Preview
[Authors and titles are listed at the end of the review.]
The book is structured with essays falling into two parts: a diachronic examination of ethics across the late-antique and Byzantine periods, and a series of essays with more in-depth analysis of certain aspects of the former.
The first part has five chapters on Plotinus, Porphyry, and the Church Fathers; one chapter on the monastic tradition and transmission of ethics; one on free will; and a final chapter on ethical training in tenth- to twelfth-century Byzantium. As is clear from this overview, late antiquity takes up most of the space, which both reflects the need to establish a foundation for the later tradition and the fact that Byzantine scholarship is in an earlier state of research on the subjects of ethics and philosophy. The slant in favor of better-researched periods is also reflected in the choice of authors for the case studies in the second part: Gregory of Nazianzus, Porphyry, and Komnenian authors – in particular Michael of Ephesus – and finally George Pachymeres, indicating that most Palaiologan literature, apart from a few remarks, remains untouched by the present publication.
Bradshaw opens the collection of papers with a study of the reception of Platonic and Stoic philosophy in the Greek Fathers’ writings about gender and the soul, a subject of much consequence considering the evident clash between the idea of the soul as free from all accidents and the expectation of corporal resurrection. The next four chapters, as well as the tenth from the second part of the book, present different aspects of Neoplatonism and ethics. Chapter Two, by Chiaradonna, shares with Chapter One an interest in the Platonic tradition and the problem of ethics and the (perfect) soul. The chapters on Neoplatonism are elegantly linked and work their way from the particulars of Plotinian philosophy to an understanding of impractical or theoretical ethics and their contribution to the impassive life of contemplation envisioned by Evagrios Ponticus – as in Ahbel-Rappe’s Chapter Three, thus connecting two different strands of late antique schools of thought – as well as drawing on Stoic ethics. Plotinus and Porphyry incorporated the practical wisdom into the theoretical as a prerequisite, and in so doing turned most attention towards contemplation of the self. As Ahbel-Rappe makes clear, it is the same development in the evolution of monastic writings: the imperative to leave behind the practical life (and with it the need for practical ethics), for contemplation and silence (hesychia). We might here see the beginnings of two paths for orthodox Christianity, frequently entwining and combining but still distinct: that of rational thought (theology), and that of mystic contemplation removed from disturbing definitions of thoughts, or hesychasm.
In Chapter Four, Finamore attempts to extricate practical ethics from the seeming monolith of theoretical ethics encountered in the previous chapters. On the face of it, the ethics of Plotinus concern themselves only with transcendence through union with The One, at which point the material world is of no consequence to the philosopher, thus leaving little or no place for practical ethics, the good and right way to live. However, by drawing on Neoplatonic commentaries and Iamblichus’ De Mysteriis, Finamore shows first how ethics is connected to the progressive disentanglement with the world, as in the case of Plotinus, and second how the last, theurgic stage of connection with The One (or the third instantiation of The One) is not static but carries with it an imperative to descend and guide those on the lower rungs of reality, as in the case of Plato’s philosopher. Van den Berg closes this sequence of chapters on Neoplatonic ethics with a closer look at Proclus’ view of the formative or pedagogical use of the Platonic dialogues. By painting vivid character sketches of the participants, Proclus believed, the dialogues appeal to the non-rational part of the soul and shape the soul through imitation. In contrast to the teaching of Stoic duties that presupposes an entirely rational soul, Proclus and the other Neoplatonists admit the irrational part of the soul, the ‘bad horse’ in the Phaedrus, and reach the conclusion that some lessons are best learned by imitation, before a more intellectual approach to ethics is begun.
The turn to the Christian philosophers of late antiquity is undertaken by Blosser in Chapter Six. This takes Origen of Alexandria as its starting point, especially his fusion of Christianity with, on the one hand, Platonism and the identification with Christ and the emanation into the intelligible world and, on the other, Stoicism with its ordering Logos. The fall from Heaven into material bodies entails, however, a pedagogy of suffering (as in the myth of Er) and redemption. The Christian philosopher follows the Platonic one down into the material world, not as part of a cycle but as the culmination of his work in imitation of Christ. In a monastic setting, Plotinus’ worldview had little need of adaption by Origen: the mortification of the flesh in order to strengthen the soul and the longing for death is heavily influenced by Neoplatonist thought, and the term monachos can be read, with Plotinus, as ‘unified’ rather than ‘solitary.’ Monastic Christianity in the fourth century thus shows signs of diverging from the emergent, non-dualistic mainstream of the Church. As exemplified by the Rule of St Basil and St Basil’s own life, withdrawal from the world is not a final state of life, but a condition which alternates with activity within the wider Christian community.
Harper elaborates on the Christian reception of Aristotelian and Stoic ethics from Origen to Maximus the Confessor, attending to the analysis of self-determination, a subject which touches upon the question of the nature of slavery and nature versus nurture. Neville takes matters down to Komnenian times and demonstrates the use of mimesis not only to enact rhetorical typoi but also to build up a sense of selfhood by internalizing Biblical and antique models of behaviour. A central tenet is the ‘training’ many Byzantines received through psalm recitation and identification with different Biblical models and the resulting conditioning that made mimesis of classical typoi second nature. This chapter, the book’s eighth, also acts as a defence of the active and creative use of ethical mimesis against earlier conceptions of Byzantine intellectual sterility, views that are probably now all but extinct in scholarship.
