[Authors and titles are listed at the end of the review]
Early on, the editors of this volume quote C. Lévy’s declaration (1992, 557, cited p.8) that De natura deorum is the work of Cicero’s philosophical corpus that opens the most possibilities for research. Whether or not that is still the case, further study of this difficult but important text is welcome. The volume under review comprises eleven essays in English, French, and (mostly) German. In view of space constraints, I will discuss them selectively with emphasis on those that seem likely to give impetus to research.
E. Begemann applies to N.D. the resonance theory of the sociologist Hartmut Rosa (2016).[1] Briefly, Rosa holds that people can relate to the world either by experiencing it passively or actively changing it. Moreover, one can relate to the world either with resonance or mutely, in the latter case either with indifference or repulsion (pp.58–59). Begemann argues that in Cicero’s presentation the self-contained Epicurean gods can find no resonance in human beings, since for the gods to act would be to cause a change, but no change could be in their interest, since they are already perfect; the Epicurean gods are mute. This approach effectively highlights the way Cotta/Cicero undermines the Epicurean gods. The theory works less well, however, for Cicero’s presentation of Stoicism. Here Begemann argues that the Stoic deity, acting with all-encompassing providence, effectively silences the human being (p.67). But the Stoic speaker Balbus seeks to create a nexus between Stoicism and traditional cult by emphasizing divination (2.7–12), with its interaction between gods and humans, and offering Stoic explanations for the traditional gods (2.63–69). He concludes by admonishing Cotta that his position in society and as a priest should move him to defend Stoic theism (2.168). Even in purely Stoic terms, considered in light of Cicero’s theological trilogy as a whole, Begemann’s case is not clear, since Chrysippus sought to carve out space for human free will, as Cicero clarifies at De fato 42–43. Some other points may also prompt disagreement, such as the claim that N.D. aims to represent the religio suitable for Cicero’s ideal republic (p.69), which is nowhere stated in the text (is she perhaps thinking of De legibus?). On the other hand, Begemann is stimulating on the division of labor between the dialogue’s two skeptics, Cotta and “Cicero” (pp.71–72). All in all, a worthwhile contribution to the debate.
H. Essler compares Philodemus’ citations of Epicurus on the corporeality of the gods in De pietate and De dis with the citations of Epicurus in N.D. 1. Philodemus’ citations serve to (1) enable a topic to be treated more precisely; (2) confirm the orthodoxy of a statement, i.e., that it is in line with the founder’s doctrine; (3) form the basis for his own argument or further reflections (p.85). Moreover, Philodemus searched several Epicurean treatises for relevant information, including De sanctitate and De dis (pp.84–85). By contrast, the citations in N.D. 1, both by the Epicurean speaker Velleius and the skeptic Cotta, are confined to a single text, Kyriai doxai 1 (“what is blessed and immortal is free of trouble and causes trouble to no one”), which is invoked with the rhetorical function of structuring the argument (p.90). Essler concludes that Cicero adopts the Epicureans’ manner of citing their founder, perhaps as a kind of parody; in his argument it serves as mere window-dressing (p.92). A helpful addition to our growing understanding of Cicero’s rhetorical strategies in the Epicurean book.
R. Woolf argues that Cicero’s two figures trained in the Academy, namely his younger self (“Young Cicero”) and C. Aurelius Cotta, enable him to differentiate two different sides of the Academic enterprise, the open-minded search for truth on the one side and the refutation of all dogmas on the other. He suggests that Young Cicero’s judgment at 3.95 that Balbus’ position is “more inclined to a likeness of the truth” may result from Balbus’ flattering citation of his poetry and a similar view of philosophical method, Balbus having remarked that Cotta, as an Academic, could argue either side of the theological question (2.168). Woolf also, like J. Müller (see below), thinks that N.D. may showcase Cicero’s philosophical evolution (p.144). His point about Velleius’ “excessive lack of deference to authority” (p.145) should perhaps be modified: vis-à-vis Epicurus, Velleius is positively sycophantic (1.43)! And when Cotta says (1.61) that he prefers to debate with Epicurus, rather than Velleius, this is perhaps not because Velleius’ “version of Epicureanism is … not quite the same as that of the founder” (p.142)—no differences have been identified—but an expression of his general comitas (cf. 1.57) in polite conversation with a fellow member of the senate.
The dialogue De divinatione takes its starting point from Q. Cicero’s reading of Cotta’s argument in N.D. 3. Quintus confesses that this has shaken his belief in the gods but not overthrown it altogether (1.8). This “reader’s response,” the way it is developed in the remainder of Div., and what this may tell us about N.D. are the subject of a stimulating paper by G.M. Müller. Quintus argues that the gods exist because divination exists. When Quintus claims that divination is widespread among various peoples and is older than philosophy (1.84 and 86), the argument is weak, as Müller shows (pp. 154–57); he could have compared Hortensius’ similar argument about the recent origin of philosophy (Hort. F 52 Grilli). But that is not the whole of Quintus’ case. One wishes that Müller had also considered the philosophical arguments for divination that Quintus adduces (1.64, 70–71, and 125). Müller thinks that Marcus does not reject divination altogether but merely casts doubt on it so as to eliminate it as a support the existence of the gods (p.167n65). This is all Marcus would have to do in order to counter Quintus, but, in fact, he goes further, repeatedly denying the existence of divination (2.8, 45, 74). Müller takes seriously the preference Marcus expresses for Stoicism at N.D. 3.95. But though Marcus in Div. is similar to Cotta in N.D. 3 in rejecting hasty arguments about the gods, he differs in that he represents a “constructive skepticism” that can strengthen the Stoic position by purging it of weak elements (p.167n64). Müller emphasizes Panaetius, the Stoic who was skeptical of divination (Div. 1.6–7 = T 137 Alesse), as Cicero’s model, and sees here a stage in Cicero’s gradual approach to Panaetius, leading to extensive use of that author in De officiis (pp.164–69). It should be noted, however, that in De officiis Cicero adopts Stoicism ad hoc for rhetorical benefit (cf. Off. 3.20 on the Stoics arguing the case “more brilliantly” [splendidius] than the Academics and Peripatetics) without abandoning his basic skepticism (Off. 2.7–8).
