‘Aristotelian Powers: Without Them, What Would Modern Science Do?’, in R. Groff and J. Greco, eds., Powers and Capacities in Philosophy: The New Aristotelianism (New York, 2013), pp. 93-112.
[2] Lecerf claims (p. 10) that what they called the ‘triad’ potentiality/actuality/essence enters the history of metaphysics with Aristotle, but this is true only with respect to the terminology, not with respect to what the terminology refers to. See for instance, Fiona Leigh ‘Being and Power in Plato’s Sophist’, Apeiron 43 (2010), 63-85. I have argued that Plato provides in the Republic the first definition of powers in Greek philosophy, in Forms and Structure in Plato’s Metaphysics (Oxford, 2021). Vasilis Politis has made the case that Forms are essences in Plato’s Essentialism: Reinterpreting the Theory of Forms (Cambridge, 2021), reviewed by Michael Augustin in BMCR 2022.02.36.
[3] Reviewed by Friedmann Buddensiek in BMCR 2003.07.47.
[4] Even in contemporary philosophy, there have been publications in French on the topic of powers which have drawn attention to the history of the concept; e.g. Claudine Tiercelin Le Ciment des choses. Petit traité de métaphysique scientifique réaliste (Paris, 2011).
[5] One final factual rectification is needed, even at the risk of appearing punctilious: in the Foreword, the authors mention their collaboration with me and my research group at Oxford funded by the European Research Council during the period 2011-2016. Contrary to what is printed at p. 7, my project did not have Irini Fotini Viltanioti as ‘co-director’ (‘responsable’). The collaboration between my research team and that of Philippe Hoffman consisted in co-organising two international workshops, held in Oxford (2015) and Paris (2016) respectively, from which some papers were selected for publication in the volume here under review. The two teams however carried out and published their research independently and my team published their research results elsewhere (by choice and always on friendly terms with the other team).