In this monograph, Hendrikus A.M. van Wijlick argues the period of Roman civil war in 44-31 BCE had a significant impact on the Near East. He sees the project as filling a lacuna in scholarship left by Fergus Millar, whose classic The Roman Near East 31 BC – AD 337 only picks up with the Battle of Actium.[1] While underscoring Millar’s accomplishment, van Wijlick takes issue with his conclusion that an analysis of the preceding period going back to Pompey’s career in the 60s BCE “would have either taken up too much space or failed to reveal much about the Near East itself, or probably both” (1; see Millar 1993, xii).
Noting how the Near East was a hotbed of Roman activity in 44-31, often involving unconventional political behavior and military activity, he suggests the likelihood of the period’s special importance in Near Eastern history (2). To determine its character, van Wijlick provides a three-part discussion of Rome and the Near East, reviewing Pompey’s campaign in 66-63, followed by analysis of 44-42 and 42-31 from the perspective of relevant Near Eastern states, and finishing with an overview of the “Types of Conduct” displayed by Near Eastern rulers and Rome as well as a final assessment of significance. Overall, van Wijlick concludes that 44-31 was not a break in patterns of interstate behavior, but a period of continuity with previous and future political practice. He offers that Roman-Parthian confrontation, rather than Roman civil war, was the decisive factor in the rhythms of the Near East (234-237).
The “Introduction” and “Part 1” effectively prepare the reader for an examination of 44-31. In the introduction, van Wijlick lays out the project, using Millar 1993 as its touchstone and noting the advantages and limitations of other works (3).[2] In addition, he defines the project’s geography (here, “Near East” does not include “Anatolia”; 3-5), structure (chapters organized by regional perspective, followed by more synthetic analysis), sources (mostly Greek and Latin literature, but also numismatic and epigraphic evidence), and terminology. On the latter, van Wijlick explains at length his avoidance of the term “client king” (10-24).
Part one then reviews Pompey’s stint in the Near East in 66-63. According to Van Wijlick, Pompey’s reorganization of the region’s geopolitical structures was significant, with long-term implications. After Pompey inherited the war against Mithridates VI of Pontus and Tigranes II of Armenia, he ultimately pursued a larger project of reorganization informed by the disintegration of the Seleucid Empire and instability in Judaea. Van Wijlick rightly concludes that Pompey’s major goal was regional stability, rather than direct Roman rule. Hence, he maintained many dynasts in their positions, and provincialization had its limits. He also rightly acknowledges Pompey’s ambition and desire to inflate his accomplishment at home.
In “Part 2,” van Wijlick offers the main study. He first focuses on the years 44-42, and then 42-31, providing chapters focused on regions that provide significant evidence of interstate behavior. Throughout, he successfully scaffolds discussion, beginning with more important states (according to their power and the mercy of the historical record) and progressing to others. For 44-42, he discusses Parthia, Ptolemaic Egypt, Judaea, and then Chalcis and the Emisenoi. For 42-31, he addresses the same subjects in the same order and adds the following: Nabataea, Armenia, Media Atropatene, and Commagene. Even as van Wijlick effectively builds the narrative in this way, it is commendable that he offers chapters that can stand on their own while still avoiding overly heavy repetition.
Part two sees van Wijlick consistently highlight two interrelated themes. First, he argues both Rome and Parthia were after long-term investment and power in the Near East. When the Parthian king Orodes II ordered an invasion west of the Euphrates into Roman-controlled territories in 41/40, the decision was not just “retaliation” or a “pre-emptive measure” (110). It was for lasting control of Syria and its environs, to dominate trade routes to the Mediterranean and prevent Roman attacks from Syria (111).