The second half of the book consists, as mentioned, of case studies, beginning with MacDougall’s analysis of Gregory of Nazianzus’ use of the Nicomachean Ethics in establishing a moral middle ground from where to criticize theological opponents. Sirkel’s chapter revisits the subject of Porphyry and animals with a refreshing twist: she focuses not on the contrast between rational and irrational beings but on the question whether an animal causes harm and thus can justifiably be harmed or, if harmless, whether one can justify harming it. Leaving the (Stoic) criterion of rationality, the question of what or whom to eat extends beyond the animal kingdom, and Porphyry does indeed include a measure of justice towards plants, tempered by the observation that they lack perception; he is perhaps hinting that the doing of injustice is not necessarily connected to the victim’s capacity to perceive the injustice; that injustice, following Plato, may rather count as an act of self-harm. Be that as it may, Sirkel argues that the injustice of harming harmless beings constitutes the ethical question of the treatment of animals. Most of the chapter is taken up by a specific discussion of Porphyry’s stance on degrees of rationality and consequently on animal rationality.
The Chapters by Trizio and Lautner examine the Komnenian reception of the Nicomachean Ethics and, together with Neville, present an interesting view of the literary milieu of the time in general and in particular of Anna Comnena’s patronage of philosophy and ethics. The closing chapter by Xenophontos is an exposition of certain aspects of a soon-to-be published editio princeps of Pachymeres’ commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. Xenophontos examines the commentary and its relation to earlier commentaries and identifies the author’s pedagogical focus and methods. She establishes that Pachymeres took pains to add explanations, etymologies, and paraphrases to make Aristotle’s text more clear; that the text seems to envisage an audience; and that this audience is on a fairly advanced level. The chapter is the only one to discuss matters after the twelfth century and it does so with an appealing behind-the-scenes look at the educational basis of the Palaiologan renaissance.
A certain redundancy is to be expected from such a wide selection of writings, but it serves a purpose in rehearsing arguments in different ways, pointing to new insights. The chapters in the first part work very well together, and arguments develop throughout. This consistency of subjects and thoughts, however, also highlights the formal-editorial differences across chapters, especially the variation with which quotes are given; some give key phrases and terms in Greek or in transliteration, others the full Greek text in either text or footnote, and sometimes the Greek is almost absent. The different choices are offset by a useful and concise index of names and terms.
The authors tend to confine themselves to traditional divisions: Neoplatonism, Patristics, before/after Maximus the Confessor, etc., and practical ethics are overshadowed by theoretical. However, the chapters inform each other, and The Reception of Greek Ethics is an inspiring collection of texts spanning beliefs and centuries of philosophy. The thoughtful arrangement of the chapters helps the reader appreciate the depth and indebtedness of the late antique and Byzantine authors, and the contributors present not only the status quo of scholarship but a wealth of departures for future research.
Authors and titles
Part I – Ethics across the Late-Antique and Byzantine Period
Chapter 1 – Sexual Difference and the Difference It Makes: The Greek Fathers and Their Sources, David Bradshaw
Chapter 2 – Ethics and the Hierarchy of Virtues from Plotinus to Iamblichus, Riccardo Chiaradonna
Chapter 3 – Neoplatonic Contemplative Ethics: Mind Training, Sara Ahbel-Rappe
Chapter 4 – Ethics, Virtue and Theurgy: On Being a Good Person in Late-Neoplatonic Philosophy, John F. Finamore
Chapter 5 – Imitation and Self-Examination
The Later Neoplatonists on the Platonic Dialogue as Moral Education through Visualisation, Robbert M. van den Berg
Chapter 6 – The Reception of Greek Ethics in Christian Monastic Writings, Benjamin Blosser
Chapter 7 – Understanding Self-Determination and Moral Selfhood in the Sources of Late-antique and Byzantine Christian Thought, Demetrios Harper
Chapter 8 – ‘Singing with David and Contemplating Agesilaus’ Ethical Training in Byzantium, Leonora Neville
Part II – Prominent Ethical Views of the Time
Chapter 9 – The Ethos of a Theologian Gregory of Nazianzus and the Reception of Classical Ethics, Byron MacDougall
Chapter 10 – Porphyry on Justice towards Animals: Are Animals Rational and Does It Matter for Justice?, Riin Sirkel
Chapter 11 – Eustratius of Nicaea and the Nicomachean Ethics in Twelfth-century Constantinople: Literary Criticism, Patronage and the Construction of the Byzantine Commentary Tradition, Michele Trizio
Chapter 12 – Michael of Ephesus on the Relation of Civic Happiness to Happiness in Contemplation, by Péter Lautner
Chapter 13 – George Pachymeres’ Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics:
A New Witness to Philosophical Instruction and Moral Didacticism in Late Byzantium,
Sophia Xenophontos