In this magisterial study, Alexandra Michalewski reinterprets the extant fragments of the second-century CE Middle Platonist philosopher Atticus together with the context in which these fragments are embedded, as a witness to debates among different interpreters of Plato’s Timaeus. The study takes into account the new evidence provided by the recently edited Syriac treatise On Principles and Matter (PM henceforth), which appears to be connected to Porphyry.[1] It clarifies the differences between Atticus and Plutarch, whose views are often critiqued together, and traces two lines of reception, the one in the Christian tradition, especially through Eusebius, but also Aeneas of Gaza; the other in Neoplatonism. The latter tradition reveals many layers, all distinguished and contextualized by the author, who starts from Proclus’ report, in his commentary on the Timaeus, on Porphyry’s rebuttals of Atticus’ claims, to work her way back to a more detailed analysis of Porphyry’s stance (now complemented by evidence from PM), his use of Plotinus and, finally, the oral teaching method in Plotinus’ circle. The adroitness and lucidity with which the author handles this complex material are truly remarkable.
Key here is the distinction in PM between two different Platonist lineages, one grouping Atticus, the Platonist lexicographer Boethus (about whom very little is known elsewhere), and Longinus; and another consisting of Severus (to whom Michalewski dedicates a separate chapter), Plotinus, and the author of PM who calls himself a pupil of both Longinus and Plotinus, so presumably Porphyry. According to the criticism which Porphyry levels against the first group, they made the mistake of sticking too much to the letter of the text and share the same wrong assumption about so-called pre-cosmic disorderly motion in the receptacle (Tim. 52d-53a), or matter as they call it, that this motion is intrinsic to matter.
But what is at stake in these debates? As the introduction, which provides an excellent roadmap for the relevant issues, spells out, the focal point is just one line from Plato’s Timaeus (30a):
οὕτω δὴ πᾶν ὅσον ἦν ὁρατὸν παραλαβὼν οὐχ ἡσυχίαν ἄγον ἀλλὰ κινούμενον πλημμελῶς
καὶ ἀτάκτως, εἰς τάξιν αὐτὸ ἤγαγεν ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίαςand so he [the Demiurge] took over everything that was visible and that was not at rest but in discordant and disorderly motion, and from disorder he turned it into order. (tr. Zeyl)
Given the narrative mode of discourse Plato adopts here, every component of this statement came under close scrutiny. First, there is the connection between this passage and the famous opening of the character Timaeus’ speech at 28b-c, which states that the physical universe as the realm of Becoming had a beginning. Plutarch and Atticus interpret this claim in a temporal sense, and Atticus appears to have posited a form of pre-cosmic time. But the Greek archê can also have a non-temporal sense, as ‘principle.’ And thus Platonists such as Plotinus, Porphyry, and Proclus state that the world is eternal but depends on a higher cause for its existence and preservation.
Second, there is the connection with 52d-53a, the passage in which Plato describes a disorderly (but not random) motion in the receptacle in connection with what he there calls ‘traces’ of the elements. So, do 30a and 52d-53a refer to the same demiurgic act of imposing order? Atticus assumes so. But Porphyry posits a double demiurgy: (1) form and matter are the principles for the elements, whereas (2) the elements are the principles for the physical universe. Though the extant fragments of Porphyry’s own commentary do not cover this section of the Timaeus, one might add that it is plausible that he interpreted 52d-53a as the first stage in this process (again not in a temporal sense) and 30a as the second stage.
But what is it exactly that the Demiurge is taking in hand, so to speak? We have two indications here: something that is ‘visible’ and that moves in a disorderly manner. Atticus (and Plutarch) focus their interpretation on the second component, arguing that such a motion requires the presence of an irrational soul in matter, on which the Demiurge imposes rationality, thereby bringing about the World Soul. Porphyry, by contrast, focuses on the first component and, in light of his double demiurgy, posits that this passage refers to the second stage, of the Demiurge ordering not the traces in matter but the elements as full-fledged bodies.