And Antony’s response was telling. His goal was not simply “prestige” and “personal glory.” The campaign was more than “punitive” (122-123). Following his lieutenant Ventidius’ victories and Antony’s unsuccessful request that Orodes’ successor Phraates IV return Crassus’ standards, Antony led a campaign into Media Atropatene in 36 BCE. This campaign was a focused, strategic attack on a specific territory, primarily designed to disable Parthia’s ability to invade the Roman Near East (119-125, 181-187). When that failed, Antony tried a new tactic: dynastic intermarriage. After Antony’s defeat, Artavasdes of Media Atropatene became disaffected from Phraates. So Antony sought an alliance with him, confirming the bond by uniting Alexander Helios, his son by Cleopatra VII of Egypt, with Artavasdes’ daughter Iotape. In this way, Antony hoped Media would enter Ptolemaic control in time (124-125, 191-195).
The second theme was the importance of “pragmatism” and “expediency” above personal ties. To be sure, van Wijlick acknowledges the relevance of interpersonal connections in Near Eastern politics. But they were trumped by the honest assessment and effective use of human resources. For example, in 41 Cleopatra asked Antony to eliminate her sister Arsinoe and Serapion, the Ptolemaic commander of Cyprus who assisted Brutus and Cassius in 43-42. Antony complied. This solidified Cleopatra’s position, and it allowed Antony to eliminate the prospect of internal conflict in Egypt and an enemy in Serapion (128-129). In 37/36-34, Antony transferred a significant number of territories into the control of Cleopatra and her children (130-136). Here Cleopatra made progress toward the restoration of the earlier Ptolemaic kingdom, while Antony secured a loyal ally that backed him in the Near East as he faced off against the Parthian empire. These were not decisions of passion, but calculated moves for mutual benefit.
Judaea is another good example. In the 40s, the Romans controlled it, using and advancing the Hasmonean Hyrcanus and Hyrcanus’ strongmen, Antipater and his sons, especially Herod. In the process, we see how Hyrcanus, Antipater, and Herod switched sides during internal Roman conflict, showing concern for self-advantage and pragmatism rather than personal relations (80-94). First, Hyrcanus and Antipater supported Caesar in Egypt in 47, and Caesar rewarded them with various promotions. But then Antipater, Herod, and Phasael did the expedient after Caesar’s assassination in 44, when his assassin Cassius assumed command of Syria. When he imposed taxes in the region in 43, Antipater and his sons raised the required funds. As result, Cassius returned the favor, confirming Herod as στρατηγός of Coele Syria.
This rhythm of political pragmatism persisted in 42-31 (141-164). In 41, Antony maintained Herod and his brother Phasael, appointing them as “tetrarchs.” While their father’s relationship with Antony may have been a factor, the major consideration must have been their previous loyalty and effectiveness. In 41/40, at Orodes’ direction, Pacorus invaded Syria, appointing the Hasmonean Antigonus as vassal king of Judaea. In response, Antony and the senate appointed Herod as king of Judaea as the best decision in the face of the Parthian conquest. Rome needed a capable challenger to Antigonus—and Herod was a proven quantity.
Van Wijlick uses “Part 3” to synthesize his findings in a way that may surprise the reader. Here he explores whether there are patterns of international relations between Rome and Near Eastern rulers that are “typical” of the triumviral period of 44-31. Recalling the introduction, the reader may expect to find that Roman civil war produced distinctive political behavior in these years. On the contrary, among the 13 types of behavior that Romans and Near Easterners exhibited (209-233), van Wijlick concludes only one was truly typical of the period: a Near Eastern ruler’s “Involvement in a Civil War” (224-225). Even in this case, though, it is notable that examples creep beyond 44-31. Van Wijlick notes Armenian support for Pompey at Pharsalus in 48 (181), and Bassus enjoyed aid from Chalcis and the Emisenoi in his struggle with Sextus Caesar in 46 (224). In the end, we find that continuity of interstate behavior defined 44-31. More important than civil war in 44-31 (as well as before and beyond) was Roman-Parthian conflict. As van Wijlick states, “Parthia’s looming presence and actual policies, more so than circumstances brought about by the civil war, thus made limits to Rome’s empire and hegemony in the eastern Mediterranean palpable” (237). This geopolitical instability shaped the decisions of Rome and Near Eastern rulers throughout the period.
