Stephen Makin has produced an interesting and demanding contribution to the Clarendon Aristotle Series: Metaphysics Theta. The fifteen-page translation of Aristotle’s central text on potentiality and actuality paired with some 285 pages of commentary (including the introduction) strikes a fair balance. Makin charts a path through the text and genuinely engages with its arguments (xx). Generally, his interpretation is conceptual rather than historical. He proceeds by formulating claims from the text and then analyzing their meaning, supporting argumentation, and implications in relation to issues of interest or other Aristotelian claims. Avoiding or “finessing” (e.g., xxii, 66, 227) historical questions in favor of conceptual ones seems to be a deliberate strategy. He tries to appeal to “readers who are not predisposed to be interested in Aristotle and to give those readers a way into
Makin renders energeia as “actuality” (“actually” in the adverbial dative). Entelecheia is “fulfilment.” The explanation of Aristotle’s neologisms and their translations (xxvii-xxx) is helpful and clear. Greater complications attach to the translation of the “potential” terms. The verb dunasthai is “to be capable.” The noun dunamis is “potentially” in the adverbial dative. Because this form appears almost exclusively in chapters 6-10, Makin renders other forms of this noun as “potentiality” in those chapters. However, in chapters 1-5, he finds this term “unnecessarily opaque” and, with a few exceptions, uses “capacity” instead, along with its convenient privative form, “incapacity.” Makin finds the resultant near uniformity across large portions of text attractive (xxii-xxiv). He does not say whether he considered “potency” as a translation.
Even greater complexity arises with dunaton. Makin translates this term with reference to a distinction between “possibility” and “capacity” that is essential to both commentary and translation (cf. 22, 46, 69, 72-74, 159, 211-15). “The distinction between possibility and capacity is a distinction between a standard modality (that something is actual entails that it is possible) and a non-standard modality (that I do something does not entail that I have the capacity to do it)” (72). The distinction is drawn within the “very wide range of weak modalities”; “weak” because the fact that something can be done does not entail that it is done (xxiv).1 Each weak modality can be expressed by some sense of the word “can.” ‘I can read,’ ‘Wood can be burned,’ ‘Jones can win the lottery,’ and ‘I can embezzle money.’ Makin classifies weak modalities based on whether they satisfy the principle [T].
I embezzle money, so I “can” embezzle in the sense of physical possibility, but embezzling does not entail that I “can” do so ethically. Thus, [T] holds for physical possibilities, but not for ‘ethical permissions’ (or ‘epistemic licenses’). “Most significantly for present purposes, [T] does not hold of capacities” (xxv). An unskilled person might build a wall that stands or perform a just deed, but this does not entail the presence of a capacity (art or virtue). The modalities for which [T] holds are ‘standard modalities’ and include “logical, physical, and temporal possibilities” (xxv). “So the distinction between ‘capacity’ and ‘possibility’ is best understood by reference to [T]” (xxv). Thus, ” dunaton will sometimes be translated ‘capable’, sometimes ‘possible’. . . . The choice of translation at a particular place will reflect whether the modality is being treated as standard or non-standard in the passage in question” (xxvi). By reference to [T], Makin is able to address in the commentary ambiguities inherent to the Greek and produce definite interpretations of many passages. In many respects, Makin ties the translation to and makes it dependent on the commentary.
Capacities are just one sort of non-standard modality, so it is not clear how [T] provides the “best” understanding of the possibility/capacity distinction. In fact, Makin declares Aristotle’s own way of expressing this distinction (in Metaphysics Delta, ch. 12) “perfectly clear” (xxv). The deployment of Makin’s strategy also raises questions. For example, at 1047a10-11, he translates: “Again, if what is deprived of a capacity is impossible . . .” (4). He defends “impossible” (over “incapable”) as required by his translation policy (69), but does not explain what this phrase means. (See other translations and consider the similar text at 1046a29-30.) These difficulties are noteworthy because at key points Aristotle’s text and argument are interpreted by reference to [T].
Makin almost always translates clearly; the few supplements are normally, but not uniformly, marked by brackets (compare 1048a23-24, 1049a3, and 1051b28-32 with 1051b33-1052a11). The commentary explains some translation decisions, but not all. For example, to thermantikon (1046a27), is rendered with a modal verb as “what can heat,” just as are most terms with that suffix, but not all (see 1046a14-15, 1048a6, and 1048a8; compare 1048b1 and at 1049b14). He translates kai as “and” (1050a16-17) even when he thinks it should be read as “namely” (198). At 1050b2-3, a similar translation of kai yields “the substance and the form are actuality.” Additionally, the introduction (contra 211) offers no comment on the fourteen forms of endechesthai, which he renders “can.” He calls this verb “rare” and “colourless” (72)3 and does not clarify its relation to dunaton, which is unfortunate especially because of 1047a26-27: “if it is possible ( dunaton) for it to sit and it can ( endechetai) sit.”