J. Sauer examines the handling of Balbus’ argument for providence in the metaphysical section of the apologetic dialogue Octavius by Minucius Felix (early 3rd century). He notes that among Cicero’s interlocutors Cotta is the senior figure and is looked up to as a specialist on rhetoric by both Velleius (2.1) and Balbus (3.8). Moreover, while critical of some aspects of Balbus’ speech, Cotta expresses confidence that Balbus can refute him (3.95), thus hinting that a better case can be made for Stoicism. Sauer argues that Minucius took up the challenge. Thus, Minucius’ speaker Octavius, unlike Balbus in N.D. 2, does not begin his argument with an attempt to prove the existence of god(s), a point criticized by Cotta (3.8), but rather with a discussion of the human being, as in Leg. 1.26–27 (and possibly also in the passage of Rep. cited there). It is a problem that Sauer wants to claim, on the one hand, that Minucius may have borrowed arguments from Leg. to supplement or emend Balbus’ presentation in N.D. but, on the other hand, that Stoic theology as presented in N.D. needed to be supplemented because Leg. remained unpublished (p.198). He seeks to obviate this difficulty by claiming that points raised in Leg. may also have been argued in Rep. He seems, however, to lose sight of the fact that Leg., though unpublished during Cicero’s lifetime, was available to later authors such as Lactantius and Macrobius, who cite fragments from it that are not found in our manuscript tradition; it may have been available to Minucius as well (by the way, Sauer’s title is confusing in making it appear that Cotta’s critique was “received” in De legibus, which is chronologically unlikely, as his text makes clear). In any case, Sauer makes a valuable contribution by showing that Minucius takes hints from Cotta’s critique to offer an improved (Christian) version of Balbus’ case.
J. Müller also reads N.D. in light of a later work that imitates and emulates it, David Hume’s Dialogues concerning Natural Religion. Müller argues that with the dialogue figure Pamphilus, a protégé of the dogmatist Demea, Hume offers a portrait of his younger self (it can be shown that Hume’s early philosophical notebooks had a dogmatic bent). Müller goes on to suggest that the same may be true of Cicero, in particular that the view “Cicero” expresses at 3.95, with a certain (qualified) preference for Balbus’ presentation, is that of his younger self. Hence, Cicero, too, would be offering a kind of portrait of himself in his youth, rather than a position he would take as a mature man. The thesis is interesting but ultimately unconvincing. As evidence for a change of mind on Cicero’s part Müller cites the different attitudes toward divination in De legibus 2 and De divinatione 2. But he seems to forget that at Leg. 1.39 skeptical objections have been explicitly sidelined, so this difference cannot be used as evidence for a change of mind. It should also be borne in mind that Cicero insists upon his license, as an Academic skeptic, to identify and follow “probables” (Luc. 66, N.D. 1.12, Off. 2.7–8). If in his philosophical dialogues of 45–44 Cicero had wanted to sketch an intellectual autobiography, and if he had deviated from the skepticism expressed at Inv. 2.9–10 under the influence of Antiochus, as Müller postulates, then surely in De finibus 5, set at the very time and place of Cicero’s studies with Antiochus, he might have been expected to support the case that Piso argues for Antiochus’ philosophy, but instead he offers a critique (Fin. 5.76–85). Müller cites Cicero’s willingness to hear further arguments from Piso as a sign that young Cicero’s views on ethics are still evolving (pp.262–63), but such a willingness is by no means at odds with skepticism of the Ciceronian type, with its careful weighing of arguments (cf., e.g., Div. 2.150). The hedged judgment at N.D. 3.95 is also consistent with such an approach. Finally, by inscribing an autobiography into his philosophical works Cicero would have encouraged readers to inquire quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, something he was keen to avoid (N.D. 1.10).
References
Lévy, C. 1992. Cicero Academicus. Recherches sur les Académiques et sur la philosophie cicéronienne. Rome.
Rosa, H. 2016. Resonanz: Eine Soziologie der Weltbeziehungen. Berlin.
Authors and Titles
Christopher Diez, Christoph Schubert, Einleitung
Wilfried Stroh, Cicero und die römische Religion
Jörg Rüpke, Cicero’s Philosophy of Piety Seen through the Lens of Urban Religion
Elisabeth Begemann, Was haben die Götter mit Gerechtigkeit zu tun?
Holger Essler, Epikurs theologische Aussagen bei Cicero und Philodem
Christopher Diez, Ciceros De natura deorum und die deutsche Quellenforschung
Clara Auvray-Assayas, Stratégies auctoriales dans la construction du De natura deorum
Raphael Woolf, Cicero’s Academy Award
Gernot Michael Müller, Perlegi tuum paulo ante de natura deorum [librum]
Jochen Sauer, Die Schule des Gaius Aurelius Cotta in De natura deorum. Die akademische Kritik an Balbus’ Argumentation im Spiegel ihrer Rezeption in De legibus und bei Minucius Felix.
Dagmar Kiesel, Cicero als Kronzeuge im Streit zwischen Iulian und Augustin
Jörn Müller, Portrait of the Skeptic as a Young Man.
Notes
[1] H. Rosa, Resonanz: Eine Soziologie der Weltbeziehung, Suhrkamp Verlag, 2016; translated as Resonance: a sociology of the relationship to the world, Polity Press, 2019.