Aristotle’s ethics has been a cornerstone of philosophical inquiry into eudaimonia (often translated as “happiness” or “flourishing”), virtue, and human relationships. Living together, the second of three volumes collecting essays written by Jennifer Whiting over a period of approximately thirty years,[1] has these themes at its core. The seven essays collected in the present volume, all originally published in other venues, remain significant contributions to the field. Their compilation enables the reader to grasp the cumulative impact of ideas built gradually and the recurring themes throughout: eudaimonia tied to Aristotle’s psychology and teleology, the interplay between the activities of practical and theoretical intellect, and the importance of friendship (philia) and appreciating one’s important others “for themselves”, rather than for self-serving reasons. Her exploration is lucid and nuanced, a great example of reading Aristotle dialectically, and while contemporary questions concerning, for instance, Aristotle’s method in ethics, are not absent from this volume, her approach here is mostly devoted to discussing the Aristotelian passages pertaining to the above issues.
Although it is rewarding to read these essays back-to-back, their length and the density of argumentation defy detailed exposition. In what follows, I focus on the principal axes of this work that reveal the originality of Whiting’s thought, beginning with her introduction to the volume, which offers an overview of the threads that connect the essays included herein, and then grouping the essays in accordance with these threads. The introduction also provides some clarifications, in tune with her current thought—for instance, on her inclusivist interpretation of Aristotle’s function argument (along with J. L. Ackrill and T. H. Irwin among others). This is the view that eudaimonia is inclusive of some or all intrinsic goods, in contrast to the argument for contemplation as the single best good (following J. M. Cooper and R. Kraut among others). Whiting’s earlier views are strengthened by what she qualifies in the introduction as “a holistic form of inclusivism” that takes eudaimonia to consist in a structured combination of activities, each contributing more or less directly to the overall good.
Chapter 1: “Aristotle’s Function Argument: A Defense” corrects common misconceptions about the relationship between eudaimonia and human nature. In Nicomachean Ethics (NE) I.7 (1097b22-1098a20), Aristotle defines eudaimonia as rational activity in accord with virtue. Whiting answers objections concerning Aristotle’s naturalism and the charge that he moves from an “is” to an “ought”—namely, from a descriptive account of what is to be a human being to normative conclusions about what is good for a human being. She shows that Aristotle’s account is normative “all the way down” in the sense that the argument rests on the assumption that an account of a kind’s function (or essence) inevitably involves some idea of what benefits members of that kind. At the end of Chapter 1 she has added a postscript written in 2021 to clarify how these views are compatible with her later (McDowellian) views. These are set out in Chapter 5: “Strong Dialectic, Neurathian Reflection, and the Ascent of Desire: Irwin and McDowell on Aristotle’s Methods of Ethics”, which examines the intensely debated topic in contemporary ethics about Aristotle’s method of ethics. Here Whiting attempts to reconcile what she calls “Irwin’s Aristotle” with “McDowell’s Aristotle” concerning the method each of the two ascribes to Aristotle.
Whiting agrees with McDowell that virtuous agents choose a particular action qua just or generous, and not qua expression of their nature or actualization of their essence (although it is in fact such an expression). However, she thinks that the recognition of such facts can play an indirect role in motivation by providing “reflective reassurance” to less than fully virtuous agents, because the function argument may serve to reinforce their commitment to virtue (even if it cannot directly engage with their will). Of course, she acknowledges the limits of this sort of argument: this can, at best, work as an exhortation to undertake the sort of training needed to become fully virtuous. In other words, the function argument is seen as a justification of virtue in general—one that is to be distinguished from the justification appropriate to the practices of the particular virtues listed by Aristotle in the NE. In sum, Whiting thinks that Aristotle’s ethical reflection does not assume an external point of view positing the deducibility of ethical conclusions from (non-ethical) metaphysical and psychological premises (which would amount to “a theory about motivation built into human beings as such”). Rather, she accepts that Aristotle maintains a point of view internal to ethical thought, proceeding from reputable beliefs (or ethical endoxa) about virtue and refining them to reveal the grains of truth they may contain and resolve the relevant puzzles.
Chapter 2 “Human Nature and Intellectualism in Aristotle” argues against a strict intellectualist reading of NE X. Her view that the highest good for humans will be a “mixed life”, consisting in some combination of contemplative and political activity, is shaped by Plato’s account of a “mixed life” in the Philebus. An increasing appreciation of the relevance of this comparison is evident in Chapter 7 “The Pleasures of Thinking Together: Prolegomenon to a Complete Reading of Eudemian Ethics VII.12”, which also reflects a growing appreciation of the role of pleasure in virtuous activity. Whiting offers a close reading of EE VII.12 to provide a justification of the fact that maximally self-sufficient persons choose to have friends as sunergoi, not only in political activities but also in contemplative ones. In her view, it is the pleasures that justify why such a person will want to share a contemplative life with like-minded friends—not, as other readers maintain, because contemplating with a friend increases the quality and/or the quantity of the activity. There is not, I think, an unbridgeable gap between the two, insofar as the pleasure that is appropriate to each virtuous activity enhances the relevant activity of which it is derivative (NE X.5, 1175a30-36).