Finally, in the “Textual Notes” (271-73), Makin indicates discrepancies between Ross’s text and Jaeger’s text and says he has followed Ross, except in twenty-eight passages, conveniently marked by asterisks in the translation. In one unidentified departure from this practice, he adopts an emendation suggested (but not used) by Jaeger and not mentioned by Ross (1046a31). Normally, Makin avoids technical textual criticism. In one exception, he translates the manuscript reading, but interprets it according to an alternative suggestion (94-95). In a more substantive case, his provides a textually and philosophically interesting analysis of 1048b18-35, arguing that it should not be readily taken as decisive for the rest of Theta (141-54).
Each chapter of the commentary corresponds to one chapter of Theta and begins with an “overview” of the chapter’s contents. Headers on each page identify the chapter under consideration. The commentary is replete with helpful references to various parts of Aristotle’s corpus, especially other books of Metaphysics (most frequently Delta). Unfortunately, not all references appear in the Index Locorum. He refers forward and backward to his own commentary, tying its parts together. He inventively discerns possible meanings and generates supporting arguments. For example, he devises a nice translation of 1046b22-23, preserving it from Ross’s charge of being “rather pointless” (57-58). Generally, he gives interesting and helpful analyses where the text itself may be vague: the specification of the content of capacities (103 ff.); the distinction of normal, interfering, and blocking conditions (42 et passim); the emphatic distinction between capacity and nature; and the treatment of “seeing” as an exercise of a nature not a capacity (xxx-xxxvi, but see 60, 68, 116, 164, 171, 173). Makin refers occasionally to Plato, but does not often connect Aristotle’s text to ancient figures or to the tradition of Aristotelian interpretation and commentary. References to recent secondary literature are common, though he cites just twelve sources published after 1995.
Makin articulates a clear structure of Theta, which reflects the interpretation of Frede (xi-xviii, 18-21, and 128-35).4 Chapters 1-5 introduce potentiality and actuality by considering the exemplary relation between capacities and the changes to which they give rise. This subject determines the content and order of those chapters (21). Chapters 6-9 treat “the potentiality-actuality distinction conceived more generally” (xiv). Chapter 10 treats truth and falsity and is “tangential” (xii).5 “The core of the Frede interpretation is that the discussion of change and capacity in
Nevertheless, “It is plain that there is a transition at
The general schema relates energeia and dunamis, which is “potentiality” here, but “capacity” at the lower level (151). Thus, in the commentary, “capacity” and “potentiality” mark whether Makin has in mind dunamis in the use coordinated with change or dunamis in the schematic use coordinated with actuality. In this light, the introduction seems to have understated the distinction between the two translations of dunamis.6 In the commentary Makin works out interesting distinctions among many kinds of capacity: active and passive, rational and non-rational, innate capacities and those acquired by learning and by teaching (cf. “relational capacities” or “relational possibilities” on 66-69). These many senses of “capacity” are ordered in a “focal analysis” around the primary type, the “active capacity” (22-29). However, no “focal account” is appropriate at the general, schematic level (133-34). Whether “potentiality” at the schematic level is only an extension of the very same notion encountered at the level of capacity-change may be disputed, but it is helpful to recognize the distinct usage of “capacity” and “potentiality.”
Makin seems not to want to defend any particular relation between Theta and the remaining books of Metaphysics. He does say that this book “has to be understood, at least to some degree, in the light of questions set by a project already under way when the book starts” (xix), but “a commentary on
There are, unfortunately, a relatively large number of typographical errors (more than two dozen). Most merely annoy, but some inconsistencies are difficult to interpret. Throughout the text we find formulations such as “what is potentially (
In any translation, there will be reasons to object, and, in any commentary, there will be large and small points to inspire disagreement. Two such issues that deserve more attention are the question of the possibility of true speech about future matters of choice and chance (83 ff. and 115-16) and the emphasis on substance in the sense of composite rather than form or essence (133, 158, 167-68, and 178). In any case, Professor Makin has produced a great deal of substantive material that deserves consideration, and readers who work through his book will be grateful for his rewarding effort to elucidate this difficult text.
1. Makin says no more than this about the alternative to weak modalities. At one point in the commentary, however, he discusses what he calls the Principle of Plenitude, according to which “if something is possible then it is sometime actual” (84). If, as Makin suggests, Aristotle accepts some form of this, Makin’s commentary should consider whether Aristotle at times speaks of strong modalities.
2. Page xxiv. Makin uses an arrow, not the word “entails.” The commentary, especially in chapter 3, assumes familiarity with various logical symbols (“iff” and the entailment arrow are most common). He usually provides very clear formulations in ordinary English that would help anyone unfamiliar with the symbolization.
3. Compare W. D. Ross, Aristotle’s Metaphysics: Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1924), 245.
4. Michael Frede, “Aristotle’s Notion of Potentiality in Metaphysics
5. Neither here nor elsewhere does he mention Heidegger, who claimed that in chapter 10 “the treatise reaches its proper end; indeed the whole of Aristotle’s philosophy attains its ‘highest point'” ( Aristotle’s Metaphysics Theta 1-3, Translated by W. Brogan and P. Warnek (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 8).
6. On xxxv, Makin says the term dunamis is “already overworked, referring both to a capacity and to a potentiality,” which seems to imply two distinct meanings.
7. There is just one (non-technical) reference to probability and atomic theory (108).