As with any ambitious work, there are occasional omissions and misrepresentations. For example, van Wijlick makes bright points about Antony’s eastern policy in 36-31. He highlights how Antony focused on Media Atropatene in his campaign of 36 (not Parthia and its broader empire), how Augustan tradition warped the evidence emphasizing his failure, and how Antony’s post-campaign strategy involved a marriage alliance with Artavasdes of Media Atropatene in 34 (in good Hellenistic fashion) (116-125, 181-195). As often, the full discussion is engaged with relevant ancient and modern sources. Notably, however, he omits Jones 2017, which powerfully underscores each of these points.[3]
Finally, the Roman-Parthian treaty established by Pompey and Phraates III in the 60s is a thorny issue. Van Wijlick rightly notices several stages to its development in 66 and 65, but his description of how it unfolds produces some confusion (38-41). He understands the original treaty, established in 66 before Pompey’s attack on Mithridates of Pontus, to have involved the territorial grants of Mesopotamia and Adiabene to Phraates—but not a recognition of the Euphrates as a boundary. Only in 65, following Pompey’s campaign in the Caucusus and his lieutenant Gabinius’ march across the Euphrates and into Mesopotamia, does van Wijlick see the issue of the Euphrates surface, with Phraates arguing for it as a boundary. While possible, this distinction between Mesopotamia and the Euphrates may have been less clear. The two are likely interconnected; the Euphrates valley was Mesopotamia’s western border.[4]
This volume deserves celebration. Van Wijlick has filled a scholarly gap left by Millar. His research of ancient and modern sources is routinely meticulous. He makes his results easily and meaningfully available through specific regional case studies and a synthetic analysis. The writing is polished, clear, and enjoyable. And he offers a balanced assessment of nearly every problem. Above all, the honesty of analysis rings true. While Roman civil war shaped the Near East in 44-31 less distinctively than the reader may expect, van Wijlick effectively reveals the powerful impact of Roman-Parthian confrontation. This conclusion encourages one to seek further reading.[5] Van Wijlick has enriched the field of Classical history.
Notes
[1] Fergus Millar, The Roman Near East, 31 BC–AD 337 (Harvard University Press, 1993).
[2] E.g., Maurice Sartre, D’Alexandre à Zénobie (Arthème Fayard, 2001) (not addressing Egypt); Michael Sommer, Roms orientalische Steppengrenze (Franz Steiner, 2005) (not addressing “interstate relations in our period of civil war”); Adrian Sherwin-White, Roman Foreign Policy in the East, 168 B.C. to A.D. 1 (Duckworth, 1984), and Richard Sullivan, Near Eastern Royalty and Rome, 100-30 BC (University of Toronto Press, 1990) (less focus on 44-31).
[3] Kenneth R. Jones, “Marcus Antonius’ Median War and the Dynastic Politics of the Near East,” in Jason M. Schlude and Benjamin B. Rubin (eds.), Arsacids, Romans, and Local Elites (Oxbow, 2017), 51-63.
[4] In addition, he suggests Jason M. Schlude, “Pompey and the Parthians,” Athenaeum 101.1 (2013), 163-181, identifies the Euphrates as the boundary agreed upon by Pompey and Phraates from the beginning of their engagement in 66. This is not the case. The article suggests instead three important events across 66 and 65: (1) a treaty of alliance and friendship between Pompey and Phraates at the outset, in which Phraates would invade Armenia (no territorial stipulations discernible); (2) Phraates’ request for the recognition of the Euphrates as a boundary later in 66 after Tigranes submitted himself to Pompey and Pompey assumed control of the Armenian empire (Pompey agrees); and (3) Phraates’ irritation and request to renew the Roman-Parthian treaty in 65 after Pompey’s campaigns in Albania and Iberia and Gabinius’ march from the Euphrates to the Tigris (i.e., across Mesopotamia).
[5] See, recently, Jason M. Schlude, Rome, Parthia, and the Politics of Peace (Routledge, 2020).