[Authors and titles are listed at the end of the review.]
The fifth book of Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations (Tusc.) is enigmatic bordering on impenetrable. In the first half of the work Cicero argues in favor of the Stoic position on goods and the sufficiency of virtue for happiness—a view he resoundingly rejected in the fourth book of De finibus (Fin.). In the second half of Tusc. 5 we find a sweeping argument for the harmony of all ancient ethical thought: Cicero enlists not just the Stoics, but also their main rivals the Antiochian-Peripatetics and even the Epicureans, debauched hedonists though they are, as allies: these schools too, regardless of the end(s) they support, believe that virtue is sufficient for happiness (Tusc. 5.83). This positive conclusion of philosophical concord sits uneasily beside the more agonistic and aporetic elements of Cicero’s Academic skepticism, especially evident again in Fin. How does Cicero come to these conclusions, and how does this book fit within his broader approach to ethics?
The volume Cicero Ethicus, as its subtitle clarifies, is primarily concerned with interrogating the idiosyncrasies of Tusc. 5, especially in light of Fin., as a way to better grasp Cicero’s overall ethical project. This seemingly narrow scope is both warranted and valuable, given that Cicero himself praises Tusc. 5 as “illuminating the whole of philosophy most of all” (Div. 2.2). The volume’s eight contributions (in German, French, and English) tackle the problems posed from all directions, and the overall conclusions certainly make manifest the philosophical sophistication of Tusc. and Fin. and the overall coherence of Cicero’s project as a philosophical author.
The editors’ introduction, after a persuasive paean to the importance of taking Cicero philosophus seriously, succinctly lays out the interpretative challenges posed by Cicero’s two ethical dialogues. This is followed by G. Müller’s lengthy and wide-ranging chapter on the dialogue form in Tusc. and Fin., which centers on the question: why does Cicero reject the use of Socratic question-and-answer in favor of forensic-style speeches? Elenctic questioning fails in being too agonistic, ad hominem, and unpersuasive, while oratio perpetua promotes different dialogic ideals in line with Cicero’s specifically Roman model of discourse: open and collaborative inquiry with one’s interlocutor; a more robust exposition of doctrine; a cautious respect for authority; and, especially in Tusc., a more practically oriented discussion aimed at philosophical therapy.
Two of the collection’s strongest papers get to the heart of issues central to Cicero’s ethics. Gill explains the internal and external inconsistencies of Tusc. 5 by arguing that Cicero’s focus is a conception of happiness narrower than that of Fin.: happiness here is characterized above all as permanent emotional invulnerability. This particular conception explains the more practically oriented inquiry and the positive conclusion of Tusc. 5. Gill’s is a compelling argument, and his concluding suggestion is provocative: once we acknowledge the narrower, consolatory goals of the Tusculans, we are prompted to ask whether it is appropriate to conceive of Hellenistic ethics as primarily therapeutic (à la Nussbaum), or if this is rather a distortion arising from an overgeneralization of the peculiar aims of Tusc. J. Müller tracks Cicero’s attitude towards the dispute between Stoic and Antiochian-Peripatetic ethics, specifically the question, which Cicero raises all over the place, whether the two sects differ merely in terminology (verba) or if there are irreconcilable differences in substance (res). I am more inclined to accept Muller’s conclusion than that offered by Schofield in an earlier paper:[1] Cicero ultimately stops short of endorsing either Antiochian or Stoic ethics, but rather prefers an ethical system that prioritizes the pursuit of virtue as the highest (if not the sole) good, leaving it to the respective schools to work out the details of their account (cf. Luc. 134; Leg. 1.53-5; Off. 3.33; Fin. 2.38). Whether this is an epistemically acceptable or coherent position for Cicero to adopt is a question that needs further examination.
Wildberger’s excellent paper offers a careful and critical analysis of Cicero’s unlikely argument that Epicureanism too holds that virtue is sufficient for procuring happiness. Most valuable is how Wildberger excavates the originality and flexibility of Cicero’s use of Greek sources. His translation of Epicurus KD 2 and his reference to Epicurus’ deathbed letter at Tusc. 5.88, differing subtly but significantly from those found at Fin. 2.100 and 2.96, reveal how Cicero has (re)interpreted Epicurus to emphasize the psychic invulnerability of the Epicurean sage. The unique version of the Carneadea divisio at Tusc. 5.84 primes us to evaluate philosophical ends in terms of the role they grant to psychic goods and virtue. And even the phrasing of the central problematic (i.e. whether virtue is capable of securing and defending happiness) leaves opens the possibility that virtue may be merely instrumental to happiness. As much as this all allows us to reevaluate Cicero as a multifaceted and creative author, Wildberger’s ultimate conclusion (p. 272) is a salutary warning: “we should never adduce any quote or testimony about whatever source in Cicero’s Philosophica without careful consideration of its context.”
Two papers rightly draw attention to the Socratic-Platonic tenor of Tusc. 5. Karamanolis argues that Tusc. 5 successfully moves beyond the aporia expressed at the conclusion of Fin. While Fin. had revealed Cicero’s insistence that virtue must play the primary role in securing happiness, only in Tusc. 5 does Cicero voice his endorsement of the view that virtue is the sole good, as advanced not only by the Stoics but also Plato’s Socrates (e.g. in the Euthydemus). Pointing to Tusc. 5.32–33, Karamanolis argues that Cicero’s change of mind is warranted by his Academic skepticism and is in fact a reflection of his commitment to Socratic canons of rational argument. Auvray-Assayas, homing in on Tusc. 5.34–48, argues that the framework of ethical naturalism adopted by the Hellenistic schools is responsible for the failure of the investigation in Fin. Cicero surmounts this impasse in Tusc. 5 by developing a Platonic theory of human development that avoids the failures of both the Antiochian-Peripatetics and the Stoics.[2] While the former wrongly advance a naturalism that includes bodily goods within the sphere of human concern, the latter cannot explain the radical jump from our initial impulses towards natural goods to the development of perfect reason. A Platonic account navigates this Scylla and Charybdis by emphasizing man’s affinity with the divine.
