Bryn Mawr Classical Review 1998.4.01
Word count: words
1. Ackrill himself has been criticized on just this point. Thus E. Halper, in [quot ]Ackrill, Aristotle, and Analytic Philosophy,[quot ] Ancient Philosophy Vol. 2 No. 2 (1982), pp. 142-151, criticizes Aristotle the Philosopher for Ackrill's assumption that Aristotle is an ordinary language philosopher. "... Aristotle is not self-consciously engaged in linguistic or conceptual analysis... Rightly or wrongly, he thinks that he is making claims about the world" (148). But Ackrill nowhere claims that either he or Aristotle is interested in language for its own sake. Rather, he takes Aristotle to (correctly) believe that an investigation of how we normally talk about reality is a necessary prerequisite for resolving metaphysical issues which concern the world itself.
2. C. Kahn, [quot ]The Greek Verb 'To Be' and the Concept of Being,[quot ] Foundations of Language 2 (1966), pp. 245-65 and The Verb [quot ]Be[quot ] in Ancient Greek (Dordrecht, Neth., 1973); G. E. L. Owen, [quot ]Plato on Not-Being,[quot ] in Plato I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, ed. G. Vlastos (Garden City, NY, 1970, repr. South Bend, IN, 1978), pp. 223-67, repr. in G. E. L. Owen, Logic, Science, and Dialectic, ed. M. C. Nussbaum (Ithaca, NY, 1986), pp. 104-37.
3. M. L. Gill, Aristotle on Substance: The Paradox of Unity (Princeton, 1989), pp. 126-138; J. Whiting, [quot ]Living Bodies,[quot ] in M. C. Nussbaum and A. O. Rorty, edd., Essays on Aristotle's De Anima (Oxford, 1992), pp. 75-91.