Eusebius’ use of Atticus, as Michalewski demonstrates, is markedly different from what we find in the Neoplatonist sources. Eusebius marshals Atticus for his claim that Platonism represents the best of pagan philosophy and is most compatible with Christianity by focusing on Atticus’ notions of the world’s temporal beginning and Providence. Atticus’ vehement polemic against what he considers Aristotle’s mistaken view of Providence also serves Eusebius’ purpose. This rejection of Aristotle is another feature that sets Atticus apart from the Severus-Plotinus-Porphyry lineage. As the Severus fragment in PM shows, he too uses arguments derived from Aristotle in support of his interpretation of the Timaeus. But Eusebius does not mention those views of Atticus that would push against an alignment with the Christian perspective, notably Atticus’ positing of multiple principles that are independent of the Demiurge, and his claim that matter eternally coexists with god.
Porphyry, for his part, targets precisely these claims. Positing multiple principles instead of assuming that everything in reality derives from the intelligible realm, and ultimately the One, leads to a misrepresentation of the god as Demiurge, soul, and matter. For Porphyry it makes no sense to have the Forms be external to the Demiurge and to make the Demiurge somehow dependent on and inferior to matter insofar as he has to gauge matter’s suitability to receive form. Moreover, positing an irrational soul in matter is not compatible with the elevated role the hypostasis Soul plays in the order of reality.
One of the break-through insights this study offers, which confirms an earlier hypothesis Michalewski had advanced,[2] concerns Atticus’ principles. Scholars have assumed that Atticus belongs with those Platonists who endorse a set of three principles, the Demiurge/God, Forms, and matter. To this effect Festugière had suggested the addition of matter preceding the pair Demiurge and Forms in a fragment of Atticus recorded by Proclus (in Tim. 1.391.6-12 = fr. 26 des Places; the new edition of Proclus’ commentary on the Timaeus by Gerd Van Riel does not adopt this emendation). But, as Michalewski argues, Atticus does not belong in this camp, because soul is also a principle for him. With the new evidence provided by PM, we now have Atticus’ claim that he in effect endorses four principles (PM 73). These four can be reduced, the fragment continues, to the pair active versus passive (PM 74). But it also emerges that Atticus actually criticizes the view that posits the triad god-forms-matter (PM 75-76); he states that the triad god-soul-matter would provide a more correct reading of Plato (PM 77-78).
Finally, as can perhaps be expected from this reviewer, I want to turn to the issue of the extensive parallel between PM (17-67) and chs. 302-20 of the fourth-century partial Latin commentary on the Timaeus by Calcidius, which strengthens the assumption that in this section of his commentary Calcidius relied at the very least on doxographical material gathered by Porphyry.[3] Scholars have also long assumed that the Platonist view that posits the elements as principles of the physical world (ch. 301) refers to a view endorsed by Porphyry. As I pointed out, this view presupposes two levels of principles: form and matter are the principles of the elements, and the elements in turn are the principles of the world. But, going beyond Michalewski’s analysis now, here too PM provides a fresh perspective, in signaling that Severus already proposed a similar framework (86-94). So, in light of this evidence, it would now be worth examining further to which extent Severus’ version is different from Porphyry’s, who coopts it for his purposes, and whether Calcidius’ version of this view is not actually the one deriving from Severus.
Alexandra Michalewski’s work amply demonstrates the power of the hermeneutical approach to Ancient Greek philosophy. By paying attention to texts and not just to arguments and fully taking context into account we can arrive at a much richer understanding of these debates. This monograph is incontournable.
Notes
[1] Y. Arzhanov, Porphyry, On Principles and Matter. Scientia Graeco-Arabica 34. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2021.
[2] A. Michalewski, ‘Atticus et le nombre des principes. Nouvel examen de quelques problèmes textuels du fragment DP 26 (= Proclus, in Tim., I, 391, 6-12),’ in: Les Principes cosmologiques du platonisme. Origines, influences et systématisation, ed. by M. A. Gavray and A. Michalewski (Turnhout: Brepols, 2017), 119–41.
[3] On this issue, see also A. Michalewski, ‘Review of Arzhanov Y., Porphyry, On Principles and Matter,’ Études Platoniciennes 17 (2022, https://doi.org/10.4000/etudesplatoniciennes.2195); M. Chase, ‘Calcidius Syriacus? On some implications of the close parallels between Porphyry’s On Principles and Matter and Calcidius’ Commentary on the Timaeus,’ in: Porphyry in Syriac. The Treatise ‘On Principles and Matter’ and its Place in the Greek, Latin, and Syriac Philosophical Traditions, ed. by Y. Arzhanov (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2024) 89-95; G. Reydams-Schils, ‘Calcidius on matter and the Platonist tradition: The case of Porphyry revisited,’ forthcoming.