Finally, two chapters take up Cicero’s reception of the founders of two Hellenistic sects. Focusing on Zeno of Citium, Luciani agrees with others that Fin. has a theoretical bent while Tusc. is more practical and therapeutic, and argues that this is borne out by each work’s presentation of Zeno’s (supposed) originality and (illegitimate) linguistic novelty. Though Cicero’s spirit is largely polemical, by Tusc. 5 he finds Zeno’s theory of virtue worthy of approbation. Prost sees a similar evolution in Cicero’s attitude toward Epicurus. Always the stalwart opponent of hedonism, Cicero nevertheless is able to admit that some of Epicurus’ views would indeed be worthy of philosophy—if only Epicurus had accepted that virtue is the good! By Tusc. 5, Epicurus is welcomed into the chorus of philosophers, along with Stoics and Peripatetics, all harmoniously singing that the wise man is unperturbed and invariably happy.
Insightful and engaging, these papers do an excellent job of rehabilitating and illuminating the ethical project that culminates in Tusc. 5. That said, I would like to float a worry about how Cicero’s ethical project is framed throughout the collection. Many of the contributors accept as a starting point or come to the conclusion that Fin. is a theoretical treatise that critically evaluates philosophical ends while Tusc. is a practical exercise in philosophical consolation. But I’m not so sure that the theoretical/practical distinction really applies. Surely evaluating ends is very much a practical exercise, insofar as one’s accepted end will be a guiding moral criterion of action.[3] More objectionable is the label “practical” for Tusc.: this label often reads as shorthand for “less rigorous,” as if Cicero has cut corners in his critical presentation of competing theories or has compromised his earnest commitment to Academic skepticism. Connected with this, I think, is a tendency to misread what Cicero says about his Academic principles at Tusc. 5.33. Cicero here does not claim that the Academic is free to simply change his beliefs; his liberty allows him to argue for different views without being taken to have endorsed them.[4] It may be that Cicero, in the short time between writing Fin. and Tusc. 5, has indeed come around to accepting Stoic ethics and has softened his antipathy towards Epicureanism. But this sits uncomfortably with his assertion at the start of the book that he will follow Socrates’ dialectical method by “concealing his own view” (Tusc. 5.11).[5] Getting to the bottom of Cicero’s Academic ethical project ultimately requires a deeper interrogation of the epistemology underwriting the Tusculans.[6]
Cicero’s philosophical bona fides should no longer need defending, and this collection shows the importance of engaging with Cicero seriously and attentively not only for our evaluation of Cicero himself, but also for our interpretation of the whole of Hellenistic and Roman philosophy. That this collection is the inaugural volume of the new series Philosophia Romana bodes well for what is to come.[7]
Authors and Titles
Jörn Müller and Gernot Michael Müller: Einleitung. Ciceros ethisches Projekt im Spannungsfeld von de Finibus bonorum et malorum und den Tusculanae disputationes
Gernot Michael Müller: Continentem orationem audiere malo (Cic. Tusc. 1,16). Gesprächsdynamik und römisches Selbstverständnis in den Tusculanae disputationes mit einim Ausblick auf de Finibus bonorum et malorum und Ciceros frühe Dialoge
Christopher Gill: Questions and Answers: De finibus and Tusculans 5
Clara Auvray-Assayas: L’Anthropologie du 5e livre des Tusculanes et la critique des Stoïciens dans le de Finibus bonorum et malorum
George Karamanolis: The Primacy of Virtue: The Transition from De finibus to Tusculanae Disputationes 5
Jörn Müller: Mere verbal dispute or serious doctrinal debate? Cicero on the relationship between the Stoics, the Peripatetics, and the Old Academy
Sabine Luciani: Un Phénicien à Tusculum. La figure de Zénon dans les dialogues éthique de Cicéron
François Prost: Épicure de De finibus aux Tusculanes
Jula Wildberger: Happiness despite Mortality. Epicurus’s Preparation against Death and Pain in Cic. Tusc. 5,88f.
Notes
[1] M. Schofield, ‘The neutralizing argument: Carneades, Antiochus, Cicero’, in D. Sedley (ed.), The Philosophy of Antiochus. (Cambridge, 2012), 237-249.
[2] Here (as with the other papers by French contributors) one notices the lasting influence of Carlos Lévy, Cicero Academicus. Recherches sur les Académiques et sur la philosophie cicéronienne. (Rome, 1992). A similar argument about Platonism and naturalism is found in ch. 4 of W. Altman, The Revival of Platonism in Cicero’s Late Philosophy. (Lanham, Maryland, 2016).
[3] The end provides a ratio vivendi (Fin. 5.15; cf. 1.11; Luc. 29, 132; Ac. 1.29).
[4] “Whatever strikes our souls with plausibility, we say (id dicimus).” At de Legibus 1.36, Atticus speaks of the Academic’s libertas disserendi.
[5] nostrum ipsi sentetiam tegeremus…; cf. Nat. Deor. 1.11; Div. 2.150; de Or. 1.84, 3.67; Luc. 60.
[6] A good start, presumably published too late for the authors to take into account, is J.P.F Wynne, “Cicero’s Tusculan Disputations: A Sceptical Reading,” OSAP 58 (2020), 205-238.
[7] Two more monographs on Ciceronian philosophy are already slated for publication in this series (https://www.winter-verlag.de/de/programm/buchreihen/philosophie/reihe159/Philosophia_Romana/alle/).