Two further remarks reveal a strength and a possible weakness on her view. First, in a framework where Aristotle seems to model human eudaimonia on divine eudaimonia, special care is required to justify why contemplating together is better. Special care is certainly not absent from the eighty-page, detailed analysis of the Aristotelian text, where Whiting convincingly argues that contemplating together is more pleasant, while avoiding the transformation of virtue-based friendship into a pleasure-based one. This is a strength because it helps readers to better appreciate the role of (intellectual) pleasures in Aristotle’s scheme—especially those who, based on NE I.5 and EE I.5, where Aristotle introduces the life of (sensual) pleasure alongside the political and the contemplative only to dismiss it a few lines later, might not have been able to do so fully. The possible weakness is that it is hard to read either EE VII.12 or the parallel text in NE IX.9 as not acknowledging that human self-sufficiency is already conditioned by the necessity to live with others.[2] Aristotle’s requirement that we love and benefit our friends ‘for themselves’ is not necessarily threatened, I think, by the acknowledgment of what is inherent in our nature as social animals, given that both of the above texts are primarily concerned with virtuous persons who are reliably oriented towards what is valuable in itself.[3]
Aristotle’s requirement that we love and benefit our friends ‘for themselves’ lies at the core of Chapter 6 “The Nicomachean Account of Philia”, which follows the non-traditional route of arguing from friendship to eudaimonism and not vice versa, in order to counter the egoistic implications of a eudaimonism not seen through the lens of philia. This is another recurring theme in Whiting’s work. Loving others ‘for themselves’ (di’ hautous, NE 1156b10), and not because we gain some benefit from them, forms the basis of her reading of the parallel Aristotelian requirement that the virtuous agent values and engages in virtuous actions ‘for themselves’ (di’ auta, NE 1105a32) in Chapter 3 “Eudaimonia, External Results, and Choosing Virtuous Actions for Themselves”. Most commentators take the ‘eudaimonist axiom’[4] to refer to the agent’s own eudaimonia—broadly construed, in the sense that the agent’s own well-being depends to some extent or even includes that of their loved ones.[5] The question, then, is how to reconcile choosing virtuous activities “for themselves” or choosing to benefit a friend “for himself” with the idea that the agent ultimately aims at their own eudaimonia. Whiting’s suggestion is that virtuous agents choose these things “for the sake of eudaimonia” but not for the sake of their own eudaimonia. This sounds less convincing than her analysis concerning the association of each of the canonical virtues with certain sorts of external results—for instance, generous actions aiming at the welfare of others. Her latter suggestion that aiming at such external result is built into the notion of choosing a virtuous action for itself is insightful and avoids the impersonal implications of the former.
Chapter 4, “Self-Love and Authoritative Virtue: Prolegomenon to a Kantian Reading of Eudemian Ethics VIII.3”, applies the above considerations to self-friendship, informed by what Whiting calls an ‘ethocentric concern’, that is, character (êthos)-based concern, both for oneself and for others. In other words, virtuous agents’ concern for loved ones and for themselves is based on decent character, in a way that downplays the role that a shared history might play in this framework. Prioritizing an impersonal virtue, while exploring its parallels with the Kantian idea of being governed by a “law within”, is in line with the impersonal eudaimonia mentioned above. These two elements of Whiting’s thought, together with a tendency to approach intrinsic value as exclusive of any sort of instrumental value, represent a philosophically fruitful dialogue between Aristotle and Kant in her work. On the other hand, scholars of ancient philosophy might trace an overemphasis on Kantian parallels that, at times, fails to address the full complexity of Aristotle’s thought.[6] That said, Whiting is a great interlocutor of these thinkers. No doubt, scholars and students of Aristotle as well as ethicists working across ancient and contemporary ethics will benefit from this philosophically rich volume.[7]
Notes
[1] The first volume is First, Second, and Other Selves: Essays on Friendship and Personal Identity (Oxford University Press, 2016); the third volume is Body and Soul: Essays on Aristotle’s Hylomorphism (Oxford University Press, 2023).
[2] See, among others, Kraut R., Aristotle on the Human Good, (Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 299-300 n. 28.
[3] This is a main point of disagreement with McCabe’s interpretation of EE VII.12, which emphasizes the ‘joint activity’ of friends as central to a fulfilling life. McCabe’s interpretation appeared in the same volume as Whiting’s original essay on EE VII.12: Fiona Leigh (ed.), The ‘Eudemian Ethics’ on the Voluntary, Friendship, and Luck (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2012).
[4] “Happiness and Virtue in Socrates’ Moral Theory,” in G. Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
[5] Whiting’s critique of the egoistic implications of the eudaimonist axiom—primarily in Chapters 3, 4, and 6—is consistent with her concerns about what she elsewhere calls “colonizing ego” accounts of Aristotle’s conception of the friend as “other self”, particularly in her “Impersonal Friends”. While her concern is to some extent justified, one might consider alternative approaches, such as that proposed by David. O. Brink in his review of the first volume, which includes the essay referred to in this note.
[6] See, for instance, Brad Inwood’s review of S. Engstrom and J. Whiting (eds.), Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics (Cambridge University Press, 1996).
[7] Overall, the volume is well edited; I found only one typo , on p. xiii: for sunhêmereuin (Whiting’s favorite word in Aristotle); read sunhêmereuein.